From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 10:28:22 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240116072822.pvzseyqry56eqa4j@box.shutemov.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <89e8722b-661b-4319-8018-06705b366c62@suse.com>
On Mon, Jan 15, 2024 at 12:53:42PM +0200, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
>
>
> On 23.12.23 г. 1:52 ч., Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > TDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by
> > allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them
> > to shared with set_memory_decrypted().
> >
> > The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only
> > sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
> >
> > Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to
> > unrecoverable TD exit.
> >
> > On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to
> > private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it
> > normally.
> >
> > The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and
> > unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of
> > conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This
> > allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The
> > second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and
> > interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may
> > access shared memory.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 +
> > arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 6 ++
> > arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 13 ++++
> > 4 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> > index 8a49484a2917..5c64db168edd 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> > @@ -6,8 +6,10 @@
> > #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
> > #include <linux/debugfs.h>
> > +#include <linux/delay.h>
> > #include <linux/export.h>
> > #include <linux/io.h>
> > +#include <linux/kexec.h>
> > #include <asm/coco.h>
> > #include <asm/tdx.h>
> > #include <asm/vmx.h>
> > @@ -15,6 +17,7 @@
> > #include <asm/insn.h>
> > #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
> > #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> > +#include <asm/set_memory.h>
> > /* MMIO direction */
> > #define EPT_READ 0
> > @@ -41,6 +44,9 @@
> > static atomic_long_t nr_shared;
> > +static atomic_t conversions_in_progress;
> > +static bool conversion_allowed = true;
>
> Given the usage model of this variable, shouldn't it be simply accessed via
> READ/WRITE_ONCE macros?
What do you see it changing?
> > +
> > static inline bool pte_decrypted(pte_t pte)
> > {
> > return cc_mkdec(pte_val(pte)) == pte_val(pte);
> > @@ -726,6 +732,14 @@ static bool tdx_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
> > static bool tdx_cache_flush_required(void)
> > {
> > + /*
> > + * Avoid issuing CLFLUSH on set_memory_decrypted() if conversions
> > + * stopped. Otherwise it can race with unshare_all_memory() and trigger
> > + * implicit conversion to shared.
> > + */
> > + if (!conversion_allowed)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > /*
> > * AMD SME/SEV can avoid cache flushing if HW enforces cache coherence.
> > * TDX doesn't have such capability.
> > @@ -809,12 +823,25 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
> > static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
> > bool enc)
> > {
> > + atomic_inc(&conversions_in_progress);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Check after bumping conversions_in_progress to serialize
> > + * against tdx_shutdown().
> > + */
> > + if (!conversion_allowed) {
> > + atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
> > + return -EBUSY;
> > + }
>
> nit: Can you make the inc of conversions_in_progress be done here, this
> eliminated the atomic_dec in case they aren't. Somewhat simplifies the
> logic.
Okay, fair enough. Will change.
> > +
> > /*
> > * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
> > * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
> > */
> > - if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
> > + if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
> > + atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
> > return -EIO;
> > + }
> > return 0;
> > }
> > @@ -826,17 +853,102 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
> > * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
> > * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
> > */
> > - if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
> > + if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
> > + atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
> > return -EIO;
> > + }
> > if (enc)
> > atomic_long_sub(numpages, &nr_shared);
> > else
> > atomic_long_add(numpages, &nr_shared);
> > + atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
> > +
> > return 0;
> > }
> > +static void tdx_kexec_stop_conversion(bool crash)
> > +{
> > + /* Stop new private<->shared conversions */
> > + conversion_allowed = false;
>
> What's the logic behind this compiler barrier?
Disallow compiler to push the assignment past atomic_read() loop below.
Not sure if anything else prevents such reorder without the barrier.
And I don't think WRITE_ONCE() will do the trick. It only prevents
multiple writes, but doesn't prevent reorders agains accesses
non-READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() accesses.
> > + barrier();
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for
> > + * conversions to finish.
> > + *
> > + * If race happened, just report and proceed.
> > + */
> > + if (!crash) {
> > + unsigned long timeout;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Wait for in-flight conversions to complete.
> > + *
> > + * Do not wait more than 30 seconds.
> > + */
> > + timeout = 30 * USEC_PER_SEC;
> > + while (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress) && timeout--)
> > + udelay(1);
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress))
> > + pr_warn("Failed to finish shared<->private conversions\n");
> > +}
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> > index c9503fe2d13a..3196ff20a29e 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> > @@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct x86_guest {
> > int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
> > bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
> > bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
> > + void (*enc_kexec_stop_conversion)(bool crash);
> > + void (*enc_kexec_unshare_mem)(void);
>
> These are only being initialized in the TDX case, but called in all cases
> when CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT is true, which includes AMD. So it would
> cause a crash, no ? Shouldn't you also introduce noop handlers initialized
> in the default x86_platform struct in arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c ?
kexec on AMD will not work without them, I think. But noops makes sense
anyway. Will fix.
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-16 7:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-22 23:51 [PATCHv5 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 01/16] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 02/16] x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 03/16] cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 04/16] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 05/16] x86/kvm: Do not try to disable kvmclock if it was not enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 06/16] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 07/16] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 08/16] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 09/16] x86/tdx: Account shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-05 19:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-06 0:59 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-06 1:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-15 10:53 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 7:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2024-01-16 8:01 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 10:45 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-16 10:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 11/16] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 12/16] x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 13/16] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 14/16] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-25 8:05 ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-08 3:04 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 10:15 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-09 3:04 ` Huang, Kai
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 15/16] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free() Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-08 3:13 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 3:30 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 10:17 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-08 13:13 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 13:35 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-15 13:19 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 6:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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