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From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Nikunj A Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
	David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	"Kim Phillips" <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 5/6] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 15:25:57 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260402202558.195005-6-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260402202558.195005-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>

AMD EPYC 5th generation and above processors support IBPB-on-Entry
for SNP guests.  By invoking an Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
(IBPB) on VMRUN, old indirect branch predictions are prevented
from influencing indirect branches within the guest.

SNP guests may choose to enable IBPB-on-Entry by setting
SEV_FEATURES bit 21 (IbpbOnEntry).

Host support for IBPB on Entry is indicated by CPUID
Fn8000_001F[IbpbOnEntry], bit 31.

If supported, indicate support for IBPB on Entry in
sev_supported_vmsa_features bit 23 (IbpbOnEntry).

For more info, refer to page 615, Section 15.36.17 "Side-Channel
Protection", AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System
Programming Part 2, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024 (see Link).

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
v3: Rebased on top of new SNP_ONLY_MASK etc. changes
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260203222405.4065706-3-kim.phillips@amd.com/
    - Added Tom's Reviewed-by.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260126224205.1442196-3-kim.phillips@amd.com/

 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h         | 4 +++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c             | 3 +++
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index dbe104df339b..236411a1a86a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -459,6 +459,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27) /* Allowed SEV Features */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SVSM		(19*32+28) /* "svsm" SVSM present */
 #define X86_FEATURE_HV_INUSE_WR_ALLOWED	(19*32+30) /* Allow Write to in-use hypervisor-owned pages */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY	(19*32+31) /* SEV-SNP IBPB on VM Entry */
 
 /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP	(20*32+ 0) /* No Nested Data Breakpoints */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 4f844a72890c..2a2b8705b2c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -306,9 +306,11 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION		BIT(4)
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP				BIT(5)
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC				BIT(9)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY			BIT(21)
 
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK	(SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE | \
-					 SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
+					 SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC | \
+					 SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY)
 
 #define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID			BIT_ULL(63)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 9663424c0cf0..561023486253 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3170,6 +3170,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 
 		if (tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
 			sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+
+		if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_ENTRY))
+			sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY;
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-02 20:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-02 20:25 [PATCH v3 0/6] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips

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