From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/sev: Disallow userspace access to BIOS region for SEV-SNP guests
Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2025 11:39:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <67f6bee647aa5_1302d294f5@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202504091038.5D9B68A@keescook>
Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 08, 2025 at 04:55:08PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> > Dave Hansen wrote:
> > > On 4/8/25 06:43, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > > >> Tom/Boris, do you see a problem blocking access to /dev/mem for SEV
> > > >> guests?
> > > > Not sure why we would suddenly not allow that.
> > >
> > > Both TDX and SEV-SNP have issues with allowing access to /dev/mem.
> > > Disallowing access to the individually troublesome regions can fix
> > > _part_ of the problem. But suddenly blocking access is guaranteed to fix
> > > *ALL* the problems forever.
> >
> > ...or at least solicits practical use cases for why the kernel needs to
> > poke holes in the policy.
> >
> > > Or, maybe we just start returning 0's for all reads and throw away all
> > > writes. That is probably less likely to break userspace that doesn't
> > > know what it's doing in the first place.
> >
> > Yes, and a bulk of the regression risk has already been pipe-cleaned by
> > KERNEL_LOCKDOWN that shuts down /dev/mem and PCI resource file mmap in
> > many scenarios.
> >
> > Here is an updated patch that includes some consideration for mapping
> > zeros for known legacy compatibility use cases.
[..]
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> > index bfa444a7dbb0..c8679ae1bc8b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> > @@ -867,6 +867,8 @@ void __init poking_init(void)
> > */
> > int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr)
> > {
> > + bool platform_allowed = x86_platform.devmem_is_allowed(pagenr);
> > +
> > if (region_intersects(PFN_PHYS(pagenr), PAGE_SIZE,
> > IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM, IORES_DESC_NONE)
> > != REGION_DISJOINT) {
> > @@ -885,14 +887,20 @@ int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr)
> > * restricted resource under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM.
> > */
> > if (iomem_is_exclusive(pagenr << PAGE_SHIFT)) {
> > - /* Low 1MB bypasses iomem restrictions. */
> > - if (pagenr < 256)
> > + /*
> > + * Low 1MB bypasses iomem restrictions unless the
> > + * platform says "no", in which case map zeroes
> > + */
> > + if (pagenr < 256) {
> > + if (!platform_allowed)
> > + return 2;
> > return 1;
> > + }
> >
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > - return 1;
> > + return platform_allowed;
> > }
> >
> > void free_init_pages(const char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end)
>
> I am reminded of this discussion:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPcyv4iVt=peUAk1qx_EfKn7aGJM=XwRUpJftBhkUgQEti2bJA@mail.gmail.com/
>
> As in, mmap will bypass this restriction, so if you really want the low
> 1MiB to be unreadable, a solution for mmap is still needed...
Glad you remembered that!
This needs a self-test to verify the assumptions here. I can circle back
next week or so take a look at turning this into a bigger series. If
someone has cycles to take this on before that I would not say no to
some help.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-09 18:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-03 12:02 [RFC PATCH] x86/sev: Disallow userspace access to BIOS region for SEV-SNP guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2025-04-03 19:06 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-07 13:13 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-08 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-04-08 21:19 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-08 23:55 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-09 16:02 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-09 17:06 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-09 17:39 ` Kees Cook
2025-04-09 18:39 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2025-04-10 12:03 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-10 16:32 ` Kees Cook
2025-04-10 16:39 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-10 19:20 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-10 19:27 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-10 20:07 ` Dan Williams
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