From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
seanjc@google.com, peterz@infradead.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
ardb@kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, aik@amd.com, Michael.Roth@amd.com,
Tycho.Andersen@amd.com, Nathan.Fontenot@amd.com,
ackerleytng@google.com, jackyli@google.com, pgonda@google.com,
rientjes@google.com, jacobhxu@google.com, xin@zytor.com,
pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, babu.moger@amd.com,
dyoung@redhat.com, nikunj@amd.com, john.allen@amd.com,
darwi@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/7] crypto/ccp: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 17:23:26 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aaf08f03-ada1-4e2a-88ae-2e900e1f5c89@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <763bff29-e737-4033-ab30-cec8fd3e7438@amd.com>
Hello Prateek,
On 6/16/2026 11:33 PM, K Prateek Nayak wrote:
> Hello Ashish,
>
> On 6/16/2026 1:19 AM, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>
>> The SEV firmware enumerates the CPUs at SNP initialization and is not
>> aware of the OS bringing CPUs online or offline afterwards, so OS CPU
>> hotplug can diverge from the firmware's expectations and break SNP.
>> Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active.
>
> Dumb question: Is this specific to RMPOPT? Otherwise ...
The actual reason is purely about the SEV firmware: it enumerates the BIOS-enabled CPUs at SNP_INIT_EX
and has no knowledge of OS hotplug afterward. That's true whether or not RMPOPT exists.
RMPOPT only benefits from the side effect, which is a stable rmpopt_cpumask and an uncontended cpus_read_lock()
in the work handler.
So it is specific to SNP, but RMPOPT patches that come later in the series rely on it, therefore it
is a pre-patch here.
>
>>
>> SNP is fully torn down only on the SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX x86_snp_shutdown
>> path; the legacy path leaves SNP enabled in hardware while clearing
>> snp_initialized, so __sev_snp_init_locked() can run again. Track the
>> disable with a flag so it is balanced by a matching enable rather than
>> stacked, and re-enable hotplug only on the x86_snp_shutdown path, after
>> snp_shutdown() has cleared the per-core RMPOPT_BASE MSRs with hotplug
>> still disabled.
>>
>> This also keeps the CPU set stable for the asynchronous RMPOPT scan
>> added later in this series, and ensures cpus_read_lock() in the scan
>> is uncontended.
>>
>> Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>> ---
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> index 217b6b19802e..c8c3c577463c 100644
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> @@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ struct snp_hv_fixed_pages_entry {
>>
>> static LIST_HEAD(snp_hv_fixed_pages);
>>
>> +/* Set while SNP has CPU hotplug disabled. */
>> +static bool snp_cpu_hotplug_disabled;
>> +
>> /* Trusted Memory Region (TMR):
>> * The TMR is a 1MB area that must be 1MB aligned. Use the page allocator
>> * to allocate the memory, which will return aligned memory for the specified
>> @@ -1479,6 +1482,17 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
>>
>> snp_hv_fixed_pages_state_update(sev, HV_FIXED);
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active. Guard against stacking
>> + * the disable count: the legacy SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX path clears
>> + * snp_initialized without re-enabling hotplug, so this can run
>> + * again while hotplug is already disabled.
>> + */
>> + if (!snp_cpu_hotplug_disabled) {
>> + cpu_hotplug_disable();
>> + snp_cpu_hotplug_disabled = true;
>> + }
>> +
>
> ... should this be done before __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX)
> is issued?
>
> I'm assuming that is when the firmware enumerates the CPUs during SNP
> initialization and any hotplug after that should be disallowed?
Yes, it makes sense to do it before SNP_INIT_EX is issued.
Thanks,
Ashish
>
>> snp_setup_rmpopt();
>>
>> sev->snp_initialized = true;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-17 22:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <cover.1781419998.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
2026-06-15 19:48 ` [PATCH v8 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT feature flag Ashish Kalra
2026-06-15 19:48 ` [PATCH v8 2/7] x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs Ashish Kalra
2026-06-16 6:03 ` K Prateek Nayak
2026-06-15 19:49 ` [PATCH v8 3/7] crypto/ccp: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active Ashish Kalra
2026-06-17 4:33 ` K Prateek Nayak
2026-06-17 22:23 ` Kalra, Ashish [this message]
2026-06-15 19:49 ` [PATCH v8 4/7] x86/sev: Add support to perform RMP optimizations asynchronously Ashish Kalra
2026-06-16 7:27 ` K Prateek Nayak
2026-06-16 19:56 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-06-17 4:20 ` K Prateek Nayak
2026-06-17 21:57 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-06-15 19:49 ` [PATCH v8 5/7] x86/sev: Add interface to re-enable RMP optimizations Ashish Kalra
2026-06-15 19:50 ` [PATCH v8 6/7] KVM: SEV: Perform RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown Ashish Kalra
2026-06-15 19:50 ` [PATCH v8 7/7] x86/sev: Add debugfs support for RMPOPT Ashish Kalra
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