From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
"tabba@google.com" <tabba@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com,
ackerleytng@google.com, vbabka@suse.cz, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
nikunj.dadhania@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, pankaj.gupta@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC gmem v1 4/8] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating memory
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2024 13:26:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZfC6gnqVhZQJnB_3@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240311172431.zqymfqd4xlpd3pft@amd.com>
On Mon, Mar 11, 2024, Michael Roth wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 09, 2024 at 07:13:13AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 09, 2024, Steven Price wrote:
> > > >> One option that I've considered is to implement a seperate CCA ioctl to
> > > >> notify KVM whether the memory should be mapped protected.
> > > >
> > > > That's what KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES+KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE is for, no?
> > >
> > > Sorry, I really didn't explain that well. Yes effectively this is the
> > > attribute flag, but there's corner cases for destruction of the VM. My
> > > thought was that if the VMM wanted to tear down part of the protected
> > > range (without making it shared) then a separate ioctl would be needed
> > > to notify KVM of the unmap.
> >
> > No new uAPI should be needed, because the only scenario time a benign VMM should
> > do this is if the guest also knows the memory is being removed, in which case
> > PUNCH_HOLE will suffice.
> >
> > > >> This 'solves' the problem nicely except for the case where the VMM
> > > >> deliberately punches holes in memory which the guest is using.
> > > >
> > > > I don't see what problem there is to solve in this case. PUNCH_HOLE is destructive,
> > > > so don't do that.
> > >
> > > A well behaving VMM wouldn't PUNCH_HOLE when the guest is using it, but
> > > my concern here is a VMM which is trying to break the host. In this case
> > > either the PUNCH_HOLE needs to fail, or we actually need to recover the
> > > memory from the guest (effectively killing the guest in the process).
> >
> > The latter. IIRC, we talked about this exact case somewhere in the hour-long
> > rambling discussion on guest_memfd at PUCK[1]. And we've definitely discussed
> > this multiple times on-list, though I don't know that there is a single thread
> > that captures the entire plan.
> >
> > The TL;DR is that gmem will invoke an arch hook for every "struct kvm_gmem"
> > instance that's attached to a given guest_memfd inode when a page is being fully
> > removed, i.e. when a page is being freed back to the normal memory pool. Something
> > like this proposed SNP patch[2].
> >
> > Mike, do have WIP patches you can share?
>
> Sorry, I missed this query earlier. I'm a bit confused though, I thought
> the kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate() hook provided in this patch was what we
> ended up agreeing on during the PUCK call in question.
Heh, I trust your memory of things far more than I trust mine. I'm just proving
Cunningham's Law. :-)
> There was an open question about what to do if a use-case came along
> where we needed to pass additional parameters to
> kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate() other than just the start/end PFN range for
> the pages being freed, but we'd determined that SNP and TDX did not
> currently need this, so I didn't have any changes planned in this
> regard.
>
> If we now have such a need, what we had proposed was to modify
> __filemap_remove_folio()/page_cache_delete() to defer setting
> folio->mapping to NULL so that we could still access it in
> kvm_gmem_free_folio() so that we can still access mapping->i_private_list
> to get the list of gmem/KVM instances and pass them on via
> kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate().
Yeah, this is what I was remembering. I obviously forgot that we didn't have a
need to iterate over all bindings at this time.
> So that's doable, but it's not clear from this discussion that that's
> needed.
Same here. And even if it is needed, it's not your problem to solve. The above
blurb about needing to preserve folio->mapping being free_folio() is sufficient
to get the ARM code moving in the right direction.
Thanks!
> If the idea to block/kill the guest if VMM tries to hole-punch,
> and ARM CCA already has plans to wire up the shared/private flags in
> kvm_unmap_gfn_range(), wouldn't that have all the information needed to
> kill that guest? At that point, kvm_gmem_free_folio() can handle
> additional per-page cleanup (with additional gmem/KVM info plumbed in
> if necessary).
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-12 20:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-16 11:50 [PATCH RFC gmem v1 0/8] KVM: gmem hooks/changes needed for x86 (other archs?) Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 1/8] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 2/8] KVM: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 3/8] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing memory Michael Roth
2024-02-08 10:57 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-02-08 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 4/8] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating memory Michael Roth
2024-02-09 10:11 ` Steven Price
2024-02-09 14:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-09 15:02 ` Steven Price
2024-02-09 15:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 17:24 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-12 20:26 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-03-13 17:11 ` Steven Price
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 5/8] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 6/8] KVM: x86: Add KVM_X86_SNP_VM vm_type Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 7/8] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 8/8] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults based on vm_type Michael Roth
2024-01-31 1:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-08 0:24 ` Michael Roth
2024-02-08 17:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-08 17:30 ` Paolo Bonzini
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