From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev,
Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>,
Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>,
Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>, Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>,
linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, samba-technical@lists.samba.org,
stable <stable@kernel.org>,
"Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat)" <pc@manguebit.org>,
Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6.18 137/198] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 17:41:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260420153940.539666924@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260420153935.605963767@linuxfoundation.org>
6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3d8b9d06bd3ac4c6846f5498800b0f5f8062e53b upstream.
The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp()
later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen. Isn't pointer math fun?
The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.
Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.
An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.
Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rs
nlen = ea->ea_name_length;
vlen = le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length);
if (nlen != SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN ||
- (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
+ (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen > end)
return -EINVAL;
switch (vlen) {
next parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-20 16:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20260420153935.605963767@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-20 15:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-04-20 15:41 ` [PATCH 6.18 138/198] smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-20 15:41 ` [PATCH 6.18 139/198] ksmbd: validate EaNameLength in smb2_get_ea() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-20 15:41 ` [PATCH 6.18 140/198] ksmbd: require 3 sub-authorities before reading sub_auth[2] Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-20 15:42 ` [PATCH 6.18 141/198] ksmbd: fix mechToken leak when SPNEGO decode fails after token alloc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-20 15:42 ` [PATCH 6.18 142/198] smb: client: avoid double-free in smbd_free_send_io() after smbd_send_batch_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-20 15:42 ` [PATCH 6.18 143/198] smb: server: avoid double-free in smb_direct_free_sendmsg after smb_direct_flush_send_list() Greg Kroah-Hartman
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