From: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 10:01:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bad09d97-d99b-4231-a481-c14ed0f8d59d@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240116072822.pvzseyqry56eqa4j@box.shutemov.name>
On 16.01.24 г. 9:28 ч., Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
<snip>
>>> @@ -41,6 +44,9 @@
>>> static atomic_long_t nr_shared;
>>> +static atomic_t conversions_in_progress;
>>> +static bool conversion_allowed = true;
>>
>> Given the usage model of this variable, shouldn't it be simply accessed via
>> READ/WRITE_ONCE macros?
>
> What do you see it changing?
Serving as documentation that you are accessing a shared variable
without an explicit lock (unless I'm missing something).
conversion_allowed can be read by multiple threads, no ? And it's
written by a single thread?
>
<snip>
>>> +static void tdx_kexec_stop_conversion(bool crash)
>>> +{
>>> + /* Stop new private<->shared conversions */
>>> + conversion_allowed = false;
>>
>> What's the logic behind this compiler barrier?
>
> Disallow compiler to push the assignment past atomic_read() loop below.
> Not sure if anything else prevents such reorder without the barrier.
>
> And I don't think WRITE_ONCE() will do the trick. It only prevents
> multiple writes, but doesn't prevent reorders agains accesses
> non-READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() accesses.
>
>>> + barrier();
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for
>>> + * conversions to finish.
>>> + *
>>> + * If race happened, just report and proceed.
>>> + */
>>> + if (!crash) {
>>> + unsigned long timeout;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * Wait for in-flight conversions to complete.
>>> + *
>>> + * Do not wait more than 30 seconds.
>>> + */
>>> + timeout = 30 * USEC_PER_SEC;
>>> + while (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress) && timeout--)
>>> + udelay(1);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + if (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress))
>>> + pr_warn("Failed to finish shared<->private conversions\n");
>>> +}
>>> +
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
>>> index c9503fe2d13a..3196ff20a29e 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
>>> @@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct x86_guest {
>>> int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
>>> bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
>>> bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
>>> + void (*enc_kexec_stop_conversion)(bool crash);
>>> + void (*enc_kexec_unshare_mem)(void);
>>
>> These are only being initialized in the TDX case, but called in all cases
>> when CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT is true, which includes AMD. So it would
>> cause a crash, no ? Shouldn't you also introduce noop handlers initialized
>> in the default x86_platform struct in arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c ?
>
> kexec on AMD will not work without them, I think. But noops makes sense
> anyway. Will fix.
I'm not disputing whether those are needed for AMD or not, that way I
see it you make those callbacks mandatory in the case of
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT being present, yet only implement them for
TDX. So in the case of AMD they will be NULL and so AMD with kexec
enabled (albeit erroneously) will crash, no ?
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-16 8:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-22 23:51 [PATCHv5 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 01/16] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 02/16] x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 03/16] cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 04/16] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 05/16] x86/kvm: Do not try to disable kvmclock if it was not enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 06/16] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 07/16] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 08/16] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 09/16] x86/tdx: Account shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-05 19:38 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-06 0:59 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-06 1:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-15 10:53 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 7:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-16 8:01 ` Nikolay Borisov [this message]
2024-01-16 10:45 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-16 10:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 11/16] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 12/16] x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 13/16] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 14/16] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-25 8:05 ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-08 3:04 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 10:15 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-09 3:04 ` Huang, Kai
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 15/16] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free() Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-08 3:13 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 3:30 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 10:17 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-08 13:13 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 13:35 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-15 13:19 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 6:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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