From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail.skyhub.de (mail.skyhub.de [5.9.137.197]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DD82F2115 for ; Fri, 13 Jan 2023 19:11:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from zn.tnic (p5de8e9fe.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [93.232.233.254]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.skyhub.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id 7BF711EC0518; Fri, 13 Jan 2023 20:11:20 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=dkim; t=1673637080; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references; bh=uSenXaLo6u2BuPearjH6XYMPmRVbj/fPB2X9geCCSBQ=; b=N4v11qcO3FHjovvV1c6EaFU2xeyguJlnWDJSyC8w+rf7M4BzksU9+WdDquv+1mHSgLIrOU NqaFofzSkjTrLynioeH/8a5rGjWs2RFNEZSKoOHUAp0OTc4JkKP5IlN7DeXV3OGoQIjbsZ duvJXqWfKJ71FJkX8JawNxzGZ60iono= Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 20:11:14 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov To: Michael Roth Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, harald@profian.com, Vishal Annapurve Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 10/64] KVM: SEV: Populate private memory fd during LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Message-ID: References: <20221214194056.161492-1-michael.roth@amd.com> <20221214194056.161492-11-michael.roth@amd.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20221214194056.161492-11-michael.roth@amd.com> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 01:40:02PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote: > From: Vishal Annapurve > > This change adds handling of HVA ranges to copy contents s/This change adds handling of/Handle/ > +static int sev_launch_update_priv_gfn_handler(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_gfn_range *range, > + struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct sev_data_launch_update_data data; > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + gfn_t gfn; > + kvm_pfn_t pfn; > + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot = range->slot; > + int ret = 0; > + > + data.reserved = 0; > + data.handle = sev->handle; > + > + for (gfn = range->start; gfn < range->end; gfn++) { > + int order; > + void *kvaddr; > + > + ret = kvm_restricted_mem_get_pfn(memslot, gfn, &pfn, &order); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + > + kvaddr = pfn_to_kaddr(pfn); > + if (!virt_addr_valid(kvaddr)) { > + pr_err("Invalid kvaddr 0x%llx\n", (uint64_t)kvaddr); Is that some debugging help leftover or what is that printk issued for? > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto e_ret; > + } > + > + ret = kvm_read_guest_page(kvm, gfn, kvaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); > + if (ret) { > + pr_err("guest read failed 0x%x\n", ret); > + goto e_ret; > + } > + > + if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT)) check_for_deprecated_apis: WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:602: Do not use this_cpu_has() - use cpu_feature_enabled() instead. > + clflush_cache_range(kvaddr, PAGE_SIZE); > + > + data.len = PAGE_SIZE; > + data.address = __sme_set(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT); > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error); > + if (ret) > + goto e_ret; > + kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn); > + } > + kvm_vm_set_region_attr(kvm, range->start, range->end, > + true /* priv_attr */); No need to break that line. > + > +e_ret: > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int sev_launch_update_gfn_handler(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range, > + void *data) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp = (struct kvm_sev_cmd *)data; > + > + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(range->slot)) > + return sev_launch_update_priv_gfn_handler(kvm, range, argp); > + > + return sev_launch_update_shared_gfn_handler(kvm, range, argp); > +} > + > +static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) > + return -EFAULT; Not gonna check those user-supplied values for sanity? Or is this check if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hva_end <= hva_start)) return -EINVAL; in kvm_vm_do_hva_range_op() enough? Thx. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette