From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Nikunj A Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"Kim Phillips" <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 6/6] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 15:25:58 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260402202558.195005-7-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260402202558.195005-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>
Advertise support for BTB Isolation via SEV_VMSA_FEATURES when SNP is
enabled, as all hardware that supports SNP also support BTB Isolation.
BTB Isolation is an optional feature that can be enabled by the guest to
ensure its guest Branch Target Buffers (BTBs) are not
affected by any context outside that guest.
SNP-active guests may choose to enable the Branch Target Buffer
Isolation mode through SEV_FEATURES bit 7 (BTBIsolation).
For more info, refer to page 615, Section 15.36.17 "Side-Channel
Protection", AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System
Programming Part 2, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024 (see Link).
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
---
v3: Reworded, Rebased on top of new SNP_ONLY_MASK etc. changes
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260203222405.4065706-3-kim.phillips@amd.com/
- Added Tom's Reviewed-by.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260126224205.1442196-3-kim.phillips@amd.com/
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 7 ++++++-
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 2a2b8705b2c0..d3a15a40a09b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -305,10 +305,12 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION BIT(3)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_BTB_ISOLATION BIT(7)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY BIT(21)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE | \
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_BTB_ISOLATION | \
SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC | \
SVM_SEV_FEAT_IBPB_ON_ENTRY)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 561023486253..733423000bc8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3166,7 +3166,12 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
if (sev_snp_enabled) {
- sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
+ /*
+ * Some SNP-only features such as BTB Isolation are
+ * available on all systems that support SNP.
+ */
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE |
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_BTB_ISOLATION;
if (tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
--
2.43.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-02 20:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-02 20:25 [PATCH v3 0/6] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-04-02 20:25 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
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