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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	 Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,  linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Sashiko Bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>,
	Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>,
	 Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>,
	Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: SEV: Explicitly disallow NULL user address for SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:37:10 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260630213711.479692-2-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260630213711.479692-1-seanjc@google.com>

From: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>

Explicitly reject a NULL userspace virtual address for the source page of
SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE instead of relying on the post-populate callback to do
the check, and don't WARN on failure, as the scenario is blatantly user-
triggerable, as reported by Sashiko.  Waiting until post-populate to check
the address "works", but makes it unnecessarily difficult to see that KVM's
ABI is to disallow a NULL source page for non-ZERO pages.

Note, several existing VMMs pass a valid userspace address for the ZERO
case, i.e. KVM can't *require* the userspace address to be NULL for ZERO
pages, at least not without breaking userspace.

Fixes: dee5a47cc7a4 ("KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command")
Reported-by: Sashiko Bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260611125849.9ED631F00893@smtp.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 74fb15551e83..621a2eaa58f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2330,9 +2330,6 @@ static int sev_gmem_post_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
 	int level;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_populate_args->type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO && !src_page))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	ret = snp_lookup_rmpentry((u64)pfn, &assigned, &level);
 	if (ret || assigned) {
 		pr_debug("%s: Failed to ensure GFN 0x%llx RMP entry is initial shared state, ret: %d assigned: %d\n",
@@ -2421,10 +2418,12 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	     params.type != KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	src = params.type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO ? NULL : u64_to_user_ptr(params.uaddr);
-
-	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(src))
+	if (params.type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO)
+		src = NULL;
+	else if (!params.uaddr || !PAGE_ALIGNED(params.uaddr))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	else
+		src = u64_to_user_ptr(params.uaddr);
 
 	npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE;
 
-- 
2.55.0.rc0.799.gd6f94ed593-goog


  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-30 21:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-30 21:37 [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: x86: gmem populate fix and cleanups Sean Christopherson
2026-06-30 21:37 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-07-01 21:15   ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: SEV: Explicitly disallow NULL user address for SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE Ackerley Tng
2026-07-01 21:22     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-30 21:37 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: TDX: Return EINVAL, not EOPNOTSUPP, for NULL INIT_MEM_REGION source Sean Christopherson
2026-07-01  7:27   ` Yan Zhao
2026-07-01  8:02   ` Binbin Wu
2026-07-01 17:12     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-02  1:12       ` Binbin Wu
2026-07-01  9:22   ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-07-02  2:32   ` Xiaoyao Li

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