Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] x86/tdx: Allow MMIO instructions from userspace

[Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>]

On 9/13/24 09:28, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> because folks would update their kernel and old userspace would break.
>>
>> Or maybe we start enforcing things at >=SEV-SNP and TDX and just say
>> that security model has changed too much to allow the old userspace.
> Heh, that's an outright lie though.  Nothing relevant has changed between SEV-ES
> and SEV-SNP that makes old userspace any less secure, or makes it harder for the
> kernel to support decoding instructions on SNP vs. ES.

The trust model does change, though.

The VMM is still in the guest TCB for SEV-ES because there are *so* many
ways to leverage NPT to compromise a VM.  Yeah, the data isn't in plain
view of the VMM, but that doesn't mean the VMM is out of the TCB.

With SEV-ES, old crusty userspace is doing MMIO to a VMM in the TCB.

With SEV-SNP, old crusty userspace is talking to an untrusted VMM.

I think that's how the security model changes.

> I also don't know that this is for old userspace.  AFAIK, the most common case
> for userspace triggering emulated MMIO is when a device is passed to userspace
> via VFIO/IOMMUFD, e.g. a la DPDK.

Ahh, that would make sense.

It would be nice to hear from those folks _somewhere_ about what their
restrictions are and if they'd ever be able to enforce a subset of the
ISA for MMIO or even (for example) make system calls to do MMIO.

Does it matter to them if all of a sudden the NIC or the NVMe device on
the other side of VFIO is malicious?