From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795080751; b=4W1urIbOkaYOWc8txAn0uzwBFjKeGQv/J5vEu3hF8amxyabw28XCwM7wV/SE9tOVSOty Q52xjMnzs/dCjNiEmtfH+QCUkgOHzjDfmJ99KMNcKE9D4MSQfsbz2Rv2N+h17hiqQQgwY 24B+HBVs2VIMesnPglnV3q4N+6oQT8Fof05G1IwhGb3n27p7w/+YTgzn93PxSe++ofc9s SbZ6NM/JBsimyrUwkGe8ujq6USBTDoTDgf30tBl5DF4ric+YL7+gwNvrUd58hW9a79h3O Y05W/Bu7w87edz6/N4Swi7LSF7lqiW+f6lYTEOlpkQS1etfVstFTLY6Qo6aCxZ709pQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795080751; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=VLBjx/M4f/CXYHrDMbrhUZMeJtsaGrzScOG8FVHjYeg=; b=OUTpJLqnAdEQtB2gh8eQeljEA9wF+AnrL3KDOejBdAQSOPQaJ2/V5wFF0nns/tj0I0rV Ufc7kyM/lGh3nwfFftjLqYbnkyTUJcxu0H5lmrltVw3vNo36qwuQyjpeYvE+a80dTlpEn EznAHkUvwQuh6lUmoOWdYT/3RJD+HdmJvfNgcRUTGauCwFcTmSk2bRNA23F0a8TQV5klc g5oHlmorKao8c3ZAZ1J7s7qd9tQwoDRxqqHAOUJ351LP1qsjf2CBzdZvuk60pdaAhPQOw 1unn78NTpy37AycvadcfV6FCGso2MSrEy7+SSQrJLYwyMN9jfMtv+EmAJsFfQqo+5Jg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=MI01AjAl; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A7514606A330 for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:32:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=MI01AjAl Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3AAAF1F000C5; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:32:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795080751; bh=VLBjx/M4f/CXYHrDMbrhUZMeJtsaGrzScOG8FVHjYeg=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=MI01AjAlElZc8yJsLQ2yZhBsNqn+GpbzzfC+3b+4K0EiZ2y+88p8HdYDaTV48gzJj oNsLah3zEh9uAVeR0UcHFrIBScgtf5bj8oZY/KPKVJaWdtLwv1gSnll7FD4Y4IHAam VqbQKuhuAwrP97920Xg+E4PurADyblLr0R/efMqd7tfFkFw7lsn3/9x67hbzFaPVPP wSivwgOEv/RUVEUFEcGXROO/ELxTMy4rItPdBREUS2UEYgijJXaDEiDagmA+YUhXpL u1rmmHiiBaXUsUz1bkN79pg30RfWUG8vjuFQyqcAqn+C0TjLj2awbKUkTrVQDCmQ1N iK6JxT65y9Rzg== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 12/12] can: xilinx_can: set CAN FD flags on received frames Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Marc Kleine-Budde" Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org, "Oliver Hartkopp" , "Vincent Mailhol" , "Oleksij Rempel" In-Reply-To: <20261118092955.1283165-13-mkl@pengutronix.de> References: <20261118092955.1283165-1-mkl@pengutronix.de> <20261118092955.1283165-13-mkl@pengutronix.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:32:30 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linux-can@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not introduce: - [Critical] can: xilinx_can: uninitialized data leak in xcanfd_rx() [1] -- commit d0681f7cdc97d2a1c4872665c855ad2b34da35d9 Author: Maximilian Zimmermann can: xilinx_can: set CAN FD flags on received frames This commit adds the ESI register mask and sets the CANFD_BRS and CANFD_ESI flags in struct canfd_frame when receiving CAN FD frames. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921-fix-xilinx-canfd-flags-v1-1-a371c90= b4e7c@spacecubics.com > diff --git a/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c b/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c > index 43d7f22820b88..52661e0882054 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c > +++ b/drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c [ ... ] > @@ -959,6 +960,11 @@ static int xcanfd_rx(struct net_device *ndev, int fr= ame_base) > =20 > /* Check the frame received is FD or not*/ > if (dlc & XCAN_DLCR_EDL_MASK) { > + if (dlc & XCAN_DLCR_BRS_MASK) > + cf->flags |=3D CANFD_BRS; > + if (dlc & XCAN_DLCR_ESI_MASK) > + cf->flags |=3D CANFD_ESI; > + > for (i =3D 0; i < cf->len; i +=3D 4) { > dw_offset =3D XCANFD_FRAME_DW_OFFSET(frame_base) + > (dwindex * XCANFD_DW_BYTES); [Severity: Critical] This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but can the payload copy loops in xcanfd_rx() and xcan_rx() leak residual hardware register bytes to userspace [1]? alloc_can_skb() and alloc_canfd_skb() zero-initialize cf->data, but both receive paths write full 32-bit words into cf->data: drivers/net/can/xilinx_can.c:xcanfd_rx() { ... for (i =3D 0; i < cf->len; i +=3D 4) { dw_offset =3D XCANFD_FRAME_DW_OFFSET(frame_base) + (dwindex * XCANFD_DW_BYTES); data[0] =3D priv->read_reg(priv, dw_offset); *(__be32 *)(cf->data + i) =3D cpu_to_be32(data[0]); dwindex++; } ... } When cf->len is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the final 32-bit store overwrites the zeroed trailing padding with leftover bytes from the hardware register, which are then copied to userspace on raw CAN socket reads. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-32f289b3-a2b0-4d94-a883-7cfaa1d3ff70 --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118092955.1283= 165-1-mkl@pengutronix.de?part=3D12