Linux CAN drivers development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: "Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>,
	"Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
	"Vincent Mailhol" <mailhol@kernel.org>,
	"Oleksij Rempel" <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>,
	linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release()
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 18:15:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260712181550.4BAB21F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260712-isotp-fixes-v10-1-793a1b1ce17f@hartkopp.net>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] CAN filter leak in isotp_release() during concurrent netdevice unregistration leading to Use-After-Free.
- [High] Missing synchronization and state cleanup in isotp_sendmsg error path causes data corruption when racing with CAN echo frames.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v10 1/3] can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release() ---
commit fa3db7e87e5eabd37c1bb7bc38aae86169f62182
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>

can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release()

This commit adds an unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release()
before cancelling timers. It addresses a race condition where a
concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER could cause a use-after-free in the timer
callback on the freed socket.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260707085210.6B6C01F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/

> diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c
> index c48b4a818297e..d30937345bcdc 100644
> --- a/net/can/isotp.c
> +++ b/net/can/isotp.c
> @@ -1237,11 +1237,18 @@ static int isotp_release(struct socket *sock)
>  						  SINGLE_MASK(so->txid),
>  						  isotp_rcv_echo, sk);
>  				dev_put(dev);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is there a potential CAN filter leak here
that could lead to a use-after-free?

If a user closes the ISOTP socket exactly when the bound netdevice is being
unregistered, unlist_netdevice(dev) is called before the NETDEV_UNREGISTER
notifiers.

If isotp_release() runs in this window, it removes the socket from
isotp_notifier_list and calls dev_get_by_index(). Since the device is
unlisted, dev_get_by_index() returns NULL, causing isotp_release() to skip
can_rx_unregister().

Because the filter is left active, any matching CAN frames subsequently
processed by the unregistering device might trigger isotp_rcv() with the
freed socket pointer. Does the newly added synchronize_rcu() below prevent
this if the filter is never actually unregistered?

> -				synchronize_rcu();
>  			}
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> +	/* Always wait for a grace period before touching the timers below.
> +	 * A concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER may have already unregistered our
> +	 * filters and cleared so->bound in isotp_notify() without waiting
> +	 * for in-flight isotp_rcv() callers to finish, so this call must not
> +	 * be skipped just because so->bound is already 0 here.
> +	 */
> +	synchronize_rcu();
> +
>  	hrtimer_cancel(&so->txfrtimer);
>  	hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer);
>  	hrtimer_cancel(&so->rxtimer);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the error path in isotp_sendmsg()
properly clean up the echo state when interrupted by a signal?

If a user initiates a blocking transfer with wait_tx_done enabled, and it
is interrupted by a signal, the err_event_drop path forcefully sets
so->tx.state = ISOTP_IDLE without clearing so->cfecho or waiting for the
in-flight CAN hardware echo:

net/can/isotp.c:isotp_sendmsg() {
[ ... ]
err_event_drop:
        /* got signal: force tx state machine to be idle */
        so->tx.state = ISOTP_IDLE;
        hrtimer_cancel(&so->txfrtimer);
        hrtimer_cancel(&so->txtimer);
[ ... ]
}

When the background echo frame arrives, isotp_rcv_echo() matches the stale
so->cfecho and unconditionally continues transmission by reading from
so->tx.buf and incrementing so->tx.idx:

net/can/isotp.c:isotp_rcv_echo() {
[ ... ]
        if (skb->sk != sk || so->cfecho != *(u32 *)cf->data)
                return;
[ ... ]
        if (!so->tx_gap) {
                /* enable echo timeout handling */
                hrtimer_start(&so->txtimer, ktime_set(ISOTP_ECHO_TIMEOUT, 0),
                              HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
                isotp_send_cframe(so);
                return;
        }
[ ... ]
}

Concurrently, the user can call sendmsg() again since the state is IDLE,
overwriting the buffer and lengths without locks. Could this time-of-check
to time-of-use race cause the background softirq to read corrupted indices
and result in out-of-bounds memory accesses?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260712-isotp-fixes-v10-0-793a1b1ce17f@hartkopp.net?part=1

  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-12 18:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-12 17:59 [PATCH v10 0/3] net: can: isotp-fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 17:59 ` [PATCH v10 1/3] can: isotp: use unconditional synchronize_rcu() in isotp_release() Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 18:15   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-12 17:59 ` [PATCH v10 2/3] can: isotp: fix use-after-free race with concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 17:59 ` [PATCH v10 3/3] can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-12 18:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-12 20:10     ` Oliver Hartkopp

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260712181550.4BAB21F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-can@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mailhol@kernel.org \
    --cc=mkl@pengutronix.de \
    --cc=o.rempel@pengutronix.de \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=socketcan@hartkopp.net \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox