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From: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
To: Ruirui Yang <ruirui.yang@linux.dev>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,  bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, rafael@kernel.org,
	 hpa@zytor.com, peterz@infradead.org, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
	 sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	jun.nakajima@intel.com,  rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
	 seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, bhe@redhat.com,
	 kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, bdas@redhat.com,
	vkuznets@redhat.com,  dionnaglaze@google.com,
	anisinha@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, ardb@kernel.org,
	 kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] efi/x86: Fix EFI memory map corruption with kexec
Date: Thu, 9 May 2024 18:00:35 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALu+AoRVoYPjvAgkO0cpCVxvPv48BBar8Kuwc12b0XJ9wDeVRA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zjydu25Z26dH81NX@darkstar.users.ipa.redhat.com>

On Thu, 9 May 2024 at 17:56, Ruirui Yang <ruirui.yang@linux.dev> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 04:33:48PM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> >
> > With SNP guest kexec observe the following efi memmap corruption :
> >
> > [    0.000000] efi: EFI v2.7 by EDK II
> > [    0.000000] efi: SMBIOS=0x7e33f000 SMBIOS 3.0=0x7e33d000 ACPI=0x7e57e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7e57e014 MEMATTR=0x7cc3c018 Unaccepted=0x7c09e018
> > [    0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries:
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem03: [type=269370880|attr=0x0e42100e42180e41] range=[0x0486200e41038c18-0x200e898a0eee713ac17] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem04: [type=12336|attr=0x0e410686300e4105] range=[0x100e420000000176-0x8c290f26248d200e175] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem06: [type=1124304408|attr=0x000030b400000028] range=[0x0e51300e45280e77-0xb44ed2142f460c1e76] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem08: [type=68|attr=0x300e540583280e41] range=[0x0000011affff3cd8-0x486200e54b38c0bcd7] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem10: [type=1107529240|attr=0x0e42280e41300e41] range=[0x300e41058c280e42-0x38010ae54c5c328ee41] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem11: [type=189335566|attr=0x048d200e42038e18] range=[0x0000318c00000048-0xe42029228ce4200047] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem12: [type=239142534|attr=0x0000002400000b4b] range=[0x0e41380e0a7d700e-0x80f26238f22bfe500d] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem14: [type=239207055|attr=0x0e41300e43380e0a] range=[0x8c280e42048d200e-0xc70b028f2f27cc0a00d] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem15: [type=239210510|attr=0x00080e660b47080e] range=[0x0000324c0000001c-0xa78028634ce490001b] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem16: [type=4294848528|attr=0x0000329400000014] range=[0x0e410286100e4100-0x80f252036a218f20ff] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem19: [type=2250772033|attr=0x42180e42200e4328] range=[0x41280e0ab9020683-0xe0e538c28b39e62682] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem20: [type=16|   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |WB|  |WC|  ] range=[0x00000008ffff4438-0xffff44340090333c437] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem22: [Reserved    |attr=0x000000c1ffff4420] range=[0xffff442400003398-0x1033a04240003f397] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem23: [type=1141080856|attr=0x080e41100e43180e] range=[0x280e66300e4b280e-0x440dc5ee7141f4c080d] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem25: [Reserved    |attr=0x0000000affff44a0] range=[0xffff44a400003428-0x1034304a400013427] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem28: [type=16|   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |WB|  |WC|  ] range=[0x0000000affff4488-0xffff448400b034bc487] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem30: [Reserved    |attr=0x0000000affff4470] range=[0xffff447400003518-0x10352047400013517] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem33: [type=16|   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |WB|  |WC|  ] range=[0x0000000affff4458-0xffff445400b035ac457] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem35: [type=269372416|attr=0x0e42100e42180e41] range=[0x0486200e44038c18-0x200e8b8a0eee823ac17] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem37: [type=2351435330|attr=0x0e42100e42180e42] range=[0x470783380e410686-0x2002b2a041c2141e685] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem38: [type=1093668417|attr=0x100e420000000270] range=[0x42100e42180e4220-0xfff366a4e421b78c21f] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem39: [type=76357646|attr=0x180e42200e42280e] range=[0x0e410686300e4105-0x4130f251a0710ae5104] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem40: [type=940444268|attr=0x0e42200e42280e41] range=[0x180e42200e42280e-0x300fc71c300b4f2480d] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem41: [MMIO        |attr=0x8c280e42048d200e] range=[0xffff479400003728-0x42138e0c87820292727] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem42: [type=1191674680|attr=0x0000004c0000000b] range=[0x300e41380e0a0246-0x470b0f26238f22b8245] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem43: [type=2010|attr=0x0301f00e4d078338] range=[0x45038e180e42028f-0xe4556bf118f282528e] (invalid)
> > [    0.000000] efi: mem44: [type=1109921345|attr=0x300e44000000006c] range=[0x44080e42100e4218-0xfff39254e42138ac217] (invalid)
> > ...
> >
> > This EFI memap corruption is happening with efi_arch_mem_reserve() invocation in case of kexec boot.
> >
> > ( efi_arch_mem_reserve() is invoked with the following call-stack: )
> >
> > [    0.310010]  efi_arch_mem_reserve+0xb1/0x220
> > [    0.311382]  efi_mem_reserve+0x36/0x60
> > [    0.311973]  efi_bgrt_init+0x17d/0x1a0
> > [    0.313265]  acpi_parse_bgrt+0x12/0x20
> > [    0.313858]  acpi_table_parse+0x77/0xd0
> > [    0.314463]  acpi_boot_init+0x362/0x630
> > [    0.315069]  setup_arch+0xa88/0xf80
> > [    0.315629]  start_kernel+0x68/0xa90
> > [    0.316194]  x86_64_start_reservations+0x1c/0x30
> > [    0.316921]  x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
> > [    0.317582]  common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
> >
> > efi_arch_mem_reserve() calls efi_memmap_alloc() to allocate memory for
> > EFI memory map and due to early allocation it uses memblock allocation.
> >
> > Later during boot, efi_enter_virtual_mode() calls kexec_enter_virtual_mode()
> > in case of a kexec-ed kernel boot.
> >
> > This function kexec_enter_virtual_mode() installs the new EFI memory map by
> > calling efi_memmap_init_late() which remaps the efi_memmap physically allocated
> > in efi_arch_mem_reserve(), but this remapping is still using memblock allocation.
> >
> > Subsequently, when memblock is freed later in boot flow, this remapped
> > efi_memmap will have random corruption (similar to a use-after-free scenario).
> >
> > The corrupted EFI memory map is then passed to the next kexec-ed kernel
> > which causes a panic when trying to use the corrupted EFI memory map.
> >
> > Fix this EFI memory map corruption by skipping efi_arch_mem_reserve() for kexec.
> >
> > Additionally, skipping this function for kexec altogther makes sense
> > as for kexec use case need to use the the EFI memmap passed from first
> > kernel via setup_data and avoid any additional EFI memory map
> > additions/updates.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
> > index f0cc00032751..af7126d9c540 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
> > @@ -258,6 +258,26 @@ void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size)
> >       int num_entries;
> >       void *new;
> >
> > +     /*
> > +      * efi_arch_mem_reserve() calls efi_memmap_alloc() to allocate memory for
> > +      * EFI memory map and due to early allocation it uses memblock allocation.
> > +      * Later during boot, efi_enter_virtual_mode() calls kexec_enter_virtual_mode()
> > +      * in case of a kexec-ed kernel boot. This function kexec_enter_virtual_mode()
> > +      * installs the new EFI memory map by calling efi_memmap_init_late() which
> > +      * remaps the efi_memmap physically allocated here in efi_arch_mem_reserve(),
> > +      * but this remapping is still using memblock allocation.
> > +      * Subsequently, when memblock is freed later in boot flow, this remapped
> > +      * efi_memmap will have random corruption (similar to a use-after-free scenario).
> > +      * The corrupted EFI memory map is then passed to the next kexec-ed kernel
> > +      * which causes a panic when trying to use the corrupted EFI memory map.
> > +      * Additionally, skipping this function for kexec altogther makes sense
> > +      * as for kexec use case need to use the the EFI memmap passed from first
> > +      * kernel via setup_data and avoid any additional EFI memory map
> > +      * additions/updates.
> > +      */
> > +     if (efi_setup)
> > +             return;
> > +
>
> efi_mem_reserve is used to reserve boot service memory eg. bgrt, but
> it is not necessary for kexec boot, as there are no boot services in
> kexec reboot at all after the 1st kernel ExitBootServices().
>
> The UEFI memmap passed to kexec kernel includes not only the runtime
> service memory map but also the boot service memory ranges which were
> reserved by the 1st kernel with efi_mem_reserve, and those boot service
> memory ranges have already been marked "EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME" attribute.
>
> Take example of bgrt, the saved memory is there only for people to check
> the bgrt image info via /sys/firmware/acpi/bgrt/*, and it is not used in
> early boot phase by boot services.
>
> Above is the reason why the efi_mem_reserve can be skipped for kexec
> booting.  But as I suggested before I personally think that checking
> EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute set or not looks better than checking
> efi_setup.
>

I recently applied the linux.dev mail with my Chinese pinyin name  for
use when I do not have vpn access.   So just to clarify a bit, I'm the
same person here :)


  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-09 10:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-09 11:29 [PATCHv10 00/18] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:29 ` [PATCHv10 01/18] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-18 16:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-19 13:28     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:29 ` [PATCHv10 02/18] x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:29 ` [PATCHv10 03/18] cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-18 14:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-19 13:31     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-23 13:17       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 11:29 ` [PATCHv10 04/18] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-23 16:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24  8:38     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-24 13:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 14:35         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-24 14:40           ` Dave Hansen
2024-04-24 14:51             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-27 15:36               ` [PATCHv10.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:29 ` [PATCHv10 05/18] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 12:38   ` Huang, Kai
2024-04-09 14:22   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-09 15:26     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-28 17:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-29 13:17         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-29 14:45           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-29 15:16             ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-30 12:57               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-30 13:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-30 14:49     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-05-02 13:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-02 13:38         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 11:29 ` [PATCHv10 06/18] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-28 17:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-29 14:29     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-29 14:53       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-03 16:29   ` Michael Kelley
2024-04-09 11:29 ` [PATCHv10 07/18] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 08/18] x86/tdx: Account shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 09/18] x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-27 16:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-27 17:06     ` [PATCHv10.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-05-02 13:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 13:22         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-05-06 14:21           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 10/18] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-05-05 12:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-06 15:37     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-05-08 12:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-08 13:30         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 11/18] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-05-08 12:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 12/18] x86/mm: Do not zap page table entries mapping unaccepted memory table during kdump Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 13/18] x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-05-08 12:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 14/18] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 15/18] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 16/18] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free() Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 17/18] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 11:30 ` [PATCHv10 18/18] ACPI: tables: Print MULTIPROC_WAKEUP when MADT is parsed Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-09 20:42 ` [PATCH v4 0/4] x86/snp: Add kexec support Ashish Kalra
2024-04-09 20:42   ` [PATCH v4 1/4] efi/x86: skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() in case of kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-04-09 20:42   ` [PATCH v4 2/4] x86/sev: add sev_es_enabled() function Ashish Kalra
2024-04-09 21:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-09 20:42   ` [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/boot/compressed: Skip Video Memory access in Decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP Ashish Kalra
2024-04-09 20:43   ` [PATCH v4 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-04-10 14:17     ` kernel test robot
2024-04-15 23:22   ` [PATCH v5 0/3] x86/snp: Add kexec support Ashish Kalra
2024-04-15 23:22     ` [PATCH v5 1/3] efi/x86: skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() in case of kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-04-24 14:48       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-24 21:17         ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-04-25 16:45           ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-04-26 14:21           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-26 14:47             ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-04-26 15:22               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-26 15:28                 ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-04-26 15:34                   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-26 16:32                     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-04-15 23:23     ` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/boot/compressed: Skip Video Memory access in Decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP Ashish Kalra
2024-04-15 23:23     ` [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-04-26 16:33   ` [PATCH v6 0/3] x86/snp: Add kexec support Ashish Kalra
2024-04-26 16:33     ` [PATCH v6 1/3] efi/x86: Fix EFI memory map corruption with kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-05-09  9:56       ` Ruirui Yang
2024-05-09 10:00         ` Dave Young [this message]
2024-05-10 18:36         ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-04-26 16:34     ` [PATCH v6 2/3] x86/boot/compressed: Skip Video Memory access in Decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP Ashish Kalra
2024-04-26 16:35     ` [PATCH v6 3/3] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Ashish Kalra
2024-05-02 12:01   ` [PATCH v4 0/4] x86/snp: Add kexec support Alexander Graf
2024-05-02 12:18     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-05-03  8:32       ` Alexander Graf
2024-05-09  9:19         ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-05-02 21:54     ` Kalra, Ashish

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