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[47.54.130.67]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id af79cd13be357-910ba182540sm234520585a.4.2026.05.14.05.35.30 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 14 May 2026 05:35:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jgg by wakko with local (Exim 4.97) (envelope-from ) id 1wNVHl-00000005B3F-3Oru; Thu, 14 May 2026 09:35:29 -0300 Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 09:35:29 -0300 From: Jason Gunthorpe To: Mostafa Saleh Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" , iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Robin Murphy , Marek Szyprowski , Will Deacon , Marc Zyngier , Steven Price , Suzuki K Poulose , Catalin Marinas , Jiri Pirko , Petr Tesarik , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Dan Williams , Xu Yilun , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" , Alexander Gordeev , Gerald Schaefer , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 04/13] dma: swiotlb: track pool encryption state and honor DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED Message-ID: <20260514123529.GZ7702@ziepe.ca> References: <20260512090408.794195-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> <20260512090408.794195-5-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> <20260513172450.GR7702@ziepe.ca> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: > > How will pKVM signal what kind of memory the DMA needs then? > > > > Does it use set_memory_decrypted()? How can it use > > set_memory_decrypted() without offering CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT ? > > pKVM (hypervisor) doesn’t signal anything. > The VMM when running protected guests will use restricted dma-pools > for emulated vritio devices in the guest, which gets decrypted by > the guest kernel and hence shared with the host kernel, and then > traffic is bounced via the pool. That really does sound like CC and set_memory_decrypted() to me.. > It’s also worth noting that bouncing here isn't just about visibility. > Because memory sharing operates at page granularity, bouncing sub-page > allocations through the restricted pool prevents adjacent, sensitive > guest data from being exposed to the untrusted host. That's a somewhat different problem, we have the dev->trusted stuff that is supposed to deal with this kind of security. We need it for IOMMU based systems too, eg hot plug thunderbolt should have it. Then CC issue is more that the DMA API can't decrypt random passed in memory because doing so often requires changing the PTEs pointing at the page so it would break everything if done transparently. > > > I believe that the pool should have a way to control it’s property > > > (encrypted or decrypted) and that takes priority over whatever > > > attributes comes from allocation. > > > > We should get here because dma_capable() fails, and then swiotlb needs > > to return something that makes dma_capable() succeed. Yes, it should > > return details about the thing it decided, but it shouldn't have been > > pre-created with some idea how to make dma_capable() work. > > That sounds neat, but at the end we have force_dma_unencrypted() in > dma_capable() which is just hardcoded to true/false by the platform. For now, the next step is it becomes per-device and dynamic during the device lifecycle. > How is that different from having the state static by the pool? statically attached pools to the device are not so flexible when devices have dynamically changing capabilities.. > > If dma_capable() can fail, then swiotlb should know exactly what to do > > to fix it. > > dma_capable() returns a bool, I don’t think it can know what exactly > went wrong (based on address, size, attrs, dev...) Yes, but I think the design is swiotlb is supposed to re-inspect what is going on against the limits dma_capable checks and then select the correct remedy.. > While we can debate the aesthetics of the setup , this is > the exisitng behaviour for Linux, which existed for years > and pKVM relies on and is used extensively. > And, this patch alters that long-standing logic and introduces > a functional regression. Yeah, Aneesh needs to do something here, I'm pointing out it is entirely seperate thing from the CC path we are working on which is decoupling CC from reylying on force swiotlb. > We can address this by either adjusting this patch or by changing > pKVM guests to be more aligned with other CCA guests which is > something I have been wondering about if it would help reduce > bouncing. Every time I look at pkvm I think it is just ARM CCA with a different design and no access to the unique HW features.. > > If we can make that work then maybe the flows are designed correctly. > > Mmm, I am not sure I understand this one, shouldn’t the device also be > notified about the switch in memory state, if it expects to read/write > decrypted memory, how would that work if the kernel changes it to an > encrypted one? Nothing on the device changes. In a CC world we put the device in a T=0 or T=1 state before the driver loads and the expectation from the DMA API is that the device will only use that T=x DMA type during operation. A T=1 state device can access all of memory, private or shared. Any information the platform may need is encoded in the dma_addr_t or in the S1 IOPTEs. So we never need to tell the device driver what kind of memory the DMA is targetting, and we NEVER expect a device in T=1 mode to have to issue a T=0 DMA to use the DMA API. In a pkvm world it should be the same, the S2 table for the SMMU will control what the device can access, and if the SMMU points to a "private" or "shared" page is not something the device needs to know or care about. Jason