From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk (cavan.codon.org.uk [176.126.240.207]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9572D2F24 for ; Wed, 2 Feb 2022 04:15:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: by cavan.codon.org.uk (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 394B740A4A; Wed, 2 Feb 2022 04:01:57 +0000 (GMT) Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 04:01:57 +0000 From: Matthew Garrett To: James Bottomley Cc: Greg KH , Dov Murik , linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Gerd Hoffmann , Lenny Szubowicz , Peter Gonda , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nayna Jain , dougmill@linux.vnet.ibm.com, gcwilson@linux.ibm.com, gjoyce@ibm.com, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, dja@axtens.net Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Message-ID: <20220202040157.GA8019@srcf.ucam.org> References: <20220201124413.1093099-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> <37779659ca96ac9c1f11bcc0ac0665895c795b54.camel@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <37779659ca96ac9c1f11bcc0ac0665895c795b54.camel@linux.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 09:24:50AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2022-02-01 at 14:50 +0100, Greg KH wrote: > > You all need to work together to come up with a unified place for > > this and stop making it platform-specific. We're talking about things that have massively different semantics. How do we expose that without an unwieldy API that has to try to be a superset of everything implemented, which then has to be extended when yet another implementation shows up with another behavioural quirk? EFI variables already need extremely careful handling to avoid rm -rf /sys bricking the system - should we impose that on everything, or should we allow the underlying implementation to leak through in some ways?