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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, svsm-devel@coconut-svsm.dev,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 15/15] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 14:16:20 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6e597167-7e29-175d-4e69-0ccf74dedf3e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240531145423.GLZlnkn4JHSyh4-G8P@fat_crate.local>

On 5/31/24 09:54, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:58:11AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> @@ -624,8 +626,12 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   		 * modifies permission bits, it is still ok to do so currently because Linux
>>   		 * SNP guests running at VMPL0 only run at VMPL0, so VMPL1 or higher
>>   		 * permission mask changes are a don't-care.
>> +		 *
>> +		 * Running at VMPL0 is not required if an SVSM is present and the hypervisor
>> +		 * supports the required SVSM GHCB events.
>>   		 */
>> -		if (rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
>> +		if (rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1) &&
>> +		    !(vmpl && (hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_MULTI_VMPL)))
>>   			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
>>   	}
> 
> Let's make that more readable:

Will do.

> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index fb1e60165cd1..157f749faba0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -610,8 +610,10 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>   	 * features.
>   	 */
>   	if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED) {
> -		u64 hv_features = get_hv_features();
> +		u64 hv_features;
> +		int rmpadj_ret;

But I'll probably just call this 'ret'.

>   
> +		hv_features = get_hv_features();
>   		if (!(hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP))
>   			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
>   
> @@ -626,11 +628,15 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>   		 * modifies permission bits, it is still ok to do so currently because Linux
>   		 * SNP guests running at VMPL0 only run at VMPL0, so VMPL1 or higher
>   		 * permission mask changes are a don't-care.
> -		 *
> +		 */
> +		rmpadj_ret = rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1);
> +
> +		/*
>   		 * Running at VMPL0 is not required if an SVSM is present and the hypervisor
>   		 * supports the required SVSM GHCB events.
>   		 */
> -		if (rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1) &&
> +
> +		if (rmpadj_ret &&
>   		    !(vmpl && (hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_MULTI_VMPL)))
>   			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
>   	}
> 
>> -static int __init report_cpuid_table(void)
>> +static void __init report_cpuid_table(void)
>>   {
>>   	const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
>>   
>>   	if (!cpuid_table->count)
>> -		return 0;
>> +		return;
>>   
>>   	pr_info("Using SNP CPUID table, %d entries present.\n",
>>   		cpuid_table->count);
>>   
>>   	if (sev_cfg.debug)
>>   		dump_cpuid_table();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __init report_vmpl_level(void)
>> +{
>> +	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	pr_info("SNP running at VMPL%u.\n", vmpl);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int __init report_snp_info(void)
>> +{
>> +	report_vmpl_level();
>> +	report_cpuid_table();
>>   
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>> -arch_initcall(report_cpuid_table);
>> +arch_initcall(report_snp_info);
> 
> Zap one more silly helper:
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 7955c024d5d7..ff5a32b0b21c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -2356,32 +2356,23 @@ static void dump_cpuid_table(void)
>    * sort of indicator, and there's not really any other good place to do it,
>    * so do it here.
>    */
> -static void __init report_cpuid_table(void)
> +static int __init report_snp_info(void)
>   {
>   	const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
>   
>   	if (!cpuid_table->count)
> -		return;
> +		return 0;

Well you can't return in this case, just not report/dump the CPUID info. 
So I'll remove the helpers and adjust accordingly.

Thanks,
Tom

>   
>   	pr_info("Using SNP CPUID table, %d entries present.\n",
>   		cpuid_table->count);
>   
>   	if (sev_cfg.debug)
>   		dump_cpuid_table();
> -}
>   
> -static void __init report_vmpl_level(void)
> -{
>   	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
> -		return;
> +		return 0;
>   
>   	pr_info("SNP running at VMPL%u.\n", vmpl);
> -}
> -
> -static int __init report_snp_info(void)
> -{
> -	report_vmpl_level();
> -	report_cpuid_table();
>   
>   	return 0;
>   }
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-31 19:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-24 15:57 [PATCH v4 00/15] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] x86/sev: Shorten snp_secrets_page_layout to snp_secrets_page Tom Lendacky
2024-04-25 13:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:57 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking more straight forward Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-05-02  9:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-02 15:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-17 15:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-20 13:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-22 15:27           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-22 16:15             ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-22 17:23               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-05-03 10:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 10:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 13:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-06 14:14         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08  8:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 19:13     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-08 19:40       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-08 19:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 20:09         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-17 19:23           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-05-22 18:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-22 21:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 12:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 12:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-28 20:28     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 12:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 13:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-28 20:57     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 12:48       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-05-27 13:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-28 21:08     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-30 17:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-05-01 23:57   ` [svsm-devel] " Jacob Xu
2024-05-02 13:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 12:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 18:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 19:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 19:34         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 19:38           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 20:51   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 21:48   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-29 13:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] x86/sev: Take advantage of configfs visibility support in TSM Tom Lendacky
2024-04-26 21:58   ` Dan Williams
2024-04-29 13:35     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-29 14:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-01 19:28         ` Dan Williams
2024-05-01  5:18   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-05-01 20:15     ` Dan Williams
2024-05-02  3:40       ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-05-02 17:29         ` Dan Williams
2024-05-03 16:10   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 13:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 19:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-24 15:58 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky
2024-05-03 11:37   ` [svsm-devel] " Jörg Rödel
2024-05-03 16:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06  7:43       ` Jörg Rödel
2024-05-31 14:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 19:16     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-05-03 11:38 ` [svsm-devel] [PATCH v4 00/15] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Jörg Rödel

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