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This > protocol definition builds upon Component Measurement and Authentication > (CMA), and link Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE). It adds support for > assigning devices (PCI physical or virtual function) to a confidential VM > such that the assigned device is enabled to access guest private memory > protected by technologies like Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, RISCV COVE, or ARM > CCA. > > The "TSM" (TEE Security Manager) is a concept in the TDISP specification > of an agent that mediates between a "DSM" (Device Security Manager) and > system software in both a VMM and a confidential VM. A VMM uses TSM ABIs > to setup link security and assign devices. A confidential VM uses TSM > ABIs to transition an assigned device into the TDISP "RUN" state and > validate its configuration. From a Linux perspective the TSM abstracts > many of the details of TDISP, IDE, and CMA. Some of those details leak > through at times, but for the most part TDISP is an internal > implementation detail of the TSM. > > CONFIG_PCI_TSM adds an "authenticated" attribute and "tsm/" subdirectory > to pci-sysfs. Consider that the TSM driver may itself be a PCI driver. > Userspace can watch for the arrival of a "TSM" device, > /sys/class/tsm/tsm0/uevent KOBJ_CHANGE, to know when the PCI core has > initialized TSM services. > > The operations that can be executed against a PCI device are split into > two mutually exclusive operation sets, "Link" and "Security" (struct > pci_tsm_{link,security}_ops). The "Link" operations manage physical link > security properties and communication with the device's Device Security > Manager firmware. These are the host side operations in TDISP. The > "Security" operations coordinate the security state of the assigned > virtual device (TDI). These are the guest side operations in TDISP. Only > link management operations are defined at this stage and placeholders > provided for the security operations. > > The locking allows for multiple devices to be executing commands > simultaneously, one outstanding command per-device and an rwsem > synchronizes the implementation relative to TSM > registration/unregistration events. > > Thanks to Wu Hao for his work on an early draft of this support. > > Cc: Lukas Wunner > Cc: Samuel Ortiz > Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy > Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas > Co-developed-by: Xu Yilun > Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams > --- > Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci | 51 ++ > Documentation/driver-api/pci/index.rst | 1 + > Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst | 12 + > MAINTAINERS | 4 +- > drivers/pci/Kconfig | 15 + > drivers/pci/Makefile | 1 + > drivers/pci/doe.c | 2 - > drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 4 + > drivers/pci/pci.h | 10 + > drivers/pci/probe.c | 3 + > drivers/pci/remove.c | 6 + > drivers/pci/tsm.c | 601 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c | 49 +- > include/linux/pci-doe.h | 4 + > include/linux/pci-tsm.h | 143 ++++++ > include/linux/pci.h | 3 + > include/linux/tsm.h | 6 +- > include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h | 1 + > 18 files changed, 910 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst > create mode 100644 drivers/pci/tsm.c > create mode 100644 include/linux/pci-tsm.h > > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci > index 69f952fffec7..e0c8dad8d889 100644 > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci > @@ -612,3 +612,54 @@ Description: > > # ls doe_features > 0001:01 0001:02 doe_discovery > + > +What: /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../tsm/ > +Contact: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev > +Description: > + This directory only appears if a physical device function > + supports authentication (PCIe CMA-SPDM), interface security > + (PCIe TDISP), and is accepted for secure operation by the > + platform TSM driver. This attribute directory appears > + dynamically after the platform TSM driver loads. So, only after > + the /sys/class/tsm/tsm0 device arrives can tools assume that > + devices without a tsm/ attribute directory will never have one; > + before that, the security capabilities of the device relative to > + the platform TSM are unknown. See > + Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tsm. > + > +What: /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../tsm/connect > +Contact: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev > +Description: > + (RW) Write the name of a TSM (TEE Security Manager) device from > + /sys/class/tsm to this file to establish a connection with the > + device. This typically includes an SPDM (DMTF Security > + Protocols and Data Models) session over PCIe DOE (Data Object > + Exchange) and may also include PCIe IDE (Integrity and Data > + Encryption) establishment. Reads from this attribute return the > + name of the connected TSM or the empty string if not > + connected. A TSM device signals its readiness to accept PCI > + connection via a KOBJ_CHANGE event. > + > +What: /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../tsm/disconnect > +Contact: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev > +Description: > + (WO) Write the name of the TSM device that was specified > + to 'connect' to teardown the connection. > + > +What: /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../authenticated > +Contact: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org > +Description: > + When the device's tsm/ directory is present device > + authentication (PCIe CMA-SPDM) and link encryption (PCIe IDE) > + are handled by the platform TSM (TEE Security Manager). When the > + tsm/ directory is not present this attribute reflects only the > + native CMA-SPDM authentication state with the kernel's > + certificate store. > + > + If the attribute is not present, it indicates that > + authentication is unsupported by the device, or the TSM has no > + available authentication methods for the device. > + > + When present and the tsm/ attribute directory is present, the > + authenticated attribute is an alias for the device 'connect' > + state. See the 'tsm/connect' attribute for more details. > diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/pci/index.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/pci/index.rst > index a38e475cdbe3..9e1b801d0f74 100644 > --- a/Documentation/driver-api/pci/index.rst > +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/pci/index.rst > @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ The Linux PCI driver implementer's API guide > > pci > p2pdma > + tsm > > .. only:: subproject and html > > diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..59b94d79a4f2 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ > +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +.. include:: > + > +======================================================== > +PCI Trusted Execution Environment Security Manager (TSM) > +======================================================== > + > +.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/pci-tsm.h > + :internal: > + > +.. kernel-doc:: drivers/pci/tsm.c > + :export: > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > index 024b18244c65..f1aabab88c79 100644 > --- a/MAINTAINERS > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > @@ -25619,8 +25619,10 @@ L: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev > S: Maintained > F: Documentation/ABI/testing/configfs-tsm-report > F: Documentation/driver-api/coco/ > +F: Documentation/driver-api/pci/tsm.rst > +F: drivers/pci/tsm.c > F: drivers/virt/coco/guest/ > -F: include/linux/tsm*.h > +F: include/linux/*tsm*.h > F: samples/tsm-mr/ > > TRUSTED SERVICES TEE DRIVER > diff --git a/drivers/pci/Kconfig b/drivers/pci/Kconfig > index 105b72b93613..0183ca6f6954 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/pci/Kconfig > @@ -136,6 +136,21 @@ config PCI_IDE_STREAM_MAX > platform capability for the foreseeable future is 4 to 8 streams. Bump > this value up if you have an expert testing need. > > +config PCI_TSM > + bool "PCI TSM: Device security protocol support" > + select PCI_IDE > + select PCI_DOE > + select TSM > + help > + The TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) Device Interface > + Security Protocol (TDISP) defines a "TSM" as a platform agent > + that manages device authentication, link encryption, link > + integrity protection, and assignment of PCI device functions > + (virtual or physical) to confidential computing VMs that can > + access (DMA) guest private memory. > + > + Enable a platform TSM driver to use this capability. > + > config PCI_DOE > bool "Enable PCI Data Object Exchange (DOE) support" > help > diff --git a/drivers/pci/Makefile b/drivers/pci/Makefile > index 6612256fd37d..2c545f877062 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/Makefile > +++ b/drivers/pci/Makefile > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_PCIDEV_FRONTEND) += xen-pcifront.o > obj-$(CONFIG_VGA_ARB) += vgaarb.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DOE) += doe.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_IDE) += ide.o > +obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_TSM) += tsm.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES) += of_property.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PCI_NPEM) += npem.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PCIE_TPH) += tph.o > diff --git a/drivers/pci/doe.c b/drivers/pci/doe.c > index aae9a8a00406..62be9c8dbc52 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/doe.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/doe.c > @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ > > #include "pci.h" > > -#define PCI_DOE_FEATURE_DISCOVERY 0 > - > /* Timeout of 1 second from 6.30.2 Operation, PCI Spec r6.0 */ > #define PCI_DOE_TIMEOUT HZ > #define PCI_DOE_POLL_INTERVAL (PCI_DOE_TIMEOUT / 128) > diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c > index 5eea14c1f7f5..367ca1bc5470 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c > @@ -1815,6 +1815,10 @@ const struct attribute_group *pci_dev_attr_groups[] = { > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_DOE > &pci_doe_sysfs_group, > +#endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_TSM > + &pci_tsm_auth_attr_group, > + &pci_tsm_attr_group, > #endif > NULL, > }; > diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.h b/drivers/pci/pci.h > index 56851e73439b..0e24262aa4ba 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/pci.h > +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.h > @@ -525,6 +525,16 @@ void pci_ide_init(struct pci_dev *dev); > static inline void pci_ide_init(struct pci_dev *dev) { } > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_TSM > +void pci_tsm_init(struct pci_dev *pdev); > +void pci_tsm_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev); > +extern const struct attribute_group pci_tsm_attr_group; > +extern const struct attribute_group pci_tsm_auth_attr_group; > +#else > +static inline void pci_tsm_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } > +static inline void pci_tsm_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) { } > +#endif > + > /** > * pci_dev_set_io_state - Set the new error state if possible. > * > diff --git a/drivers/pci/probe.c b/drivers/pci/probe.c > index 4fd6942ea6a8..7207f9a76a3e 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/probe.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/probe.c > @@ -2738,6 +2738,9 @@ void pci_device_add(struct pci_dev *dev, struct pci_bus *bus) > ret = device_add(&dev->dev); > WARN_ON(ret < 0); > > + /* Establish pdev->tsm for newly added (e.g. new SR-IOV VFs) */ > + pci_tsm_init(dev); > + > pci_npem_create(dev); > > pci_doe_sysfs_init(dev); > diff --git a/drivers/pci/remove.c b/drivers/pci/remove.c > index 445afdfa6498..4b9ad199389b 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/remove.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/remove.c > @@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ static void pci_destroy_dev(struct pci_dev *dev) > pci_doe_sysfs_teardown(dev); > pci_npem_remove(dev); > > + /* > + * While device is in D0 drop the device from TSM link operations > + * including unbind and disconnect (IDE + SPDM teardown). > + */ > + pci_tsm_destroy(dev); > + > device_del(&dev->dev); > > down_write(&pci_bus_sem); > diff --git a/drivers/pci/tsm.c b/drivers/pci/tsm.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..092e81c5208c > --- /dev/null > +++ b/drivers/pci/tsm.c > @@ -0,0 +1,601 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * TEE Security Manager for the TEE Device Interface Security Protocol > + * (TDISP, PCIe r6.1 sec 11) > + * > + * Copyright(c) 2024 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. > + */ > + > +#define dev_fmt(fmt) "PCI/TSM: " fmt > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include "pci.h" > + > +/* > + * Provide a read/write lock against the init / exit of pdev tsm > + * capabilities and arrival/departure of a TSM instance > + */ > +static DECLARE_RWSEM(pci_tsm_rwsem); > + > +/* > + * Count of TSMs registered that support physical link operations vs device > + * security state management. > + */ > +static int pci_tsm_link_count; > +static int pci_tsm_devsec_count; This one is not checked anywhere. > + > +static inline bool is_dsm(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + return pdev->tsm && pdev->tsm->dsm == pdev; > +} > + > +/* 'struct pci_tsm_pf0' wraps 'struct pci_tsm' when ->dsm == ->pdev (self) */ > +static struct pci_tsm_pf0 *to_pci_tsm_pf0(struct pci_tsm *pci_tsm) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev = pci_tsm->pdev; > + > + if (!is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev) || !is_dsm(pdev)) { > + dev_WARN_ONCE(&pdev->dev, 1, "invalid context object\n"); > + return NULL; > + } > + > + return container_of(pci_tsm, struct pci_tsm_pf0, base); > +} > + > +static void tsm_remove(struct pci_tsm *tsm) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev; > + > + if (!tsm) > + return; > + > + pdev = tsm->pdev; > + tsm->ops->remove(tsm); > + pdev->tsm = NULL; > +} > +DEFINE_FREE(tsm_remove, struct pci_tsm *, if (_T) tsm_remove(_T)) > + > +static void pci_tsm_walk_fns(struct pci_dev *pdev, > + int (*cb)(struct pci_dev *pdev, void *data), > + void *data) > +{ > + /* Walk subordinate physical functions */ > + for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { > + struct pci_dev *pf __free(pci_dev_put) = pci_get_slot( > + pdev->bus, PCI_DEVFN(PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), i)); > + > + if (!pf) > + continue; > + > + /* on entry function 0 has already run @cb */ > + if (i > 0) > + cb(pf, data); > + > + /* walk virtual functions of each pf */ > + for (int j = 0; j < pci_num_vf(pf); j++) { > + struct pci_dev *vf __free(pci_dev_put) = > + pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot( > + pci_domain_nr(pf->bus), > + pci_iov_virtfn_bus(pf, j), > + pci_iov_virtfn_devfn(pf, j)); > + > + if (!vf) > + continue; > + > + cb(vf, data); > + } > + } > + > + /* > + * Walk downstream devices, assumes that an upstream DSM is > + * limited to downstream physical functions > + */ > + if (pci_pcie_type(pdev) == PCI_EXP_TYPE_UPSTREAM && is_dsm(pdev)) > + pci_walk_bus(pdev->subordinate, cb, data); > +} > + > +static void pci_tsm_walk_fns_reverse(struct pci_dev *pdev, > + int (*cb)(struct pci_dev *pdev, > + void *data), > + void *data) > +{ > + /* Reverse walk downstream devices */ > + if (pci_pcie_type(pdev) == PCI_EXP_TYPE_UPSTREAM && is_dsm(pdev)) > + pci_walk_bus_reverse(pdev->subordinate, cb, data); > + > + /* Reverse walk subordinate physical functions */ > + for (int i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { > + struct pci_dev *pf __free(pci_dev_put) = pci_get_slot( > + pdev->bus, PCI_DEVFN(PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn), i)); > + > + if (!pf) > + continue; > + > + /* reverse walk virtual functions */ > + for (int j = pci_num_vf(pf) - 1; j >= 0; j--) { > + struct pci_dev *vf __free(pci_dev_put) = > + pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot( > + pci_domain_nr(pf->bus), > + pci_iov_virtfn_bus(pf, j), > + pci_iov_virtfn_devfn(pf, j)); > + > + if (!vf) > + continue; > + cb(vf, data); > + } > + > + /* on exit, caller will run @cb on function 0 */ > + if (i > 0) > + cb(pf, data); > + } > +} > + > +static int probe_fn(struct pci_dev *pdev, void *dsm) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *dsm_dev = dsm; > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops = dsm_dev->tsm->ops; > + > + pdev->tsm = ops->probe(pdev); Looks like this is going to initialize pci_dev::tsm for all VFs under an IDE (or TEE) capable PF0, even for those VFs which do not have PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_TEE, which does not seem right. > + pci_dbg(pdev, "setup TSM context: DSM: %s status: %s\n", > + pci_name(dsm_dev), pdev->tsm ? "success" : "failed"); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int pci_tsm_connect(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + int rc; > + struct pci_tsm_pf0 *tsm_pf0; > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops = tsm_pci_ops(tsm_dev); > + struct pci_tsm *pci_tsm __free(tsm_remove) = ops->probe(pdev); > + > + /* connect() mutually exclusive with subfunction pci_tsm_init() */ > + lockdep_assert_held_write(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + > + if (!pci_tsm) > + return -ENXIO; > + > + pdev->tsm = pci_tsm; > + tsm_pf0 = to_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev->tsm); > + > + /* mutex_intr assumes connect() is always sysfs/user driven */ > + ACQUIRE(mutex_intr, lock)(&tsm_pf0->lock); > + if ((rc = ACQUIRE_ERR(mutex_intr, &lock))) > + return rc; > + > + rc = ops->connect(pdev); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > + pdev->tsm = no_free_ptr(pci_tsm); > + > + /* > + * Now that the DSM is established, probe() all the potential > + * dependent functions. Failure to probe a function is not fatal > + * to connect(), it just disables subsequent security operations > + * for that function. > + */ > + pci_tsm_walk_fns(pdev, probe_fn, pdev); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static ssize_t connect_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, > + char *buf) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); > + int rc; > + > + ACQUIRE(rwsem_read_intr, lock)(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + if ((rc = ACQUIRE_ERR(rwsem_read_intr, &lock))) > + return rc; > + > + if (!pdev->tsm) > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "\n"); > + > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", tsm_name(pdev->tsm->ops->owner)); > +} > + > +/* Is @tsm_dev managing physical link / session properties... */ > +static bool is_link_tsm(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops = tsm_pci_ops(tsm_dev); > + > + return ops && ops->link_ops.probe; > +} > + > +/* ...or is @tsm_dev managing device security state ? */ > +static bool is_devsec_tsm(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops = tsm_pci_ops(tsm_dev); > + > + return ops && ops->devsec_ops.lock; > +} > + > +static ssize_t connect_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, > + const char *buf, size_t len) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); > + struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev; > + int rc, id; > + > + rc = sscanf(buf, "tsm%d\n", &id); > + if (rc != 1) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + ACQUIRE(rwsem_write_kill, lock)(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + if ((rc = ACQUIRE_ERR(rwsem_write_kill, &lock))) > + return rc; > + > + if (pdev->tsm) > + return -EBUSY; > + > + tsm_dev = find_tsm_dev(id); > + if (!is_link_tsm(tsm_dev)) There would be no "connect" in sysfs if !is_link_tsm(). > + return -ENXIO; > + > + rc = pci_tsm_connect(pdev, tsm_dev); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + return len; > +} > +static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(connect); > + > +static int remove_fn(struct pci_dev *pdev, void *data) > +{ > + tsm_remove(pdev->tsm); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void __pci_tsm_disconnect(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + struct pci_tsm_pf0 *tsm_pf0 = to_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev->tsm); > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops = pdev->tsm->ops; > + > + /* disconnect() mutually exclusive with subfunction pci_tsm_init() */ > + lockdep_assert_held_write(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + > + /* > + * disconnect() is uninterruptible as it may be called for device > + * teardown > + */ > + guard(mutex)(&tsm_pf0->lock); > + pci_tsm_walk_fns_reverse(pdev, remove_fn, NULL); > + ops->disconnect(pdev); > +} > + > +static void pci_tsm_disconnect(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + __pci_tsm_disconnect(pdev); > + tsm_remove(pdev->tsm); > +} > + > +static ssize_t disconnect_store(struct device *dev, > + struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, > + size_t len) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops; > + int rc; > + > + ACQUIRE(rwsem_write_kill, lock)(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + if ((rc = ACQUIRE_ERR(rwsem_write_kill, &lock))) > + return rc; > + > + if (!pdev->tsm) > + return -ENXIO; > + > + ops = pdev->tsm->ops; > + if (!sysfs_streq(buf, tsm_name(ops->owner))) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + pci_tsm_disconnect(pdev); > + return len; > +} > +static DEVICE_ATTR_WO(disconnect); > + > +/* The 'authenticated' attribute is exclusive to the presence of a 'link' TSM */ > +static bool pci_tsm_link_group_visible(struct kobject *kobj) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(kobj_to_dev(kobj)); > + > + return pci_tsm_link_count && is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev); > +} > +DEFINE_SIMPLE_SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE(pci_tsm_link); > + > +/* > + * 'link' and 'devsec' TSMs share the same 'tsm/' sysfs group, so the TSM type > + * specific attributes need individual visibility checks. > + */ > +static umode_t pci_tsm_attr_visible(struct kobject *kobj, > + struct attribute *attr, int n) > +{ > + if (pci_tsm_link_group_visible(kobj)) { > + if (attr == &dev_attr_connect.attr || > + attr == &dev_attr_disconnect.attr) > + return attr->mode; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static bool pci_tsm_group_visible(struct kobject *kobj) > +{ > + return pci_tsm_link_group_visible(kobj); > +} > +DEFINE_SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE(pci_tsm); > + > +static struct attribute *pci_tsm_attrs[] = { > + &dev_attr_connect.attr, > + &dev_attr_disconnect.attr, > + NULL > +}; > + > +const struct attribute_group pci_tsm_attr_group = { > + .name = "tsm", > + .attrs = pci_tsm_attrs, > + .is_visible = SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE(pci_tsm), > +}; > + > +static ssize_t authenticated_show(struct device *dev, > + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) > +{ > + /* > + * When the SPDM session established via TSM the 'authenticated' state > + * of the device is identical to the connect state. > + */ > + return connect_show(dev, attr, buf); > +} > +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(authenticated); > + > +static struct attribute *pci_tsm_auth_attrs[] = { > + &dev_attr_authenticated.attr, > + NULL > +}; > + > +const struct attribute_group pci_tsm_auth_attr_group = { > + .attrs = pci_tsm_auth_attrs, > + .is_visible = SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE(pci_tsm_link), > +}; > + > +/* > + * Retrieve physical function0 device whether it has TEE capability or not > + */ > +static struct pci_dev *pf0_dev_get(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pf_dev = pci_physfn(pdev); > + > + if (PCI_FUNC(pf_dev->devfn) == 0) > + return pci_dev_get(pf_dev); > + > + return pci_get_slot(pf_dev->bus, > + pf_dev->devfn - PCI_FUNC(pf_dev->devfn)); > +} > + > +/* > + * Find the PCI Device instance that serves as the Device Security Manager (DSM) > + * for @pdev. Note that no additional reference is held for the resulting device > + * because @pdev always has a longer registered lifetime than its DSM by virtue > + * of being a child of, or identical to, its DSM. > + */ > +static struct pci_dev *find_dsm_dev(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + struct device *grandparent; > + struct pci_dev *uport; > + > + if (is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev)) > + return pdev; > + > + struct pci_dev *pf0 __free(pci_dev_put) = pf0_dev_get(pdev); > + if (!pf0) > + return NULL; > + > + if (is_dsm(pf0)) > + return pf0; > + > + /* > + * For cases where a switch may be hosting TDISP services on behalf of > + * downstream devices, check the first upstream port relative to this > + * endpoint. > + */ > + if (!pdev->dev.parent) > + return NULL; > + grandparent = pdev->dev.parent->parent; > + if (!grandparent) > + return NULL; > + if (!dev_is_pci(grandparent)) > + return NULL; > + uport = to_pci_dev(grandparent); > + if (!pci_is_pcie(uport) || > + pci_pcie_type(uport) != PCI_EXP_TYPE_UPSTREAM) > + return NULL; > + > + if (is_dsm(uport)) > + return uport; > + return NULL; > +} > + > +/** > + * pci_tsm_link_constructor() - base 'struct pci_tsm' initialization for link TSMs > + * @pdev: The PCI device > + * @tsm: context to initialize > + * @ops: PCI link operations provided by the TSM > + */ > +int pci_tsm_link_constructor(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_tsm *tsm, > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops) > +{ > + if (!is_link_tsm(ops->owner)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + tsm->dsm = find_dsm_dev(pdev); > + if (!tsm->dsm) { > + pci_warn(pdev, "failed to find Device Security Manager\n"); > + return -ENXIO; > + } > + tsm->pdev = pdev; > + tsm->ops = ops; > + > + return 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pci_tsm_link_constructor); > + > +/** > + * pci_tsm_pf0_constructor() - common 'struct pci_tsm_pf0' (DSM) initialization > + * @pdev: Physical Function 0 PCI device (as indicated by is_pci_tsm_pf0()) > + * @tsm: context to initialize > + * @ops: PCI link operations provided by the TSM > + */ > +int pci_tsm_pf0_constructor(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_tsm_pf0 *tsm, > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops) > +{ > + mutex_init(&tsm->lock); > + tsm->doe_mb = pci_find_doe_mailbox(pdev, PCI_VENDOR_ID_PCI_SIG, > + PCI_DOE_PROTO_CMA); > + if (!tsm->doe_mb) { > + pci_warn(pdev, "TSM init failure, no CMA mailbox\n"); > + return -ENODEV; > + } > + > + return pci_tsm_link_constructor(pdev, &tsm->base, ops); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pci_tsm_pf0_constructor); > + > +void pci_tsm_pf0_destructor(struct pci_tsm_pf0 *pf0_tsm) > +{ > + mutex_destroy(&pf0_tsm->lock); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pci_tsm_pf0_destructor); > + > +static void pf0_sysfs_enable(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + bool tee = pdev->devcap & PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_TEE; IDE cap, not PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_TEE. > + > + pci_dbg(pdev, "Device Security Manager detected (%s%s%s)\n", > + pdev->ide_cap ? "IDE" : "", pdev->ide_cap && tee ? " " : "", > + tee ? "TEE" : ""); > + > + sysfs_update_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &pci_tsm_auth_attr_group); > + sysfs_update_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &pci_tsm_attr_group); > +} > + > +int pci_tsm_register(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL; > + > + if (!tsm_dev) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* > + * The TSM device must have pci_ops, and only implement one of link_ops > + * or devsec_ops. > + */ > + if (!tsm_pci_ops(tsm_dev)) > + return -EINVAL; Not needed. > + > + if (!is_link_tsm(tsm_dev) && !is_devsec_tsm(tsm_dev)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (is_link_tsm(tsm_dev) && is_devsec_tsm(tsm_dev)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + guard(rwsem_write)(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + > + /* on first enable, update sysfs groups */ > + if (is_link_tsm(tsm_dev) && pci_tsm_link_count++ == 0) { > + for_each_pci_dev(pdev) > + if (is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev)) > + pf0_sysfs_enable(pdev); You could safely run this loop in the guest too, is_pci_tsm_pf0() would not find IDE-capable PF. > + } else if (is_devsec_tsm(tsm_dev)) { > + pci_tsm_devsec_count++; > + } nit: a bunch of is_link_tsm()/is_devsec_tsm() hurts to read. Instead of routing calls to pci_tsm_register() via tsm_register() and doing all these checks here, we could have cleaner pci_tsm_link_register() and pci_tsm_devsev_register() and call those directly from where tsm_register() is called as those TSM drivers (or devsec samples) know what they are. (well, I'd love pci_tsm_{host|guest}_register or pci_tsm_{hv|vm}_register as their roles are distinct...) > + > + return 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pci_tsm_register); > + > +/** > + * __pci_tsm_destroy() - destroy the TSM context for @pdev > + * @pdev: device to cleanup > + * @tsm_dev: TSM context if a TSM device is being removed, NULL if > + * @pdev is being removed. > + * > + * At device removal or TSM unregistration all established context > + * with the TSM is torn down. Additionally, if there are no more TSMs > + * registered, the PCI tsm/ sysfs attributes are hidden. > + */ > +static void __pci_tsm_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + struct pci_tsm *tsm = pdev->tsm; > + > + lockdep_assert_held_write(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + > + if (is_link_tsm(tsm_dev) && is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev) && !pci_tsm_link_count) { > + sysfs_update_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &pci_tsm_auth_attr_group); > + sysfs_update_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &pci_tsm_attr_group); > + } > + > + if (!tsm) > + return; > + > + if (!tsm_dev) > + tsm_dev = tsm->ops->owner; > + else if (tsm_dev != tsm->ops->owner) > + return; > + > + if (is_link_tsm(tsm_dev) && is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev)) > + pci_tsm_disconnect(pdev); > + else > + tsm_remove(pdev->tsm); > +} > + > +void pci_tsm_destroy(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + guard(rwsem_write)(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + __pci_tsm_destroy(pdev, NULL); > +} > + > +void pci_tsm_init(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + guard(rwsem_read)(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + > + /* > + * Subfunctions are either probed synchronous with connect() or later > + * when either the SR-IOV configuration is changed, or, unlikely, > + * connect() raced initial bus scanning. > + */ > + if (pdev->tsm) > + return; > + > + if (pci_tsm_link_count) { > + struct pci_dev *dsm = find_dsm_dev(pdev); > + > + if (!dsm) > + return; > + > + /* > + * The only path to init a Device Security Manager capable > + * device is via connect(). > + */ > + if (!dsm->tsm) > + return; > + > + probe_fn(pdev, dsm); > + } > +} > + > +void pci_tsm_unregister(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL; > + > + guard(rwsem_write)(&pci_tsm_rwsem); > + if (is_link_tsm(tsm_dev)) > + pci_tsm_link_count--; > + if (is_devsec_tsm(tsm_dev)) > + pci_tsm_devsec_count--; > + for_each_pci_dev_reverse(pdev) > + __pci_tsm_destroy(pdev, tsm_dev); > +} > diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c > index a64b776642cf..6fdcf23d57ec 100644 > --- a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c > +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm-core.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > static struct class *tsm_class; > static DECLARE_RWSEM(tsm_rwsem); > @@ -17,8 +18,28 @@ static DEFINE_IDR(tsm_idr); > struct tsm_dev { > struct device dev; > int id; > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *pci_ops; > }; > > +const char *tsm_name(const struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + return dev_name(&tsm_dev->dev); > +} > + > +/* Caller responsible for ensuring it does not race tsm_dev unregistration */ > +struct tsm_dev *find_tsm_dev(int id) > +{ > + guard(rcu)(); > + return idr_find(&tsm_idr, id); > +} > + > +const struct pci_tsm_ops *tsm_pci_ops(const struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + if (!tsm_dev) > + return NULL; > + return tsm_dev->pci_ops; > +} > + > static struct tsm_dev *alloc_tsm_dev(struct device *parent) > { > struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev __free(kfree) = > @@ -42,6 +63,29 @@ static struct tsm_dev *alloc_tsm_dev(struct device *parent) > return no_free_ptr(tsm_dev); > } > > +static struct tsm_dev *tsm_register_pci_or_reset(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev, > + struct pci_tsm_ops *pci_ops) > +{ > + int rc; > + > + if (!pci_ops) > + return tsm_dev; > + > + pci_ops->owner = tsm_dev; > + tsm_dev->pci_ops = pci_ops; > + rc = pci_tsm_register(tsm_dev); > + if (rc) { > + dev_err(tsm_dev->dev.parent, > + "PCI/TSM registration failure: %d\n", rc); > + device_unregister(&tsm_dev->dev); > + return ERR_PTR(rc); > + } > + > + /* Notify TSM userspace that PCI/TSM operations are now possible */ > + kobject_uevent(&tsm_dev->dev.kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE); > + return tsm_dev; > +} > + > static void put_tsm_dev(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > { > if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tsm_dev)) > @@ -51,7 +95,7 @@ static void put_tsm_dev(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > DEFINE_FREE(put_tsm_dev, struct tsm_dev *, > if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) put_tsm_dev(_T)) > > -struct tsm_dev *tsm_register(struct device *parent) > +struct tsm_dev *tsm_register(struct device *parent, struct pci_tsm_ops *pci_ops) > { > struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev __free(put_tsm_dev) = alloc_tsm_dev(parent); > struct device *dev; > @@ -69,12 +113,13 @@ struct tsm_dev *tsm_register(struct device *parent) > if (rc) > return ERR_PTR(rc); > > - return no_free_ptr(tsm_dev); > + return tsm_register_pci_or_reset(no_free_ptr(tsm_dev), pci_ops); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_register); > > void tsm_unregister(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > { > + pci_tsm_unregister(tsm_dev); > device_unregister(&tsm_dev->dev); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tsm_unregister); > diff --git a/include/linux/pci-doe.h b/include/linux/pci-doe.h > index 1f14aed4354b..7d839f4a6340 100644 > --- a/include/linux/pci-doe.h > +++ b/include/linux/pci-doe.h > @@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ > > fstruct pci_doe_mb; > > +#define PCI_DOE_FEATURE_DISCOVERY 0 > +#define PCI_DOE_PROTO_CMA 1 > +#define PCI_DOE_PROTO_SSESSION 2 > + > struct pci_doe_mb *pci_find_doe_mailbox(struct pci_dev *pdev, u16 vendor, > u8 type); > > diff --git a/include/linux/pci-tsm.h b/include/linux/pci-tsm.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..e4f9ea4a54a9 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/linux/pci-tsm.h > @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +#ifndef __PCI_TSM_H > +#define __PCI_TSM_H > +#include > +#include > + > +struct pci_tsm; > + > +/* > + * struct pci_tsm_ops - manage confidential links and security state > + * @link_ops: Coordinate PCIe SPDM and IDE establishment via a platform TSM. > + * Provide a secure session transport for TDISP state management > + * (typically bare metal physical function operations). > + * @sec_ops: Lock, unlock, and interrogate the security state of the > + * function via the platform TSM (typically virtual function > + * operations). > + * @owner: Back reference to the TSM device that owns this instance. > + * > + * This operations are mutually exclusive either a tsm_dev instance > + * manages physical link properties or it manages function security > + * states like TDISP lock/unlock. > + */ > +struct pci_tsm_ops { > + /* > + * struct pci_tsm_link_ops - Manage physical link and the TSM/DSM session > + * @probe: allocate context (wrap 'struct pci_tsm') for follow-on link > + * operations > + * @remove: destroy link operations context > + * @connect: establish / validate a secure connection (e.g. IDE) > + * with the device > + * @disconnect: teardown the secure link > + * > + * Context: @probe, @remove, @connect, and @disconnect run under > + * pci_tsm_rwsem held for write to sync with TSM unregistration and > + * mutual exclusion of @connect and @disconnect. @connect and > + * @disconnect additionally run under the DSM lock (struct > + * pci_tsm_pf0::lock) as well as @probe and @remove of the subfunctions. > + */ > + struct_group_tagged(pci_tsm_link_ops, link_ops, Why not pci_tsm_dsm_ops? DSM and TDI are used all over the place in the PCIe spec, why not use those? > + struct pci_tsm *(*probe)(struct pci_dev *pdev); > + void (*remove)(struct pci_tsm *tsm); > + int (*connect)(struct pci_dev *pdev); Why is this one not pci_tsm? > + void (*disconnect)(struct pci_dev *pdev); and here. > + ); > + > + /* > + * struct pci_tsm_security_ops - Manage the security state of the function > + * @lock: probe and initialize the device in the LOCKED state > + * @unlock: destroy TSM context and return device to UNLOCKED state > + * > + * Context: @lock and @unlock run under pci_tsm_rwsem held for write to > + * sync with TSM unregistration and each other > + */ > + struct_group_tagged(pci_tsm_security_ops, devsec_ops, Why not pci_tsm_tdi_ops? Or even pci_tdi_ops? pci_tsm_link_ops::connect is also about security. > + struct pci_tsm *(*lock)(struct pci_dev *pdev); pci_tdi? Or why have pci_dev reference in pci_tsm and pci_tdi then. > + void (*unlock)(struct pci_dev *pdev); So we put host and guest in the same ops anyway, what does it buy us? Thanks, > + ); > + struct tsm_dev *owner; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct pci_tsm - Core TSM context for a given PCIe endpoint > + * @pdev: Back ref to device function, distinguishes type of pci_tsm context > + * @dsm: PCI Device Security Manager for link operations on @pdev > + * @ops: Link Confidentiality or Device Function Security operations > + * > + * This structure is wrapped by low level TSM driver data and returned by > + * probe()/lock(), it is freed by the corresponding remove()/unlock(). > + * > + * For link operations it serves to cache the association between a Device > + * Security Manager (DSM) and the functions that manager can assign to a TVM. > + * That can be "self", for assigning function0 of a TEE I/O device, a > + * sub-function (SR-IOV virtual function, or non-function0 > + * multifunction-device), or a downstream endpoint (PCIe upstream switch-port as > + * DSM). > + */ > +struct pci_tsm { > + struct pci_dev *pdev; > + struct pci_dev *dsm; > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops; > +}; > + > +/** > + * struct pci_tsm_pf0 - Physical Function 0 TDISP link context > + * @base: generic core "tsm" context > + * @lock: mutual exclustion for pci_tsm_ops invocation > + * @doe_mb: PCIe Data Object Exchange mailbox > + */ > +struct pci_tsm_pf0 { > + struct pci_tsm base; > + struct mutex lock; > + struct pci_doe_mb *doe_mb; > +}; > + > +/* physical function0 and capable of 'connect' */ > +static inline bool is_pci_tsm_pf0(struct pci_dev *pdev) > +{ > + if (!pci_is_pcie(pdev)) > + return false; > + > + if (pdev->is_virtfn) > + return false; > + > + /* > + * Allow for a Device Security Manager (DSM) associated with function0 > + * of an Endpoint to coordinate TDISP requests for other functions > + * (physical or virtual) of the device, or allow for an Upstream Port > + * DSM to accept TDISP requests for the Endpoints downstream of the > + * switch. > + */ > + switch (pci_pcie_type(pdev)) { > + case PCI_EXP_TYPE_ENDPOINT: > + case PCI_EXP_TYPE_UPSTREAM: > + case PCI_EXP_TYPE_RC_END: > + if (pdev->ide_cap || (pdev->devcap & PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_TEE)) PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_TEE says nothing about "connect". > + break; > + fallthrough; > + default: > + return false; > + } > + > + return PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn) == 0; > +} > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_TSM > +struct tsm_dev; > +int pci_tsm_register(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev); > +void pci_tsm_unregister(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev); > +int pci_tsm_link_constructor(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_tsm *tsm, > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops); > +int pci_tsm_pf0_constructor(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_tsm_pf0 *tsm, > + const struct pci_tsm_ops *ops); > +void pci_tsm_pf0_destructor(struct pci_tsm_pf0 *tsm); > +#else > +static inline int pci_tsm_register(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > +static inline void pci_tsm_unregister(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev) > +{ > +} > +#endif > +#endif /*__PCI_TSM_H */ > diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h > index 6fb0e8a95078..78c1e208d441 100644 > --- a/include/linux/pci.h > +++ b/include/linux/pci.h > @@ -545,6 +545,9 @@ struct pci_dev { > u8 nr_link_ide; /* Link Stream count (Selective Stream offset) */ > unsigned int ide_cfg:1; /* Config cycles over IDE */ > unsigned int ide_tee_limit:1; /* Disallow T=0 traffic over IDE */ > +#endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_TSM > + struct pci_tsm *tsm; /* TSM operation state */ > #endif > u16 acs_cap; /* ACS Capability offset */ > u8 supported_speeds; /* Supported Link Speeds Vector */ > diff --git a/include/linux/tsm.h b/include/linux/tsm.h > index aa906eb67360..c99d85fe56f4 100644 > --- a/include/linux/tsm.h > +++ b/include/linux/tsm.h > @@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ struct tsm_report_ops { > int tsm_report_register(const struct tsm_report_ops *ops, void *priv); > int tsm_report_unregister(const struct tsm_report_ops *ops); > struct tsm_dev; > -struct tsm_dev *tsm_register(struct device *parent); > +struct pci_tsm_ops; > +struct tsm_dev *tsm_register(struct device *parent, struct pci_tsm_ops *ops); > void tsm_unregister(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev); > +const char *tsm_name(const struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev); > +struct tsm_dev *find_tsm_dev(int id); > +const struct pci_tsm_ops *tsm_pci_ops(const struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev); > #endif /* __TSM_H */ > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h b/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h > index 911d6db5c224..4a32387c3c4a 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h > @@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PWR_VAL 0x03fc0000 /* Slot Power Limit Value */ > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_PWR_SCL 0x0c000000 /* Slot Power Limit Scale */ > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_FLR 0x10000000 /* Function Level Reset */ > +#define PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_TEE 0x40000000 /* TEE I/O (TDISP) Support */ > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL 0x08 /* Device Control */ > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_CERE 0x0001 /* Correctable Error Reporting En. */ > #define PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_NFERE 0x0002 /* Non-Fatal Error Reporting Enable */ -- Alexey