Re: [PATCH hyperv-next v4 15/16] Drivers: hv: Support establishing the confidential VMBus connection

[<dan.j.williams@intel.com>]

Roman Kisel wrote:
[..]
> Trying to understand the question, thinking out loud. The paravisor is
> running within the same GPA space as the guest, the host/hv cannot
> access the CPU context and the memory assigned to the paravisor and the
> guest until they share the pages, the paravisor is measured and goes
> through attestation. From that, the customer has the control over the
> chain of trust. They can rebuild the paravisor if they wish to do so.

Ah, that is the detail I was missing the paravisor is provided by the
tenant so it could be measured by secure boot or similar mechanism the
tenant uses to measure the kernel and/or initrd image.

I also now realize this is not trying to enable device drivers other
than existing VMBUS drivers that do not need to have explicit knowledge
that the transport channel is now encrypted.

So, carry on, sorry for the noise. TDISP is trying to solve a wholly
different problem in its support for unmodified drivers without
something like a VMBUS abstraction to secure the communication channel.