From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Cc: "Vincent Mailhol" <mailhol@kernel.org>,
"Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
"Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>,
"Oleksij Rempel" <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>,
linux-can@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH can-next 10/13] can: gs_usb: gs_update_state(): set CAN_ERR_CNT if device sends CAN error counters
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:11:42 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260720141143.119A91F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260720-gs_usb-new-features-v1-10-427a8013c380@pengutronix.de>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [High] The driver unconditionally reads uninitialized memory from the URB transfer buffer when processing malformed CAN error frames with a small DLC.
- [Medium] Valid CAN error flags (like RX/TX overflow) are silently dropped from userspace if the CAN state does not change.
- [Medium] The CAN_ERR_RESTARTED flag is unconditionally cleared from the CAN ID and then immediately checked, causing explicit restart signals from the firmware to be ignored.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] If `alloc_can_skb()` or `alloc_canfd_skb()` fails, the driver aborts URB processing without resubmitting the URB, potentially permanently starving the RX path.
--
--- Patch [10]: [PATCH can-next 10/13] can: gs_usb: gs_update_state(): set CAN_ERR_CNT if device sends CAN error counters ---
commit f1e0f1d0c2f80b9c65dc60e4897538baed5336ee
Author: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
can: gs_usb: gs_update_state(): set CAN_ERR_CNT if device sends CAN error counters
Some gs_usb compatible firmware send the CAN error counters in CAN error
frames, but doesn't set CAN_ERR_CNT in can_id. Fixup the CAN error frame by
setting CAN_ERR_CNT, if RX or TX error counters are greater than 0.
> diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
> index ec9a7cbbbc696..186abc95c9774 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -495,29 +529,35 @@ static void gs_usb_timestamp_stop(struct gs_usb *parent)
> -static void gs_update_state(struct gs_can *dev, struct can_frame *cf)
> +static void gs_update_state(struct gs_can *dev, struct can_frame *cf,
> + enum can_state tx_state, enum can_state rx_state)
> {
> struct can_device_stats *can_stats = &dev->can.can_stats;
>
> - if (cf->can_id & CAN_ERR_RESTARTED) {
> - dev->can.state = CAN_STATE_ERROR_ACTIVE;
> + /* clear CAN state information, will be set consistently by can_change_state() below */
> + cf->can_id &= ~(CAN_ERR_CRTL | CAN_ERR_BUSOFF | CAN_ERR_RESTARTED);
> + cf->data[1] &= ~(CAN_ERR_CRTL_RX_WARNING | CAN_ERR_CRTL_TX_WARNING |
> + CAN_ERR_CRTL_RX_PASSIVE | CAN_ERR_CRTL_TX_PASSIVE |
> + CAN_ERR_CRTL_ACTIVE);
> +
> + /* some firmware sends CAN error counters but doesn't set CAN_ERR_CNT, fixup */
> + if (cf->data[6] || cf->data[7])
> + cf->can_id |= CAN_ERR_CNT;
> +
> + const enum can_state new_state = max(rx_state, tx_state);
> +
> + if (new_state == dev->can.state)
> + return;
[Severity: Medium]
If the CAN state does not change, we return early from gs_update_state()
here, but we've already stripped the CAN_ERR_CRTL flag from cf->can_id.
Does this silently drop valid CAN error flags, such as RX overflow,
preventing them from reaching userspace?
> +
> + /* some firmware does automatically CAN bus off recovery, account for this */
> + if (cf->can_id & CAN_ERR_RESTARTED ||
[Severity: Medium]
Since we unconditionally cleared the CAN_ERR_RESTARTED bit from cf->can_id at
the start of gs_update_state(), won't this check always evaluate to false?
Does this cause explicit restart signals sent by the firmware to be ignored?
> + (dev->can.state == CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF && new_state < CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF)) {
> can_stats->restarts++;
> - } else if (cf->can_id & CAN_ERR_BUSOFF) {
> - dev->can.state = CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF;
> - can_stats->bus_off++;
[ ... ]
> @@ -606,6 +646,90 @@ gs_usb_get_minimum_rx_length(const struct gs_can *dev, const struct gs_host_fram
> +static void
> +gs_usb_state_get_by_hf(const struct gs_can *dev, const struct gs_host_frame *hf,
> + enum can_state *tx_state_p, enum can_state *rx_state_p)
> +{
> + enum can_state tx_state, rx_state;
> +
> + /* extract CAN state from frame */
> + if (hf->can_id & cpu_to_le32(CAN_ERR_CRTL | CAN_ERR_BUSOFF)) {
> + const u8 err_crtl = hf->classic_can->data[1];
> +
> + if (hf->can_id & cpu_to_le32(CAN_ERR_BUSOFF)) {
> + tx_state = CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF;
> + rx_state = CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF;
> + } else {
> + if (err_crtl & CAN_ERR_CRTL_RX_PASSIVE)
> + rx_state = CAN_STATE_ERROR_PASSIVE;
[ ... ]
> + }
> +
> + const u8 tx_err = hf->classic_can->data[6];
> + const u8 rx_err = hf->classic_can->data[7];
[Severity: High]
Does this code in gs_usb_state_get_by_hf() unconditionally read uninitialized
memory from the kmalloc'ed URB transfer buffer if a malformed CAN error frame
with a small DLC is received?
Since the URB length check only ensures the header is present, accessing fixed
offsets like data[6] and data[7] could read past the actual payload, leaking
uninitialized heap memory to the kernel log and causing erratic state
transitions.
> +
> + netdev_dbg(dev->netdev, "host_frame: TX-state='%s/%u' RX-state='%s/%u' %s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
> + can_get_state_str(tx_state), tx_err,
> + can_get_state_str(rx_state), rx_err,
[ ... ]
> @@ -671,7 +791,11 @@ static void gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
> if (hf->echo_id == GS_HOST_FRAME_ECHO_ID_RX) { /* normal rx */
> + struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> if (hf->flags & GS_CAN_FLAG_FD) {
> + struct canfd_frame *cfd;
> +
> skb = alloc_canfd_skb(netdev, &cfd);
> if (!skb)
> return;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(), but if this
allocation fails and we return directly, the URB is never resubmitted.
Could this permanently starve the RX path and kill CAN reception under
systemic memory pressure?
> @@ -685,6 +809,13 @@ static void gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
>
> memcpy(cfd->data, hf->canfd->data, data_length);
> } else {
> + enum can_state tx_state, rx_state;
> + struct can_frame *cf;
> +
> + if (hf->can_id & cpu_to_le32(CAN_ERR_FLAG) &&
> + !gs_usb_should_handle_can_error(dev, hf, &tx_state, &rx_state))
> + goto resubmit_urb;
> +
> skb = alloc_can_skb(netdev, &cf);
> if (!skb)
> return;
[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback().
Returning directly here without jumping to the resubmit_urb label means the
URB is permanently dropped from the active queue.
Could this lead to the same RX starvation issue mentioned above?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260720-gs_usb-new-features-v1-0-427a8013c380@pengutronix.de?part=10
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-20 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-20 13:48 [PATCH can-next 00/13] can: gs_usb: implement new features recently added to candleLight firmware Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 01/13] can: gs_usb: remove unused define GS_CAN_MODE_NORMAL Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 02/13] can: gs_usb: replace all GS_CAN_MODE_* by GS_CAN_FEATURE_* Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 03/13] can: gs_usb: update USB protocol definitions contributed by Elmue firmware Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 04/13] can: gs_usb: document GS_CAN_FEATURE_FILTER Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 05/13] can: gs_usb: gs_make_candev(): reduce scope of variable bt_const_extended Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 06/13] can: gs_usb: gs_make_candev(): sort evaluation of device features Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 07/13] can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): reduce scope of several variables Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 14:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-20 15:07 ` Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 08/13] can: gs_usb: gs_update_state(): convert CAN state handling to can_change_state() Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 14:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 09/13] can: gs_usb: gs_usb_state_get_by_hf(): optionally print recived CAN error frames Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 14:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 10/13] can: gs_usb: gs_update_state(): set CAN_ERR_CNT if device sends CAN error counters Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 14:11 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 11/13] can: gs_usb: implement CAN_CTRLMODE_BERR_REPORTING for devices without native support Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 14:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 12/13] can: gs_usb: implement Transceiver Delay Compensation Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 13:48 ` [PATCH can-next 13/13] can: gs_usb: implement CAN bus off recovery Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-20 14:28 ` sashiko-bot
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