From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBC3E43303C; Fri, 7 Aug 2026 11:58:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786103934; cv=none; b=KFELrsj0KJG6z+eurWz/RptxtX5Ciw1iYR/gpgfuZtiAoRq2xVa5G+3pOLyRnbBCyZ2aw2hSkSlF30TG/8SadM9LC7R5wf3akxwi9ZcIG7SO+dmcVFzCRE+MbSHcMJb1nMKnt9J33qoDEVJQp6SEtYgwleCHSlZiQRjTDYyrjMs= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786103934; c=relaxed/simple; bh=d9eHFqF4ILa/m5FwwPTWfmm6RlAunnATLpfvh3A36LM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=Lav8HrvAf9SZWUiHy6Ap1KUXTcpBDTMpqOItlHDfFdWPls3piZ18yIIhZZsPV+ifyRI0oSR+tGZHTAxNC5nGstCHaoAi4DG0X/giCjqm19tTeprSFOuXy1r2am7y7B3Gr8MaTHX3HyjHuK0oTvDgwigHLI8noF5RknGkFTxTxTE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Nb5CNrdE; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Nb5CNrdE" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F2F7A1F00A3A; Fri, 7 Aug 2026 11:58:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1786103918; bh=Xd3UFDIz5wYvevp0q0lFRxsbOOvF3TFwe4o0b4um2rs=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=Nb5CNrdE/4Z45mCov87EsHo7R+c/XppeMgdWkypZiJi0hG1F3qOgd2tMn8awJqvaS lbdSFBuX+8DZW+BUgsVb72bpNXzoeTOxLUMO7EfDoa8A1uqNuAgZxEIKcOk6xWqCjz inB/PGpqH/asRSsq2GTJ8yf/60nRgNhE7C1XyCY51qwFthllbwSfudh5hb9iKzACj7 QziTT7OLJ6iY0pmcLYRNlH75OV6VN8M2L9EGh7RPznyr9g/ejgHCUX6HO7rcff8qyK jVXAQEnK36ohiepgjg3IyQBDlNwN1AqiRdGYIzb5ul1D0/BFPUE3uuAab7MCjuibx8 FtaKWGZWWR0DA== Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 12:58:29 +0100 From: Will Deacon To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" Cc: iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Robin Murphy , Marek Szyprowski , Marc Zyngier , Steven Price , Suzuki K Poulose , Catalin Marinas , Jiri Pirko , Jason Gunthorpe , Mostafa Saleh , Petr Tesarik , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Dan Williams , Xu Yilun , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , Alexander Gordeev , Gerald Schaefer , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: swiotlb: Keep the default size for protected guests Message-ID: References: <20260717180442.110954-18-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> <20260807092612.2202005-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20260807092612.2202005-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> On Fri, Aug 07, 2026 at 02:56:12PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote: > Realm guests and protected KVM guests may require swiotlb for device DMA > even when all system RAM is addressable by the DMA zones. > > Do not reduce the SWIOTLB buffer to the kmalloc-bouncing size for these > guests, as the reduced number of slots can be exhausted during CCA guest > operation. > > Fixes: 30c5e45ee2c5 ("dma-direct: make dma_direct_map_phys() honor DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED") > Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) > --- > arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c > index e308a7cabd12..24caaf10e755 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/mm/init.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/init.c > @@ -339,7 +339,8 @@ void __init arch_mm_preinit(void) > { > unsigned int flags = SWIOTLB_VERBOSE; > > - if (max_pfn <= PFN_DOWN(arm64_dma_phys_limit)) { > + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && > + max_pfn <= PFN_DOWN(arm64_dma_phys_limit)) { Protected guests under pKVM rely on restricted DMA, so won't this just waste memory for them? Will