From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [192.198.163.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 562373EA88 for ; Mon, 22 Jan 2024 22:12:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=192.198.163.12 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1705961531; cv=none; b=eGaAjisRBrt/OJa1oyYfvVPf1S4TeOSJTdt2lK76VF2sOKMA4utmrDgNoNXhdQJ7mRJnbCaJFT11PUJLCYsHYL6aqu4AVQv1SCetmtidzUU6Fvskl3OqSOlNHtx1xykPSctmrxfnW0mXtFnT+WVRS0xfBTR2GnRDgFU06pZM4A0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1705961531; c=relaxed/simple; bh=eWQXk0sfcnAQS723Yb4pigupSKjfFt31ay1qJ/1xMKE=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=W8eo7EjHZIvCPqkEuEZcBYisir1LK5ozPWmbvDRAbTgigHwgxiEU4gAoizpBGMgSK5+sMzzWC9nVgFHcEnJnCJR08cF9GXOcNXNOHbsq2yHPHGaMCADN33MpgTVJqKNkdaZCasUh228ySg2PF4TEyjOOwFdIX1YXUIpKu7CAK7M= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b=fuybMpwo; arc=none smtp.client-ip=192.198.163.12 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="fuybMpwo" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1705961530; x=1737497530; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:to:cc:references: from:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=eWQXk0sfcnAQS723Yb4pigupSKjfFt31ay1qJ/1xMKE=; b=fuybMpwoDcgYsYu1BfNuufI2Nh5Pg+8uB2SlvM1G6WjoLMgEH9c7E7Jq 74ob4FTe5wHTanoMAxmET9uIHyhl8bxUfDZubLsiQfR6sycIXSYicLUFy ycx9nPXdxphoOcaSsYuF2L/ThWyMEaiSxaA9nEXj8WxK3LsvS/1lXVZSk qceO/qfu1Wki8GaKZlSEj1DVGe2g1bb7sRHNF+EORafyl27KGDhVQW1xC OaGOZDlCjor4laUARDbZRI/ylNY0UVlgJKm/CHx1lrcuoEfGmucEqv4Xf 2hX2Z2dOHhy3wf0imZDyqkfHYxG4oC2VYIWwtNtY4xO5yvDa/JQAmueZt w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10961"; a="1194490" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.05,212,1701158400"; d="scan'208";a="1194490" Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by fmvoesa106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Jan 2024 14:12:09 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10961"; a="929121025" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.05,212,1701158400"; d="scan'208";a="929121025" Received: from sjbowden-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.209.73.34]) ([10.209.73.34]) by fmsmga001-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Jan 2024 14:12:09 -0800 Message-ID: <2bd7c80b-9cd8-4450-a410-c3739d224167@linux.intel.com> Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 14:12:08 -0800 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] tsm: Allow for mapping RTMRs to TCG TPM PCRs Content-Language: en-US To: Samuel Ortiz Cc: Dan Williams , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20240114223532.290550-1-sameo@rivosinc.com> <20240114223532.290550-4-sameo@rivosinc.com> <1bbf8d3e-aa94-48c7-a1e4-76f9eefc4af7@linux.intel.com> <65a72c305291f_3b8e29484@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch> <5539c533-37b2-4b12-a5c5-056881cf8e3c@linux.intel.com> From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 1/21/24 8:31 AM, Samuel Ortiz wrote: > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 07:35:30PM -0800, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote: >> On 1/16/24 5:24 PM, Dan Williams wrote: >>> Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote: >>>> On 1/14/24 2:35 PM, Samuel Ortiz wrote: >>>>> Many user space and internal kernel subsystems (e.g. the Linux IMA) >>>>> expect a Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) that allows for extending >>>>> and reading measurement registers that are compatible with the TCG TPM >>>>> PCRs layout, e.g. a TPM. In order to allow those components to >>>>> alternatively use a platform TSM as their RTS, a TVM could map the >>>>> available RTMRs to one or more TCG TPM PCRs. Once configured, those PCR >>>>> to RTMR mappings give the kernel TSM layer all the necessary information >>>>> to be a RTS for e.g. the Linux IMA or any other components that expects >>>>> a TCG compliant TPM PCRs layout. >>>>> >>>>> TPM PCR mappings are configured through configfs: >>>>> >>>>> // Create and configure 2 RTMRs >>>>> mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0 >>>>> mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1 >>>>> echo 0 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/index >>>>> echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/index >>>>> >>>>> // Map RTMR 0 to PCRs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 >>>>> echo 4-8 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/tcg_map >>>>> >>>>> // Map RTMR 1 to PCRs 16, 17 and 18 >>>>> echo 16-18 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/tcg_map >>>> Any information on how this mapping will be used by TPM or IMA ? >>>> >>>> RTMR to PCR mapping is fixed by design, right? If yes, why allow >>>> user to configure it. We can let vendor drivers to configure it, right? >>> I assume the "vendor driver", that publishes the RTMR to the tsm-core, >>> has no idea whether they will be used for PCR emulation, or not. The TPM >>> proxy layer sitting on top of this would know the mapping of which RTMRs >>> are recording a transcript of which PCR extend events. >> My thinking is, since this mapping is ARCH-specific information >> and fixed by design, it makes more sense to hide this detail in the >> vendor driver than letting userspace configure it. If we allow users to >> configure it, there is a chance for incorrect mapping. > I think I agree with the fact that letting users configure that mapping > may be error prone. But I'm not sure this is an architecture specific > mapping, but rather a platform specific one. I'd expect the guest firmware > to provide it through e.g. the MapPcrToMrIndex EFI CC protocol. > > So I agree I should remove the user interface for setting that mapping, > and pass it from the provider capabilities instead. It is then up to the > provider to choose how it'd build that information (hard coded, from > EFI, etc). > >> Regarding the TPM proxy, I am still not clear how it is going to use >> this mapping. If we want to provide TPM like feature, it needs a >> special kernel TPM driver, right? Even if we enable TPM support >> with RTMR, I assume it can only support pcr_extend(). > Extend and read, yes. > >> Other TPM >> features should be disabled. If yes, since we already have this ABI >> for measurement extension, why again support it via TPM or did >> I misunderstand the use case. > I am not sure the TPM compatibility is always needed, but for subsystems > (like e.g. IMA) that look for a TPM as their root of trust for storage, > providing the extend+read ABI and the PCR mapping should be sufficient. My question is, do we even want to expose the PCR-RTMR mapping to the user? Even if we want to support IMA with RTMR, I think the mapping needs to be done in the kernel and the userspace does not need to worry about it. > Cheers, > Samuel. > -- Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Linux Kernel Developer