[PATCH 1/4] kvm: sev: Fix user-space triggerable WARN_ON on snp_launch_update path

["Jörg Rödel" <joro@8bytes.org>]

From: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>

Sashiko reported on an unrelated patch:

  [Severity: High]
  This is a pre-existing issue, but can a host userspace process trigger a
  kernel warning by passing a NULL user address (uaddr = 0) here?

  If params.uaddr is 0, src becomes NULL and passes the PAGE_ALIGNED(src)
  check. kvm_gmem_populate() skips fetching the user page and passes
  src_page = NULL to sev_gmem_post_populate().

  That function then unconditionally evaluates:

  WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_populate_args->type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO &&
               !src_page)

  Since the type isn't ZERO, won't this allow an unprivileged user to spam
  the kernel log?

The assessment is correct, so check for this condition earlier in the
snp_launch_update() path to avoid the WARN_ON_ONCE.

Fixes: dee5a47cc7a45 ("KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command")
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 6c6a6d663e29..41dcba5180ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2438,6 +2438,13 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(src))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Make sure user-mode did not pass NULL as src with
+	 * type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO.
+	 */
+	if (src == NULL && params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE;
 
 	/*
-- 
2.53.0