Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/random: Retry on RDSEED failure

["Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>]

What about simply treating boot-time initialization of the /dev/random
state as special.  That is, on x86, if the hardware promises that
RDSEED or RDRAND is available, we use them to initialization our RNG
state at boot.  On bare metal, there can't be anyone else trying to
exhaust the on-chip RNG's entropy supply, so if RDSEED or RDRAND
aren't working available --- panic, since the hardware is clearly
busted.

On a guest OS, if confidential compute is enabled, and if RDSEED and
RDRAND don't work after N retries, and we know CC is enabled, panic,
since the kernel can't provide the promised security gaurantees, and
the CC developers and users are cordially invited to sharpen their
pitchforks and to send their tender regards to the Intel RNG
engineers.

For non-confidential compute guests, the question is what is the
appropriate reaction if another VM, possibly belonging to a different
user/customer, is carrying out a RDRAND DOS attack.  I'd argue that in
these cases, if the guest VM is using virtio-random, then the host's
/dev/random should be able to cover for cases of Intel RNG exhaustion,
and allowing other customer to be able to prevent other user's VM's
from being able to boot is the the greater evil, so we shouldn't treat
boot-time RDRAND/RDSEED failures as panic-worthy.

						- Ted