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From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev (open list:X86 TRUST DOMAIN
	EXTENSIONS (TDX))
Cc: ken@codelabs.ch, Alexander.Grest@microsoft.com,
	chao.gao@intel.com, madvenka@linux.microsoft.com,
	mic@digikod.net, nsaenz@amazon.es, tao1.su@linux.intel.com,
	xiaoyao.li@intel.com, zhao1.liu@intel.com,
	Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/8] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK
Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2025 22:47:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251223054806.1611168-2-jon@nutanix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251223054806.1611168-1-jon@nutanix.com>

EPT exit qualification bit 6 is used when mode-based execute control
is enabled, and reflects user executable addresses. Rework name to
reflect the intention and add to EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK, which allows
simplifying the return evaluation in
tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending a pinch.

Rework handling in __vmx_handle_ept_violation to unconditionally clear
EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC until MBEC is implemented, as suggested by
Sean [1].

Note: Intel SDM Table 29-7 defines bit 6 as:
  If the “mode-based execute control” VM-execution control is 0, the
  value of this bit is undefined. If that control is 1, this bit is the
  logical-AND of bit 10 in the EPT paging-structure entries used to
  translate the guest-physical address of the access causing the EPT
  violation. In this case, it indicates whether the guest-physical
  address was executable for user-mode linear addresses.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aCJDzU1p_SFNRIJd@google.com/

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 5 +++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h  | 9 +++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index c85c50019523..de3abec84fe5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -596,10 +596,11 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ		BIT(3)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE	BIT(4)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC		BIT(5)
-#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN BIT(6)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC	BIT(6)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK		(EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ  | \
 					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \
-					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC)
+					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC  | \
+					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID	BIT(7)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED	BIT(8)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
index 412d0829d7a2..adf925500b9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
@@ -94,8 +94,13 @@ static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
 	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
 		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
-	/* ept page table entry is present? */
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
+	/*
+	 * ept page table entry is present?
+	 * note: unconditionally clear USER_EXEC until mode-based
+	 * execute control is implemented
+	 */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification &
+		       (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK & ~EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC))
 		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
 
 	if (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 0a49c863c811..61185c30a40e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ static inline bool tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcp
 	if (eeq_type != TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION)
 		return false;
 
-	return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK) && !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN);
+	return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK);
 }
 
 static int tdx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-- 
2.43.0


      reply	other threads:[~2025-12-23  5:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-23  5:47 [PATCH 0/8] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  5:47 ` Jon Kohler [this message]

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