From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: "Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>,
"Vincent Mailhol" <mailhol@kernel.org>,
"Oleksij Rempel" <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>,
"Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release()
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 14:03:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260712140347.6CBA41F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260712-isotp-fixes-v9-1-137840d7f0f4@hartkopp.net>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [Medium] Unconditional `synchronize_rcu()` in `isotp_release()` can be triggered by unprivileged users via unbound sockets.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Concurrent isotp_sendmsg() callers can forcibly abort another thread's active transmission upon receiving a signal.
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v9 1/4] can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release() ---
commit d8a6dd60eabcde6d6f502a2471ec7e04cf918503
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release()
This patch makes isotp_release() always call synchronize_rcu() before
cancelling timers to close a race condition when a concurrent
NETDEV_UNREGISTER clears so->bound.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260707085210.6B6C01F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
> diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c
> index c48b4a818297e..d30937345bcdc 100644
> --- a/net/can/isotp.c
> +++ b/net/can/isotp.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1237,11 +1237,18 @@ static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock)
> SINGLE_MASK(so->txid),
> isotp_rcv_echo, sk);
> dev_put(dev);
> - synchronize_rcu();
> }
> }
> }
>
> + /* Always wait for a grace period before touching the timers below.
> + * A concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER may have already unregistered our
> + * filters and cleared so->bound in isotp_notify() without waiting
> + * for in-flight isotp_rcv() callers to finish, so this call must not
> + * be skipped just because so->bound is already 0 here.
> + */
> + synchronize_rcu();
> +
[Severity: Medium]
Could this unconditional synchronize_rcu() be triggered rapidly by
unprivileged users?
If an unprivileged user creates an unbound CAN_ISOTP socket and closes it
immediately, it appears it will now hit this synchronize_rcu() in
isotp_release() because so->bound is no longer checked.
Might a rapid loop of socket creation and destruction allow local
unprivileged users to degrade system performance by constantly blocking for
RCU grace periods?
This is a pre-existing issue, but I noticed a potential race condition in
isotp_sendmsg() when handling signals.
[Severity: High]
Can a thread interrupted by a signal forcibly abort another thread's active
transmission?
If multiple threads call isotp_sendmsg() on the same socket, the function
uses cmpxchg() to gain exclusivity over the TX state machine. If a thread
fails the cmpxchg and waits in wait_event_interruptible(), but is then
interrupted by a signal, it jumps to err_event_drop:
net/can/isotp.c:isotp_sendmsg() {
...
err_event_drop:
/* got signal: force tx state machine to be idle */
so->tx.state = ISOTP_IDLE;
hrtimer_cancel(&so->txfrtimer);
hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer);
...
}
Does this forcible state reset to ISOTP_IDLE and timer cancellation happen
even though the interrupted thread does not own the state machine? This
appears to abort the active transmission and could allow a third thread to
pass the cmpxchg, leading to concurrent execution of isotp_sendmsg() on the
same so->tx variables.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260712-isotp-fixes-v9-0-137840d7f0f4@hartkopp.net?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-12 14:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-12 13:44 [PATCH v9 0/4] net: can: isotp-fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 1/4] can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release() Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 14:03 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-12 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 2/4] can: isotp: fix use-after-free race with concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 3/4] can: isotp: fix race between RX/TX timers and frame reception Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 13:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-12 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 4/4] can: isotp: fix state machine corruption on signal interruption Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
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