Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()

Yuanfu Xie
2026-04-08T09:39:29Z

[PATCH] smb: client: add bounds checks when iterating SMB1 WSL EAs

Add boundary and overflow checks when traversing extended attribute (EA)
entries for SMB1 WSL reparse points in cifs_query_path_info(), to prevent
out-of-bounds memory accesses from malformed next_entry_offset values.

This is necessary because SMB1 WSL EA iteration does not currently have
any explicit bounds checking, unlike SMB2 path which has check_wsl_eas().
The new checks ensure the current EA pointer plus its size does not
exceed the end of the EA buffer during iteration and before parsing.

Signed-off-by: YuanfuXie <yuanfuxie@stu.pku.edu.cn>
---
fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c
index 9694117050a6..940bae49b2cc 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c
@@ -645,13 +645,17 @@ static int cifs_query_path_info(const unsigned int xid,
if (!rc && data->reparse_point) {
struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *ea;
u32 next = 0;
+ u8 *eas_end = data->wsl.eas + data->wsl.eas_len;

ea = (struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *)data->wsl.eas;
do {
ea = (void *)((u8 *)ea + next);
+ if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) > eas_end)
+ break;
next = le32_to_cpu(ea->next_entry_offset);
} while (next);
- if (le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
+ if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) <= eas_end &&
+ le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
ea->next_entry_offset = cpu_to_le32(ALIGN(sizeof(*ea) +
ea->ea_name_length + 1 +
le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length), 4));
@@ -691,13 +695,17 @@ static int cifs_query_path_info(const unsigned int xid,
if (!rc && data->reparse_point) {
struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *ea;
u32 next = 0;
+ u8 *eas_end = data->wsl.eas + data->wsl.eas_len;

ea = (struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *)data->wsl.eas;
do {
ea = (void *)((u8 *)ea + next);
+ if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) > eas_end)
+ break;
next = le32_to_cpu(ea->next_entry_offset);
} while (next);
- if (le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
+ if ((u8 *)ea + sizeof(*ea) <= eas_end &&
+ le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length)) {
ea->next_entry_offset = cpu_to_le32(ALIGN(sizeof(*ea) +
ea->ea_name_length + 1 +
le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length), 4));
--
2.43.0

> On Apr 6, 2026, at 21:49, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
> name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
> smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp()
> later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
> ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1
> + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun?
>
> The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
> 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
> bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
> the end of iov.
>
> Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds
> check.
>
> An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
> into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
> interpreted as.
>
> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
> Cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
> Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>
> Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
> Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
> Cc: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
> Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
> Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> ---
> fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
> index 364bdcff9c9d..fe1c9d776580 100644
> --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
> +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov)
> nlen = ea->ea_name_length;
> vlen = le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length);
> if (nlen != SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN ||
> - (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
> + (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> switch (vlen) {
> --
> 2.53.0
>
>
>
>