From: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
To: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pc@manguebit.org, linkinjeon@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 11/11] smb: client: fix NameOffset and Next field validation in smb2_parse_contexts()
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 10:31:47 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260826153147.4112943-12-sorenson@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260826153147.4112943-1-sorenson@redhat.com>
Three related bounds issues in smb2_parse_contexts():
NameOffset: the existing 'noff + nlen > doff' check doesn't prevent
the name from starting inside the context header or extending past rem.
Replace it with noff >= sizeof(*cc) and noff + nlen <= rem, keeping
the name-before-data guard only when DataLength is non-zero.
Next: a non-zero Next smaller than sizeof(*cc) passes the existing
upper-bound check but creates an overlapping context pointer. Add
off < sizeof(*cc) to reject it.
Dispatch: when DataLength is zero, calling a handler that reads the
data area (parse_lease_buf, parse_query_id_ctxt, parse_posix_ctxt)
reads stale memory past the declared context. A rogue server can
craft a zero-DataLength context whose name matches a known tag (e.g.
'RqLs') and bypass the name-vs-data-offset guard, causing
parse_lease_buf to record a lease key and state from uninitialized
kmalloc content. Gate all three dispatch paths on dlen > 0.
Fixes: af1689a9b770 ("smb: client: fix potential OOBs in smb2_parse_contexts()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
---
fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c
index dea05aeb53a1..dda7a1a88b44 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c
@@ -2459,22 +2459,23 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
noff = le16_to_cpu(cc->NameOffset);
nlen = le16_to_cpu(cc->NameLength);
- if (noff + nlen > doff)
+ if (noff < sizeof(*cc) || noff + nlen > rem ||
+ (dlen && noff + nlen > doff))
return -EINVAL;
name = (char *)cc + noff;
switch (nlen) {
case 4:
- if (!strncmp(name, SMB2_CREATE_REQUEST_LEASE, 4)) {
+ if (dlen && !strncmp(name, SMB2_CREATE_REQUEST_LEASE, 4)) {
*oplock = server->ops->parse_lease_buf(cc, epoch,
lease_key);
- } else if (buf &&
+ } else if (dlen && buf &&
!strncmp(name, SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_ON_DISK_ID, 4)) {
parse_query_id_ctxt(cc, buf);
}
break;
case 16:
- if (posix && !memcmp(name, smb3_create_tag_posix, 16))
+ if (dlen && posix && !memcmp(name, smb3_create_tag_posix, 16))
parse_posix_ctxt(cc, buf, posix);
break;
default:
@@ -2488,7 +2489,7 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
off = le32_to_cpu(cc->Next);
if (!off)
break;
- if (check_sub_overflow(rem, off, &rem))
+ if (off < sizeof(*cc) || check_sub_overflow(rem, off, &rem))
return -EINVAL;
cc = (struct create_context *)((u8 *)cc + off);
}
--
2.55.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-26 15:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-26 15:31 [PATCH v3 00/11] smb: client: fix OOB reads and UAFs in SMB2/3 receive paths Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] smb: client: fix NextCommand bounds and aliasing UAF in receive_encrypted_standard() Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] smb: client: validate PDU length before smb2_get_data_area_len() struct access Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] smb: client: fix server->total_read not tracking sub-PDU size in receive_encrypted_standard() Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] smb: client: fix missing lower-bound check on DFS referral string offsets Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] smb: client: fix missing lower-bound on Next field in parse_server_interfaces() Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs() Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] smb: client: fix missing iov bounds check in parse_posix_sids() Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] smb: client: fix underflow in is_valid_oplock_break() notify offset check Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots() Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] smb: client: fix incomplete bounds check on reparse buffer in cifs_query_reparse_point() Frank Sorenson
2026-08-26 15:31 ` Frank Sorenson [this message]
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