Re: [PATCH kernel 6/9] x86/dma-direct: Stop changing encrypted page state for TDISP devices

[<dan.j.williams@intel.com>]

Robin Murphy wrote:
> On 2026-02-25 5:37 am, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> > TDISP devices operate in CoCo VMs only and capable of accessing
> > encrypted guest memory.
> > 
> > Currently when SME is on, the DMA subsystem forces the SME mask in
> > DMA handles in phys_to_dma() which assumes IOMMU pass through
> > which is never the case with CoCoVM running with a TDISP device.
> > 
> > Define X86's version of phys_to_dma() to skip leaking SME mask to
> > the device.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
> > ---
> > 
> > Doing this in the generic version breaks ARM which uses
> > the SME mask in DMA handles, hence ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA.
> 
> That smells a bit off... In CCA we should be in the same boat, wherein a 
> trusted device can access memory at a DMA address based on its "normal" 
> (private) GPA, rather than having to be redirected to the shared alias 
> (it's really not an "SME mask" in that sense at all).

Not quite, no, CCA *is* in the same boat as TDX, not SEV-SNP. Only
SEV-SNP has this concept that the DMA handle for private memory is the
dma_addr_unencrypted() conversion (C-bit masked) of the CPU physical
address. For CCA and TDX the typical expectation of dma_addr_encrypted()
for accepted devices holds. It just so happens that dma_addr_encrypted()
does not munge the address on  is a nop conversion for CCA and TDX.