From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A3FD156CB for ; Fri, 28 Jul 2023 19:40:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 453DBC433C9; Fri, 28 Jul 2023 19:40:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1690573231; bh=qJSSXg7Vv8HfsIe6IzeuukyvrA8LHNwx15c3kihE4MY=; h=Date:Cc:Subject:From:To:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=u02bMwQYkSQgP5ED1FN0HqlsYwUM4SznWO+fxaXJvlcV7S5o+37OM8TrjoODwoxn2 /2cSmEOn7JTnOSKFb7iBplxH6p+ZVAXJrp63KXeO4A67sr7XBP/ckvW4Gi8PsJrZ7i NNU0RH7/DrS9tq3aT27rNYkzYkPjojU9+iau3j+ASB/LgkcbG/2FCzSBt3CS1QIAYW YGXUkgOYqzbsKltBsbO3rPGuWZRb7dZ2cGdieLUoa1xnIWmnkA+sFARiropO2fooaN 0H5bVmOw9ribjWF/PXMlV89rkzIe8iLrPZxyQ9yexIG9i+87ddJH7fwdnne642pk5c XS1eDId1tA63w== Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 19:40:27 +0000 Message-Id: Cc: "Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan" , "Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan" , "Dionna Amalie Glaze" , "Greg Kroah-Hartman" , "Samuel Ortiz" , , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] keys: Introduce tsm keys From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" To: "Dan Williams" , X-Mailer: aerc 0.14.0 References: <169057265210.180586.7950140104251236598.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com> <169057265801.180586.10867293237672839356.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <169057265801.180586.10867293237672839356.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com> On Fri Jul 28, 2023 at 7:30 PM UTC, Dan Williams wrote: > One of the common operations of a TSM (Trusted Security Module) is to > provide a way for a TVM (confidential computing guest execution > environment) to take a measurement of its run state and use that with a > key-exchange protocol to establish a shared secret with a third-party / > remote attestation agent. The concept is common across TSMs, but the This is obfuscated "white paper" alike language. I have no idea what TSM's and TVM's are and I do not want to know. Even confidential computing is useless buzzword in the context of providing a key type for attestation. I would replace "tsm" with "attestation". BR, Jarkko