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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, erdemaktas@google.com,
	ackerleytng@google.com, jxgao@google.com, sagis@google.com,
	oupton@google.com, pgonda@google.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 1/1] x86/tdx: Route safe halt execution via tdx_safe_halt()
Date: Mon, 3 Feb 2025 13:19:46 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <702c5acb-6bab-4940-a8f1-c346373167bd@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <qzl5vkhykj4anuvjrhfco5qoeuib3oskffnxnqbcszotttnnqa@up5b4xl5l55g>

On 2/3/25 12:09, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
...
> But Sean's proposal with HLT check before enabling interrupts looks better
> to me.

"Sean's proposal" being this:

	https://lore.kernel.org/all/Z5l6L3Hen9_Y3SGC@google.com/

?

Is that just intended to quietly fix up a hlt-induced #VE? I'm not sure
that's a good idea. The TDVMCALL is slow, but the #VE is also presumably
quite slow. This is (presumably) getting called in an idle path which is
actually one of the most performance-sensitive things we have in the kernel.

Or am I missing the point of Sean's proposal?

I don't mind having the #VE handler warn about the situation if we end
up there accidentally.

I'd much rather have a kernel configured in a way that we are pretty
sure there's no path to even call hlt.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-02-03 21:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-29 23:25 [PATCH V2 1/1] x86/tdx: Route safe halt execution via tdx_safe_halt() Vishal Annapurve
2025-01-30  9:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-30 17:24   ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-01-30 18:48     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-30 19:45       ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-01-31  8:13         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-02-01  2:32           ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-02-03 15:59             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-02-03 17:01               ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-02-03 20:06                 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-02-03 18:06             ` Dave Hansen
2025-02-03 20:09               ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-02-03 21:19                 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2025-02-03 22:08                   ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-02-04 17:32 ` Dave Hansen
2025-02-04 18:52   ` Vishal Annapurve

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