From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Cunhao Lu" <1579567540@qq.com>
Cc: "Oleksij Rempel" <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>,
"Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
linux-can@vger.kernel.org,
"Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>,
"Vincent Mailhol" <mailhol@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): use dev_kfree_skb_any()
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 08:37:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260731083721.5AC1C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <tencent_3315CDBC0C4402D18844C03C62B01F7ED306@qq.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The patch fails to make can_put_echo_skb() completely safe for hardware interrupt context because it overlooks the inline helper can_create_echo_skb().
- [High] The out-of-bounds error path in can_put_echo_skb() leaks the SKB.
- [High] Unsafe kfree_skb() usage remains in CAN SKB allocation helpers which are explicitly called from hardware interrupt handlers.
- [High] can_dev_dropped_skb() and can_dropped_invalid_skb() use kfree_skb() instead of dev_kfree_skb_any(), risking execution in IRQ-disabled contexts.
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v2 1/2] can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): use dev_kfree_skb_any() ---
commit af16d148470d669cda96f722b1dffb79b817c3f9
Author: Cunhao Lu <1579567540@qq.com>
can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): use dev_kfree_skb_any()
can_put_echo_skb() is a public helper used by CAN drivers, so its callers
do not have a guaranteed IRQ context. kfree_skb() cannot be called from
hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts disabled.
Use dev_kfree_skb_any() for the existing skb drop paths so that they are
safe regardless of the caller's IRQ context.
> diff --git a/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c b/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
> index 95fcdc1026f80..d7b5a5d17ff22 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does the out-of-bounds error
path in can_put_echo_skb() leak the SKB?
If the bounds check fails, the function logs a BUG and returns without
freeing the skb:
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c:can_put_echo_skb() {
if (idx >= priv->echo_skb_max) {
netdev_err(dev, "%s: BUG! ...\n", __func__, idx, priv->echo_skb_max);
return -EINVAL;
}
...
}
Many CAN driver callers assume can_put_echo_skb() takes ownership of the skb
and frees it on error. Does this lead to a memory leak when the bounds check
fails?
> @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int can_put_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
> (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_CAN) &&
> skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_CANFD) &&
> skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_CANXL))) {
> - kfree_skb(skb);
> + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
> return 0;
> }
>
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this patch fail to make
can_put_echo_skb() completely safe for hardware interrupt context?
While dev_kfree_skb_any() is now used in the direct drop paths, the main
execution path calls the inline helper can_create_echo_skb():
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c:can_put_echo_skb() {
...
if (!priv->echo_skb[idx]) {
skb = can_create_echo_skb(skb);
...
}
can_create_echo_skb() continues to invoke kfree_skb() on allocation failure
and consume_skb() on success:
include/linux/can/skb.h:can_create_echo_skb() {
...
kfree_skb(skb);
...
consume_skb(skb);
...
}
Since both are unsafe to call from hardirq context or with interrupts
disabled, does this defeat the purpose of the patch?
> @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int can_put_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
> } else {
> /* locking problem with netif_stop_queue() ?? */
> netdev_err(dev, "%s: BUG! echo_skb %d is occupied!\n", __func__, idx);
> - kfree_skb(skb);
> + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
> return -EBUSY;
> }
>
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but do can_dev_dropped_skb() and
can_dropped_invalid_skb() still risk execution in IRQ-disabled contexts?
These functions are called in the exact same ndo_start_xmit paths, right
before can_put_echo_skb(), and they still invoke kfree_skb() on their drop
paths:
include/linux/can/dev.h:can_dev_dropped_skb() {
...
invalid_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
return true;
}
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c:can_dropped_invalid_skb() {
...
inval_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
return true;
}
This leaves the system vulnerable to the same crashes this patch attempts to
resolve.
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but do unsafe kfree_skb() calls
remain in CAN SKB allocation helpers that run in hardware interrupt handlers?
CAN drivers use alloc_can_skb(), alloc_canfd_skb(), and alloc_canxl_skb() in
their RX paths, which often run in hardirq context. If memory allocation for
the CAN SKB extension fails in can_skb_ext_add(), these helpers drop the
allocated SKB using kfree_skb():
drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c:alloc_can_skb() {
...
if (!csx) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out_error_cc;
}
...
}
Calling kfree_skb() in hardirq context is strictly forbidden and can trigger
warnings or panics. Should these also be updated to use dev_kfree_skb_any()?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260731-master-v2-0-204d772f2e36@qq.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-31 8:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20260731-master-v2-0-204d772f2e36@qq.com>
2026-07-31 8:23 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): use dev_kfree_skb_any() Cunhao Lu
2026-07-31 8:37 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-31 8:23 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] can: dev: can_put_echo_skb(): free skb on invalid echo index Cunhao Lu
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