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dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;dmarc=none action=none header.from=amd.com; Received: from SA1PR12MB999228.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:806:4db::10) by DSVPR12MB999286.namprd12.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:8:41a::20) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.21.615.14; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 11:12:46 +0000 Received: from SA1PR12MB999228.namprd12.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::4dba:119e:8e7c:37b3]) by SA1PR12MB999228.namprd12.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::4dba:119e:8e7c:37b3%6]) with mapi id 15.21.0615.013; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 11:12:46 +0000 Message-ID: Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:12:39 +1100 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance To: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: "Reshetova, Elena" , "Jiang, Dave" , Xu Yilun , "Aneesh Kumar K.V" , "linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" , Jiri Pirko , "Tian, Kevin" , Catalin Marinas , Suzuki K Poulose , Steven Price , Kiryl Shutsemau , "Edgecombe, Rick P" , Dave Hansen , Jonathan Cameron , Bjorn Helgaas , Ashish Kalra , Tom Lendacky , John Allen , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , "patches@lists.linux.dev" References: <20261109185315.GS770409@nvidia.com> <20261109234032.GT770409@nvidia.com> <20261110142038.GE738765@nvidia.com> <20261111141315.GI738765@nvidia.com> <73d5e5b5-2626-4107-8f0d-2203c53ddd43@amd.com> <20261112123127.GK738765@nvidia.com> <20261117011837.GG2245175@nvidia.com> From: Alexey Kardashevskiy Content-Language: en-US In-Reply-To: <20261117011837.GG2245175@nvidia.com> Content-Type: text/plain; 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This must be prevented by the guest and device co-operating.> >>> For a concrete example, imagine a RDMA NIC. The hypervisor boots it up >>> and establishes a remote QP with RDMA access to all memory. Passes it >>> to the guest and the guest does DMA ENABLE. Hypervisor suspends the >>> guest immediately after and rewrites all its memory via the network. >> >> Then the HV is in the guest's TCB, no? > > No, it has access to an unlocked PCI device. That should never make > the HV part of the guest TCB. Creating that barrier is entire point of > TDISP. > >> I do not know anything about RDMA NICs but there must be some access >> control. How is this different than giving the host an SSH key to >> the guest's root account, for example? > > It is completely different. The entire point of TDISP is to take a PCI > device in the system and then allow the guest to accept it into its > TCB. > > My point is: when the guest accepts the device it cannot be "Dirty" > with state and commands loaded into it by the untrusted hypervisor! I do get that :) I am trying to figure out how the guest can guarantee (== the device can prove) that the device is clean. >>> Devices MUST have protections against these kinds of attacks built >>> into their LOCKED/RUN state transitions and verification, somehow. No >>> spec says how to do this.> Exactly that. No spec. >>> Pretty much any device that does DMA can be tricked into doing >>> something like this :( >> >> So we basically want guarantees that bus master is off when >> transitioning to RUN, is that right? > > No. We need guarentees that the device is *clean* before we do DMA > ENABLE. > > Clean means something like "just reset" > > IIRC we can't change bus master while in RUN anyhow, that is not how > any of this is expected to work. We cannot clear the BM (triggers ERROR) but 0->1 is allowed. Although the VM can only ask to enable it without knowing for sure what it was... > We expect the device to respond to RUN and LOCK and do one of the > options I gave. > >> A TDI measurements could include the VF config space but we do not >> have TDI measurements... Huh. >> >> Sorry but it sounds like the device driver is the one which has deep >> enough knowledge of the device and, upon transitioning to RUN, can >> tell the device to stop/reset (via encrypted MMIO) while keeping DMA >> blocked. > > Too late, DMA has already been activated, that breaks our model to try > to activate DMA somehow after the driver starts. If DMA is activated as SWIOTLB (so the device is still "adversary") - then we could (I am not really suggesting this, just clarifying). > Plus many devices > cannot reset themselves just from mmio.. Well it does not need to reset, it needs to know it was quiesced... > The device knows what it is doing, the device has to respond to TDISP > in an appropriate way to give this guarantee, or it is security broken. >>>>> We run the attestation without a bound driver now so the device is >>>> quiet but so far PCIe TDISP did not require this. >>> >>> There are many things the specs don't *require* but have to be done in >>> a certain way to get security. Enabling dma and binding a driver >>> before taking a measurement is obviously security wrong. >> >> Well, I meant that the driver can start with encrypted MMIO (or not >> encrypted) and untrusted DMA (SWIOTLB or vIOMMU with only shared >> mappings) and then, after the attestation, switch to trusted DMA >> (and remap everything). > > That's not our goal in Linux. We want unmodified drivers to work with > TDISP devices in RUN. True. >> Say, it is a the only NIC in the guest and the VM wants to run it as >> trusted but the attestation server is outside. Reloading the driver >> is just easier. > > A flow where the VM self-attests is really weird, and I don't think it > can really be made secure in cases when the NIC is involved. We want > to log the attestation (Eg to a PCR) and then the online verification > can check if the lohged measurement is acceptable or not. Since the > log is tamper proof we have a record of exactly what was accepted > before it could have compromised the VM. Nah, I meant to use SWIOTLB which does not compromise the VM. Thanks, >> Right now my guests request measurements with a guest userspace >> provided nonce and the PSP talks to the device to get them. > > This is basically right. > > Jason -- Alexey