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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: adrian.hunter@intel.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com, bhe@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@intel.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	elena.reshetova@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com,
	kai.huang@intel.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rafael@kernel.org,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, seanjc@google.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
	Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCHv9.1 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 14:34:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240327123417.1754166-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240325103911.2651793-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

TDX is going to have more than one reason to fail
enc_status_change_prepare().

Change the callback to return errno instead of assuming -EIO;
enc_status_change_finish() changed too to keep the interface symmetric.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tao Liu <ltao@redhat.com>
---
  v9.1:
    - Fix build error in Hyper-V code after rebase;
---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c         | 20 +++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c           | 22 ++++++++++------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c      |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c   |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c    |  8 +++++---
 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index c1cb90369915..26fa47db5782 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -798,28 +798,30 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
-					  bool enc)
+static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+					 bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (enc)
-		return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-	return true;
+	if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
 					 bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (!enc)
-		return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-	return true;
+	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void __init tdx_early_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 768d73de0d09..b4a851d27c7c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -523,9 +523,9 @@ static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
  * transition is complete, hv_vtom_set_host_visibility() marks the pages
  * as "present" again.
  */
-static bool hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
+static int hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
 {
-	return !set_memory_np(kbuffer, pagecount);
+	return set_memory_np(kbuffer, pagecount);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -536,20 +536,19 @@ static bool hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc
  * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
  * with memory base and size.
  */
-static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
+static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
 {
 	enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?
 			VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE : VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE;
 	u64 *pfn_array;
 	phys_addr_t paddr;
+	int i, pfn, err;
 	void *vaddr;
 	int ret = 0;
-	bool result = true;
-	int i, pfn;
 
 	pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!pfn_array) {
-		result = false;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_set_memory_p;
 	}
 
@@ -568,10 +567,8 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bo
 		if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
 			ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
 						     visibility);
-			if (ret) {
-				result = false;
+			if (ret)
 				goto err_free_pfn_array;
-			}
 			pfn = 0;
 		}
 	}
@@ -586,10 +583,11 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bo
 	 * order to avoid leaving the memory range in a "broken" state. Setting
 	 * the PRESENT bits shouldn't fail, but return an error if it does.
 	 */
-	if (set_memory_p(kbuffer, pagecount))
-		result = false;
+	err = set_memory_p(kbuffer, pagecount);
+	if (err && !ret)
+		ret = err;
 
-	return result;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index b89b40f250e6..4770af4d6015 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
  * @enc_cache_flush_required	Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
  */
 struct x86_guest {
-	bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
-	bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+	int (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+	int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index a42830dc151b..69413ca37bfe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
 
 static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
 
-static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
-static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
+static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
+static int enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
 static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
 static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
 static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 70b91de2e053..d314e577836d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
 #endif
 }
 
-static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static int amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
 	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
 		snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
 
-	return true;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
-static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static int amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool e
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages << PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
 
-	return true;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 80c9037ffadf..e5b454036bf3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -2156,7 +2156,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 		cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
 
 	/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
-	if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
+	ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
+	if (ret)
 		goto vmm_fail;
 
 	ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
@@ -2174,7 +2175,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 		return ret;
 
 	/* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */
-	if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
+	ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc);
+	if (ret)
 		goto vmm_fail;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -2183,7 +2185,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 	WARN_ONCE(1, "CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=%p, numpages=%d) to %s.\n",
 		  (void *)addr, numpages, enc ? "private" : "shared");
 
-	return -EIO;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-03-27 12:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-25 10:38 [PATCHv9 00/17] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:38 ` [PATCHv9 01/17] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:38 ` [PATCHv9 02/17] x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:38 ` [PATCHv9 03/17] cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:38 ` [PATCHv9 04/17] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:38 ` [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-29 15:21   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-29 16:48     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-02 15:42       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-03 21:40         ` Huang, Kai
2024-04-04  9:32           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-03-17  9:27             ` David Woodhouse
2025-03-17 11:03               ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-03-17 11:32                 ` David Woodhouse
2025-03-17 11:59                   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-03 15:23   ` [PATCHv9.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-26 10:30   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-27 12:34   ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 07/17] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 08/17] x86/tdx: Account shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 15:43   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-26 10:30   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 09/17] x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-03 22:33   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 10/17] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-26 10:31   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 11/17] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 12/17] x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 13/17] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 14/17] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 15/17] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free() Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 16/17] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-25 10:39 ` [PATCHv9 17/17] ACPI: tables: Print MULTIPROC_WAKEUP when MADT is parsed Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-26 10:32   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-26 17:53   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-04 18:27 ` [PATCHv9 00/17] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kalra, Ashish
2024-04-07 15:55   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-04 23:10 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] x86/snp: " Ashish Kalra
2024-04-04 23:11   ` [PATCH v3 1/4] efi/x86: skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() in case of kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-04-05 17:02     ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-04 23:11   ` [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/sev: add sev_es_enabled() function Ashish Kalra
2024-04-05 17:03     ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-04 23:11   ` [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/boot/compressed: Skip Video Memory access in Decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP Ashish Kalra
2024-04-05 17:05     ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-04 23:11   ` [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-04-05 11:30     ` kernel test robot
2024-04-05 11:34     ` kernel test robot
2024-04-05 11:36     ` kernel test robot

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