From: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
To: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, pc@manguebit.org
Cc: linkinjeon@kernel.org, ronniesahlberg@gmail.com,
sprasad@microsoft.com, tom@talpey.com, bharathsm@microsoft.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 01/10] smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2026 16:44:59 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260913214510.3071370-2-sorenson@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260913214510.3071370-1-sorenson@redhat.com>
Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in
receive_encrypted_standard()'s handling of compound encrypted frames:
- Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server->bigbuf. A stale
next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent
error paths.
- Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using
the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale
ciphertext residue.
- Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server).
- Fix an integer overflow in the upper bound check by verifying
pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), ensuring the
trailing slice is large enough for a header.
Fixes: b24df3e30cbf ("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
---
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
index cb4fd09f996e..fcf7033889c7 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
@@ -5365,6 +5365,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
length = decrypt_raw_data(server, buf, buf_size, NULL, false);
if (length)
return length;
+ pdu_length = buf_size;
next_is_large = server->large_buf;
one_more:
@@ -5377,8 +5378,15 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
}
if (next_cmd) {
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next_cmd > pdu_length))
+ if (next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) ||
+ next_cmd > pdu_length ||
+ pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server)) {
+ unsigned int max_next = pdu_length > (unsigned int)MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) ?
+ pdu_length - (unsigned int)MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) : 0;
+ cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "invalid NextCommand offset %u out of range [%zu, %u]\n",
+ next_cmd, MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), max_next);
return -1;
+ }
if (next_is_large)
next_buffer = (char *)cifs_buf_get();
else
@@ -5414,6 +5422,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
server->bigbuf = buf = next_buffer;
else
server->smallbuf = buf = next_buffer;
+ next_buffer = NULL;
goto one_more;
} else if (ret != 0) {
/*
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-13 21:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-13 21:44 [PATCH v4 00/10] smb: client: fix OOB reads and UAFs in SMB2/3 receive paths Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:44 ` Frank Sorenson [this message]
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] smb: client: validate minimum PDU size before smb2_get_data_area_len() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] smb: client: fix missing lower-bound check on DFS referral string offsets Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] smb: client: reject short Next offsets in parse_server_interfaces() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] smb: client: fix missing iov bounds check in parse_posix_sids() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] smb: client: fix underflow in is_valid_oplock_break() notify offset check Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] smb: client: fix reparse buffer bounds in cifs_query_reparse_point() Frank Sorenson
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