From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.129.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B7D55A12 for ; Tue, 1 Mar 2022 12:24:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1646137481; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=px8h7rOi4DLdnxTseE4yd2HQ+w2dXi8TPIQasAQ9aI0=; b=dYLd+zJIKZOaIdU6A5dcX9wWbMrdvDhHTrDb4hVKYlvIK9mO3nUFQDLiidGDtkbAXOAEO7 w6V/pnTsUm2xwdGdfwMa/5gP+wXbvkFf9DQEYg5R41H9ljWjqML6vwwAXOWqA6QXfWb4BI 8co7NChr92x6nIVSqdQIt+9YFOSljnM= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-665-YRBarv4rOMm5-u5ymqgweQ-1; Tue, 01 Mar 2022 07:24:37 -0500 X-MC-Unique: YRBarv4rOMm5-u5ymqgweQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 851865200; Tue, 1 Mar 2022 12:24:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from sirius.home.kraxel.org (unknown [10.39.195.81]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8EC8C84945; Tue, 1 Mar 2022 12:24:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: by sirius.home.kraxel.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id B993D180039D; Tue, 1 Mar 2022 13:24:31 +0100 (CET) Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2022 13:24:31 +0100 From: Gerd Hoffmann To: Dov Murik Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Lenny Szubowicz , Peter Gonda , Matthew Garrett , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Message-ID: <20220301122431.xcsuneftshiibvst@sirius.home.kraxel.org> References: <20220228114254.1099945-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> <20220228114254.1099945-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220228114254.1099945-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 11:42:52AM +0000, Dov Murik wrote: > The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) > EFI secret area via securityfs interface. > > When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under > /sys/kernel/security), a "secrets/coco" directory is created in > securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name > of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is > the secret data. > > This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to > read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection > mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command). > > Removing (unlinking) files in the "secrets/coco" directory will zero out > the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is > removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem. > > Signed-off-by: Dov Murik Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann