From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Gao Shiyuan <gaoshiyuan@baidu.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, x86@kernel.org,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel v3 4/4] crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1)
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 09:30:11 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <36929d3e-b56c-4e65-9ec1-42fc52fdd962@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b6d45b8e-3eeb-4b96-b781-e0ad28861a2c@amd.com>
On 3/12/25 01:52, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 12/1/25 20:44, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>> Implement the SEV-TIO (Trusted I/O) firmware interface for PCIe TDISP
>> (Trust Domain In-Socket Protocol). This enables secure communication
>> between trusted domains and PCIe devices through the PSP (Platform
>> Security Processor).
>>
>> The implementation includes:
>> - Device Security Manager (DSM) operations for establishing secure links
>> - SPDM (Security Protocol and Data Model) over DOE (Data Object Exchange)
>> - IDE (Integrity Data Encryption) stream management for secure PCIe
>>
>> This module bridges the SEV firmware stack with the generic PCIe TSM
>> framework.
>>
>> This is phase1 as described in Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst.
>>
>> On AMD SEV, the AMD PSP firmware acts as TSM (manages the security/trust).
>> The CCP driver provides the interface to it and registers in the TSM
>> subsystem.
>>
>> Detect the PSP support (reported via FEATURE_INFO + SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS)
>> and enable SEV-TIO in the SNP_INIT_EX call if the hardware supports TIO.
>>
>> Implement SEV TIO PSP command wrappers in sev-dev-tio.c and store
>> the data in the SEV-TIO-specific structs.
>>
>> Implement TSM hooks and IDE setup in sev-dev-tsm.c.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
>
> Just some minor comments below. After those are addressed:
>
> For the ccp related changes in the whole series:
>
> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Dan did it right (thanks Dan!).
>
>> ---
>> Changes:
>> v2:
>> * moved declarations from sev-dev-tio.h to sev-dev.h
>> * removed include "sev-dev-tio.h" from sev-dev.c to fight errors when TSM is disabled
>> * converted /** to /* as these are part of any external API and trigger unwanted kerneldoc warnings
>> * got rid of ifdefs
>> * "select PCI_TSM" moved under CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
>> * open coded SNP_SEV_TIO_SUPPORTED
>> * renamed tio_present to tio_supp to match the flag name
>> * merged "crypto: ccp: Enable SEV-TIO feature in the PSP when supported" to this one
>> ---
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig | 1 +
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile | 4 +
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.h | 123 +++
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.h | 9 +
>> include/linux/psp-sev.h | 11 +-
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.c | 864 ++++++++++++++++++++
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c | 405 +++++++++
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 51 +-
>> 8 files changed, 1465 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> index 9e0c16b36f9c..d6095d1467b3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> @@ -75,6 +75,10 @@ static bool psp_init_on_probe = true;
>> module_param(psp_init_on_probe, bool, 0444);
>> MODULE_PARM_DESC(psp_init_on_probe, " if true, the PSP will be initialized on module init. Else the PSP will be initialized on the first command requiring it");
>>
>> +static bool sev_tio_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_TSM);
>> +module_param_named(tio, sev_tio_enabled, bool, 0444);
>> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(tio, "Enables TIO in SNP_INIT_EX");
>
> Hmmm... I thought you said you wanted to hide the module parameter if
> CONFIG_PCI_TSM isn't enabled. Either way, it's fine.
I did but you did not and I do not care that much :)
>
>> +
>> MODULE_FIRMWARE("amd/amd_sev_fam17h_model0xh.sbin"); /* 1st gen EPYC */
>> MODULE_FIRMWARE("amd/amd_sev_fam17h_model3xh.sbin"); /* 2nd gen EPYC */
>> MODULE_FIRMWARE("amd/amd_sev_fam19h_model0xh.sbin"); /* 3rd gen EPYC */
>> @@ -251,7 +255,7 @@ static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd)
>> case SEV_CMD_SNP_COMMIT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_commit);
>> case SEV_CMD_SNP_FEATURE_INFO: return sizeof(struct sev_data_snp_feature_info);
>> case SEV_CMD_SNP_VLEK_LOAD: return sizeof(struct sev_user_data_snp_vlek_load);
>> - default: return 0;
>> + default: return sev_tio_cmd_buffer_len(cmd);
>> }
>>
>> return 0;
>> @@ -1434,6 +1438,19 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
>> data.init_rmp = 1;
>> data.list_paddr_en = 1;
>> data.list_paddr = __psp_pa(snp_range_list);
>> +
>> + bool tio_supp = !!(sev->snp_feat_info_0.ebx & SNP_SEV_TIO_SUPPORTED);
>
> Please put the variable definition at the top of the "if" block instead
> of in the middle of the code.
>> +
>> + data.tio_en = tio_supp && sev_tio_enabled && amd_iommu_sev_tio_supported();
>
> Don't you still want to take CONFIG_PCI_TSM into account?
>
> data.tio_en = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_TSM) && tio_supp && sev_tio_enabled && amd_iommu_sev_tio_supported();
>
> or
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_TSM)
> data.tio_en = tio_supp && sev_tio_enabled && amd_iommu_sev_tio_supported();
>
> But if you change back to #ifdef the module parameter, then you won't
> need the IS_ENABLED() check here because sev_tio_enabled will be set
> based on CONFIG_PCI_TSM and will be false and not changeable if
> CONFIG_PCI_TSM is not y.
Ah true. I thought sev_tio_enabled=IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_TSM) does it but missed that sev_tio_enabled is exported as a parameter so not a constant at compile time.
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * When psp_init_on_probe is disabled, the userspace calling
>> + * SEV ioctl can inadvertently shut down SNP and SEV-TIO causing
>> + * unexpected state loss.
>> + */
>
> After this is merged, lets see if sev_move_to_init_state() can be
> cleaned up to avoid this situation.
Do we want to keep psp_init_on_probe, why? Thanks,
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>> + if (data.tio_en && !psp_init_on_probe)
>> + dev_warn(sev->dev, "SEV-TIO as incompatible with psp_init_on_probe=0\n");
>> +
>> cmd = SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX;
>> } else {
>> cmd = SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT;
>> @@ -1471,7 +1488,8 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
>>
>> snp_hv_fixed_pages_state_update(sev, HV_FIXED);
>> sev->snp_initialized = true;
>> - dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware initialized\n");
>> + dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware initialized, SEV-TIO is %s\n",
>> + data.tio_en ? "enabled" : "disabled");
>>
>> dev_info(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP API:%d.%d build:%d\n", sev->api_major,
>> sev->api_minor, sev->build);
>> @@ -1479,6 +1497,23 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
>> atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list,
>> &snp_panic_notifier);
>>
>> + if (data.tio_en) {
>> + /*
>> + * This executes with the sev_cmd_mutex held so down the stack
>> + * snp_reclaim_pages(locked=false) might be needed (which is extremely
>> + * unlikely) but will cause a deadlock.
>> + * Instead of exporting __snp_alloc_firmware_pages(), allocate a page
>> + * for this one call here.
>> + */
>> + void *tio_status = page_address(__snp_alloc_firmware_pages(
>> + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 0, true));
>> +
>> + if (tio_status) {
>> + sev_tsm_init_locked(sev, tio_status);
>> + __snp_free_firmware_pages(virt_to_page(tio_status), 0, true);
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> sev_es_tmr_size = SNP_TMR_SIZE;
>>
>> return 0;
>> @@ -2758,8 +2793,20 @@ static void __sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev, bool panic)
>>
>> static void sev_firmware_shutdown(struct sev_device *sev)
>> {
>> + /*
>> + * Calling without sev_cmd_mutex held as TSM will likely try disconnecting
>> + * IDE and this ends up calling sev_do_cmd() which locks sev_cmd_mutex.
>> + */
>> + if (sev->tio_status)
>> + sev_tsm_uninit(sev);
>> +
>> mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
>> +
>> __sev_firmware_shutdown(sev, false);
>> +
>> + kfree(sev->tio_status);
>> + sev->tio_status = NULL;
>> +
>> mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
>> }
>>
>
--
Alexey
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-02 22:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-02 2:44 [PATCH kernel v3 0/4] PCI/TSM: Enabling core infrastructure on AMD SEV TIO Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-12-02 2:44 ` [PATCH kernel v3 1/4] ccp: Make snp_reclaim_pages and __sev_do_cmd_locked public Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-12-02 2:44 ` [PATCH kernel v3 2/4] psp-sev: Assign numbers to all status codes and add new Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-12-02 2:44 ` [PATCH kernel v3 3/4] iommu/amd: Report SEV-TIO support Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-12-02 4:57 ` Vasant Hegde
2025-12-02 2:44 ` [PATCH kernel v3 4/4] crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1) Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-12-02 14:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-12-02 20:47 ` dan.j.williams
2025-12-02 22:26 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-12-02 22:30 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy [this message]
2025-12-02 22:39 ` Kalra, Ashish
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