From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from bmailout3.hostsharing.net (bmailout3.hostsharing.net [176.9.242.62]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AFA652F48 for ; Wed, 1 Nov 2023 07:38:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=wunner.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=h08.hostsharing.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=none Received: from h08.hostsharing.net (h08.hostsharing.net [IPv6:2a01:37:1000::53df:5f1c:0]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "*.hostsharing.net", Issuer "RapidSSL Global TLS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA1" (verified OK)) by bmailout3.hostsharing.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 12FA7100D9404; Wed, 1 Nov 2023 08:38:14 +0100 (CET) Received: by h08.hostsharing.net (Postfix, from userid 100393) id DEC64120EBC; Wed, 1 Nov 2023 08:38:13 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2023 08:38:13 +0100 From: Lukas Wunner To: Dionna Amalie Glaze Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, Dan Williams , Jonathan Cameron Subject: Re: TDISP enablement Message-ID: <20231101073813.GC25863@wunner.de> References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) On Tue, Oct 31, 2023 at 04:40:56PM -0700, Dionna Amalie Glaze wrote: > Only read? Can user space not provide a nonce for replay protection > here, or is that just inherent to the SPDM channel setup, and the That's internal to SPDM, regardless whether SPDM is handled by the TSM or OS kernel. > These vendored certificates will only grow in size, and they're The size of a cert chain is limited to 64 kByte by the SPDM spec. A device may have 8 slots, each containing a cert chain. > device-specific, so it makes sense for machines to have a local cache > of all the provisioned certificates that get forwarded to the guest > through the VMM. I'd like to see this kind of blob reporting as a more > general mechanism, however, so we can get TDX-specific blobs in too > without much fuss. Cert chains and measurements from the interface report need to be exposed as individual sysfs attributes for compatibility with TEE-IO incapable devices. Blobs make zero sense here. Doubly so if they're vendor-specific. Thanks, Lukas