public inbox for linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	kas@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, tglx@kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, chao.gao@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com,
	ackerleytng@google.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, vishal.l.verma@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] KVM: x86: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump
Date: Fri,  6 Mar 2026 17:03:58 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260307010358.819645-5-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260307010358.819645-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

From: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>

Use the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which disables the TDX module,
reclaims all memory resources assigned to TDX, and clears any
partial-write induced poison, to allow kexec and kdump on platforms with
the partial write errata.

On TDX-capable platforms with the partial write erratum, kexec has been
disabled because the new kernel could hit a machine check reading a
previously poisoned memory location.

Later TDX modules support TDH.SYS.DISABLE, which disables the module and
reclaims all TDX memory resources, allowing the new kernel to re-initialize
TDX from scratch. This operation also clears the old memory, cleaning up
any poison.

Add tdx_sys_disable() to tdx_shutdown(), which is called in the
syscore_shutdown path for kexec. This is done just before tdx_shutdown()
disables VMX on all CPUs.

For kdump, call tdx_sys_disable() in the crash path before
x86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu() does VMXOFF.

Since this clears any poison on TDX-managed memory, the
X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE check in machine_kexec() that blocked kexec on
partial write errata platforms can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/crash.c            |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 ----------------
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c        |  1 +
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index cd796818d94d..623d4474631a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/kdebug.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
 #include <asm/intel_pt.h>
 #include <asm/crash.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	crash_smp_send_stop();
 
+	tdx_sys_disable();
 	x86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu();
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 0590d399d4f1..c3f4a389992d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -347,22 +347,6 @@ int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
 	unsigned long reloc_end = (unsigned long)__relocate_kernel_end;
 	int result;
 
-	/*
-	 * Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum.  A kernel
-	 * partial write (a write transaction of less than cacheline
-	 * lands at memory controller) to TDX private memory poisons that
-	 * memory, and a subsequent read triggers a machine check.
-	 *
-	 * On those platforms the old kernel must reset TDX private
-	 * memory before jumping to the new kernel otherwise the new
-	 * kernel may see unexpected machine check.  For simplicity
-	 * just fail kexec/kdump on those platforms.
-	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE)) {
-		pr_info_once("Not allowed on platform with tdx_pw_mce bug\n");
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	}
-
 	/* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */
 	result = init_pgtable(image, __pa(control_page));
 	if (result)
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
index 68bd2618dde4..b388fbce5d76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static void tdx_shutdown_cpu(void *ign)
 
 static void tdx_shutdown(void *ign)
 {
+	tdx_sys_disable();
 	on_each_cpu(tdx_shutdown_cpu, NULL, 1);
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-07  1:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-07  1:03 [PATCH 0/4] Fuller TDX kexec support Rick Edgecombe
2026-03-07  1:03 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h> Rick Edgecombe
2026-03-08 23:47   ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-09 16:20     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-03-07  1:03 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86 Rick Edgecombe
2026-03-09  0:23   ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-09 16:23     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-03-07  1:03 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE Rick Edgecombe
2026-03-16 11:51   ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-03-16 21:15     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-03-17  9:47       ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-03-17 21:55         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-03-07  1:03 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2026-03-09  8:15   ` [PATCH 4/4] KVM: x86: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump Chao Gao
2026-03-09 16:24     ` Edgecombe, Rick P

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260307010358.819645-5-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
    --to=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
    --cc=ackerleytng@google.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=chao.gao@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=kas@kernel.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@kernel.org \
    --cc=vishal.l.verma@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox