From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 12:03:38 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c197dc02-b63a-eb45-8e52-275934177d7e@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220224165625.2175020-43-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Hi Brijesh,
On 24/02/2022 18:56, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate
> with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to
> read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses
> snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or
> SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP.
>
> The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key
> specified through the platform_data.
>
> Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation
> report.
>
> See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
[...]
> +
> +static struct snp_guest_crypto *init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u8 *key, size_t keylen)
> +{
> + struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
> +
> + crypto = kzalloc(sizeof(*crypto), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!crypto)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + crypto->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(crypto->tfm))
> + goto e_free;
When trying this series, the sevguest module didn't load (and printed no
error message). After adding some debug messages, I found that the
crypto_alloc_read() call returned an error. I found out that
CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM was disabled in my config.
Consider modifying sevguest/Kconfig to force it in:
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
index 2be45820e86c..74ca1fe09437 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
config SEV_GUEST
tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver"
default m
- depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT && CRYPTO_AEAD2
+ depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ select CRYPTO_AEAD2
+ select CRYPTO_GCM
help
SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with
the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read,
Another thing to consider is to add messages to the various error paths
in snp_guest_probe(). Not sure what is the common practice in other modules.
-Dov
> +
> + if (crypto_aead_setkey(crypto->tfm, key, keylen))
> + goto e_free_crypto;
> +
> + crypto->iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(crypto->tfm);
> + crypto->iv = kmalloc(crypto->iv_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!crypto->iv)
> + goto e_free_crypto;
> +
> + if (crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm) > MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN) {
> + if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(crypto->tfm, MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN)) {
> + dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "failed to set authsize to %d\n", MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN);
> + goto e_free_iv;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + crypto->a_len = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm);
> + crypto->authtag = kmalloc(crypto->a_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (!crypto->authtag)
> + goto e_free_auth;
> +
> + return crypto;
> +
> +e_free_auth:
> + kfree(crypto->authtag);
> +e_free_iv:
> + kfree(crypto->iv);
> +e_free_crypto:
> + crypto_free_aead(crypto->tfm);
> +e_free:
> + kfree(crypto);
> +
> + return NULL;
> +}
[...]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-02 10:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-24 16:55 [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 19:38 ` [PATCH v11 3.1/45] " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 08/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 17/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:55 ` [PATCH v11 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 21/45] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2022-03-03 17:09 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-03 18:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2022-03-01 9:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 14:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-02 15:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-03 9:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-03-03 11:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-04 0:31 ` Michael Roth
2022-03-04 7:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2022-03-02 10:03 ` Dov Murik [this message]
2022-03-02 14:33 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-03 17:33 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-04 13:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 15:23 ` Dave Hansen
2022-03-04 15:43 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2022-03-03 15:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-03 16:47 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 14:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-04 15:39 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-03-04 16:03 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-03-04 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-24 16:56 ` [PATCH v11 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-03-02 14:22 ` [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Borislav Petkov
2022-03-02 16:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-03-02 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-04-03 22:36 ` Borislav Petkov
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