From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: "Oleksij Rempel" <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>,
linux-can@vger.kernel.org, "Vincent Mailhol" <mailhol@kernel.org>,
"Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:46:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260610094654.A1FFE1F00893@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260610093422.39847-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [Medium] Logic flaw in statistics overflow handling breaks invariant and causes negative reduction percentages.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Data race on CAN message payloads, timestamps, and interface indices during concurrent frame reception.
- [High] Use-After-Free due to a timer teardown race during BCM RX op deletion.
- [High] Missing RCU memory barriers when modifying operation lists lead to potential uninitialized memory accesses.
--
commit 6493cba39cc176386238cda012e3d42c9808c07e
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics
This commit fixes a KCSAN-detected data race in bcm_rx_handler() when
multiple CPUs process CAN frames simultaneously. It converts the
statistics to atomic types and centralizes the overflow handling.
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index a4bef2c48a559..a8b914e862798 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -224,10 +224,13 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>
> list_for_each_entry_rcu(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
>
> - unsigned long reduction;
> + long reduction, frames_filtered, frames_abs;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does bcm_rx_setup() use list_add()
instead of list_add_rcu() when inserting into bo->rx_ops?
If so, could lockless readers like bcm_proc_show() observe uninitialized
memory due to missing store-release memory barriers?
Similarly, does bcm_proc_show() traverse bo->tx_ops locklessly while
bcm_tx_setup() inserts using list_add()?
[ ... ]
> @@ -285,6 +289,15 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
>
> +static void bcm_update_stats(struct bcm_op *op)
> +{
> + /* prevent statistics overflow */
> + if (atomic_long_inc_return(&op->frames_abs) > LONG_MAX / 100) {
> + atomic_long_set(&op->frames_filtered, 0);
> + atomic_long_set(&op->frames_abs, 0);
> + }
> +}
> +
[Severity: Medium]
When bcm_rx_handler() calls bcm_update_stats(), frames_abs is incremented
first. If it overflows, both frames_abs and frames_filtered are reset to 0.
If the packet passes the filter, bcm_rx_changed() is called next and
increments frames_filtered:
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_rx_changed() {
...
atomic_long_inc(&op->frames_filtered);
...
}
Could this order cause frames_filtered to become 1 while frames_abs is 0?
Since frames_abs increments by 1 per packet, would frames_filtered remain
strictly greater than frames_abs, causing the reduction calculation in
bcm_proc_show() to persistently yield a negative percentage?
[ ... ]
> @@ -723,7 +732,7 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
> /* save originator for recvfrom() */
> op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since the patch addresses data races in
concurrent frame reception, does this concurrent execution also race on
writing to op->rx_stamp and op->rx_ifindex here?
More significantly, could multiple CPUs concurrently execute memcpy() on
the shared op->last_frames array in bcm_rx_update_and_send():
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_rx_update_and_send() {
...
memcpy(lastdata, rxdata, op->cfsiz);
...
}
Could this non-atomic memory copy corrupt the CAN frame payload sent
to userspace?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does unregistering the handler in
bcm_delete_rx_op() properly synchronize with a concurrent bcm_rx_handler()?
If bcm_delete_rx_op() unregisters the handler and cancels timers:
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_delete_rx_op() {
...
can_rx_unregister(sock_net(op->sk), NULL, op->can_id, ...);
...
hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer);
}
Could a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() still be executing and call
hrtimer_start(&op->thrtimer) in bcm_rx_update_and_send() after the cancel?
Since op is freed after an RCU grace period, could this re-armed timer
fire later and cause a use-after-free?
> /* update statistics */
> - op->frames_abs++;
> + bcm_update_stats(op);
>
> if (op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) {
> /* send reply for RTR-request (placed in op->frames[0]) */
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260610093422.39847-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-10 9:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-10 9:34 [PATCH] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics Oliver Hartkopp
2026-06-10 9:46 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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