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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
	Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] /dev/mem: Do not map unaccepted memory
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2023 07:46:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7a50d04f-63ee-a901-6f39-7d341e423a77@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230907142510.vcj57cvnewqt4m37@box.shutemov.name>

On 9/7/23 07:25, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 07, 2023 at 07:15:21AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 9/6/23 00:39, Adrian Hunter wrote:
>>> Support for unaccepted memory was added recently, refer commit
>>> dcdfdd40fa82 ("mm: Add support for unaccepted memory"), whereby
>>> a virtual machine may need to accept memory before it can be used.
>>>
>>> Do not map unaccepted memory because it can cause the guest to fail.
>> Doesn't /dev/mem already provide a billion ways for someone to shoot
>> themselves in the foot?  TDX seems to have added the 1,000,000,001st.
>> Is this really worth patching?
> Is it better to let TD die silently? I don't think so.

First, let's take a look at all of the distro kernels that folks will
run under TDX.  Do they have STRICT_DEVMEM set?

> config STRICT_DEVMEM
...
>           If this option is switched on, and IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, the /dev/mem
>           file only allows userspace access to PCI space and the BIOS code and
>           data regions.  This is sufficient for dosemu and X and all common
>           users of /dev/mem.

Can a line of code in this patch even run in the face of IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y?

I think basically everybody sets that option and has for over a decade.
If there are any distros out there _not_ setting this, we should
probably have a chat with them to find out more.

I suspect any practical use of this patch is limited to folks who:

1. Compile sensible security-related options out of their kernel
2. Go and reads random pages with /dev/mem in their "secure" VM

They get to hold the pieces, and they can and will get a notification
from their VMM that the VM did something nasty.

BTW, Ubuntu at least also sets HARDENED_USERCOPY which will *also*
enable STRICT_DEVMEM.  So someone would have to _really_ go to some
trouble to shoot themselves in the foot here.  If they're _that_
determined, it would be a shame to thwart their efforts with this patch.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-07 14:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-06  7:38 [PATCH 0/3] Do not map unaccepted memory Adrian Hunter
2023-09-06  7:39 ` [PATCH 1/3] proc/vmcore: " Adrian Hunter
2023-09-07 15:39   ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-07 15:44     ` Adrian Hunter
2023-09-07 15:51       ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-11  8:03   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-09-11  8:41     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-09-11  8:42       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-09-11  9:27         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-09-11  9:50           ` David Hildenbrand
2023-09-11 10:05             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-09-11 14:33               ` David Hildenbrand
2023-09-06  7:39 ` [PATCH 2/3] proc/kcore: " Adrian Hunter
2023-09-07 15:36   ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-07 15:43   ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-06  7:39 ` [PATCH 3/3] /dev/mem: " Adrian Hunter
2023-09-07 10:06   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-09-07 14:15   ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-07 14:25     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-09-07 14:46       ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2023-09-07 15:04         ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-11  8:09         ` David Hildenbrand
2023-09-11 14:32           ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-07 10:07 ` [PATCH 0/3] " Kirill A. Shutemov

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