From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Naveen N Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/ioremap: Maintain consistent IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED for BIOS data
Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 10:59:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d440f49c-ab2f-4cb8-b822-362f757ae47d@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <00931e12-4e6a-9ec4-309c-372aaee333b9@amd.com>
On 4/1/25 08:07, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> I haven't tested this, yet, but with SME the BIOS is not encrypted, so
> that would need an unencrypted mapping.
>
> Could you qualify your mapping with a TDX check? Or can you do something
> in the /dev/mem support to map appropriately?
>
> I'm adding @Naveen since he is preparing a patch to prevent /dev/mem
> from accessing ROM areas under SNP as those can trigger #VC for a page
> that is mapped encrypted but has not been validated. He's looking at
> possibly adding something to x86_platform_ops that can be overridden.
> The application would get a bad return code vs an exception.
How many more /dev/mem band-aids will we need for TDX and SEV before we
just throw up our hands and turn it off?
Maybe the x86_platform_ops call should just be "Do we allow /dev/mem at
all?"
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-01 17:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-31 23:14 [PATCH] x86/ioremap: Maintain consistent IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED for BIOS data Dan Williams
2025-04-01 5:57 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-02 20:55 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-01 7:57 ` Kirill Shutemov
2025-04-01 15:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-04-01 17:59 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2025-04-02 21:03 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-02 18:55 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-02 21:36 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-03 12:11 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-02 20:56 ` Dan Williams
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=d440f49c-ab2f-4cb8-b822-362f757ae47d@intel.com \
--to=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=naveen.rao@amd.com \
--cc=nik.borisov@suse.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=vannapurve@google.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox