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From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
	luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
	pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
	dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	alpergun@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com,
	zhi.a.wang@intel.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 14/50] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 20:13:52 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d5242390-8904-7ec5-d8a1-9e3fb8f6423c@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231127095937.GLZWRoiaqGlJMX54Xb@fat_crate.local>

Hello Boris,

>> +static int ___sev_platform_init_locked(int *error, bool probe)
>>   {
>> -	int rc = 0, psp_ret = SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL;
>> +	int rc, psp_ret = SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL;
>>   	struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
>>   	struct sev_device *sev;
>>   
>> @@ -480,6 +493,34 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
>>   	if (sev->state == SEV_STATE_INIT)
>>   		return 0;
>>   
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Legacy guests cannot be running while SNP_INIT(_EX) is executing,
>> +	 * so perform SEV-SNP initialization at probe time.
>> +	 */
>> +	rc = __sev_snp_init_locked(error);
>> +	if (rc && rc != -ENODEV) {
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Don't abort the probe if SNP INIT failed,
>> +		 * continue to initialize the legacy SEV firmware.
>> +		 */
>> +		dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc %d, error %#x\n", rc, *error);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/* Delay SEV/SEV-ES support initialization */
>> +	if (probe && !psp_init_on_probe)
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	if (!sev_es_tmr) {
>> +		/* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */
>> +		sev_es_tmr = sev_fw_alloc(SEV_ES_TMR_SIZE);
>> +		if (sev_es_tmr)
>> +			/* Must flush the cache before giving it to the firmware */
>> +			clflush_cache_range(sev_es_tmr, SEV_ES_TMR_SIZE);
>> +		else
>> +			dev_warn(sev->dev,
>> +				 "SEV: TMR allocation failed, SEV-ES support unavailable\n");
>> +		}
>> +
>>   	if (sev_init_ex_buffer) {
>>   		rc = sev_read_init_ex_file();
>>   		if (rc)
>> @@ -522,6 +563,11 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
>> +{
>> +	return ___sev_platform_init_locked(error, false);
>> +}
> 
> Uff, this is silly. And it makes the code hard to follow and that meat
> of the platform init functionality in the ___-prefixed function a mess.
> 
> And the problem is that that "probe" functionality is replicated from
> the one place where it is actually needed - sev_pci_init() which calls
> that new sev_platform_init_on_probe() function - to everything that
> calls __sev_platform_init_locked() for which you've added a wrapper.
> 
> What you should do, instead, is split the code around
> __sev_snp_init_locked() in a separate function which does only that and
> is called something like __sev_platform_init_snp_locked() or so which
> does that unconditional work. And then you define:
> 
> _sev_platform_init_locked(int *error, bool probe)
> 
> note the *one* '_' - i.e., first layer:
> 
> _sev_platform_init_locked(int *error, bool probe):
> {
> 	__sev_platform_init_snp_locked(error);
> 
> 	if (!probe)
> 		return 0;
> 
> 	if (psp_init_on_probe)
> 		__sev_platform_init_locked(error);
> 
> 	...
> }
> 
> and you do the probing in that function only so that it doesn't get lost
> in the bunch of things __sev_platform_init_locked() does.
> 
> And then you call _sev_platform_init_locked() everywhere and no need for
> a second sev_platform_init_on_probe().
>

It surely seems hard to follow up, so i am anyway going to clean it up by:

Adding the "probe" parameter to sev_platform_init() where the parameter 
being true indicates that we only want to do SNP initialization on 
probe, the same parameter will get passed on to
__sev_platform_init_locked().

So eventually there won't be a second sev_platform_init_on_probe() and 
also there is no need for a ___sev_platform_init_locked().

We will only have sev_platform_init() and _sev_platform_init_locked().

>> +
>> +static int snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions(struct resource *rs, void *arg)
>> +{
>> +	struct sev_data_range_list *range_list = arg;
>> +	struct sev_data_range *range = &range_list->ranges[range_list->num_elements];
>> +	size_t size;
>> +
>> +	if ((range_list->num_elements * sizeof(struct sev_data_range) +
>> +	     sizeof(struct sev_data_range_list)) > PAGE_SIZE)
>> +		return -E2BIG;
> 
> Why? A comment would be helpful like with the rest this patch adds.
>
Ok.

>> +	switch (rs->desc) {
>> +	case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
>> +	case E820_TYPE_PMEM:
>> +	case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
>> +		range->base = rs->start & PAGE_MASK;
>> +		size = (rs->end + 1) - rs->start;
>> +		range->page_count = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +		range_list->num_elements++;
>> +		break;
>> +	default:
>> +		break;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error)
>> +{
>> +	struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
>> +	struct sev_data_snp_init_ex data;
>> +	struct sev_device *sev;
>> +	int rc = 0;
>> +
>> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
>> +		return -ENODEV;
>> +
>> +	if (!psp || !psp->sev_data)
>> +		return -ENODEV;
> 
> Only caller checks this already.
> 
Ok.

>> +	sev = psp->sev_data;
>> +
>> +	if (sev->snp_initialized)
> 
> Do we really need this silly boolean or is there a way to query the
> platform whether SNP has been initialized?
> 

Yes it makes sense to have it as any platform specific way to query 
whether the SNP has been initialized will be much more expensive then 
simply checking this boolean.

>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	if (!sev_version_greater_or_equal(SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR, SNP_MIN_API_MINOR)) {
>> +		dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP support requires firmware version >= %d:%d\n",
>> +			SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR, SNP_MIN_API_MINOR);
>> +		return 0;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * The SNP_INIT requires the MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA must be set to 0h
>> +	 * across all cores.
>> +	 */
>> +	on_each_cpu(snp_set_hsave_pa, NULL, 1);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Starting in SNP firmware v1.52, the SNP_INIT_EX command takes a list of
>> +	 * system physical address ranges to convert into the HV-fixed page states
>> +	 * during the RMP initialization.  For instance, the memory that UEFI
>> +	 * reserves should be included in the range list. This allows system
>> +	 * components that occasionally write to memory (e.g. logging to UEFI
>> +	 * reserved regions) to not fail due to RMP initialization and SNP enablement.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (sev_version_greater_or_equal(SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR, 52)) {
> 
> Is there a generic way to probe SNP_INIT_EX presence in the firmware or
> are FW version numbers the only way?

It is not only the presence of SNP_INIT_EX but this check is more 
specific to passing the HV_Fixed pages list to SNP_INIT_EX and that is 
only supported with SNP FW versions 1.52 and beyond, so the FW version 
check is the only way.

> 
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Firmware checks that the pages containing the ranges enumerated
>> +		 * in the RANGES structure are either in the Default page state or in the
> 
> "default"
> 
>> +		 * firmware page state.
>> +		 */
>> +		snp_range_list = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +		if (!snp_range_list) {
>> +			dev_err(sev->dev,
>> +				"SEV: SNP_INIT_EX range list memory allocation failed\n");
>> +			return -ENOMEM;
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Retrieve all reserved memory regions setup by UEFI from the e820 memory map
>> +		 * to be setup as HV-fixed pages.
>> +		 */
>> +
> 
> 
> ^ Superfluous newline.
> 
>> +		rc = walk_iomem_res_desc(IORES_DESC_NONE, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0, ~0,
>> +					 snp_range_list, snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions);
>> +		if (rc) {
>> +			dev_err(sev->dev,
>> +				"SEV: SNP_INIT_EX walk_iomem_res_desc failed rc = %d\n", rc);
>> +			return rc;
>> +		}
>> +
>> +		memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
>> +		data.init_rmp = 1;
>> +		data.list_paddr_en = 1;
>> +		data.list_paddr = __psp_pa(snp_range_list);
>> +
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Before invoking SNP_INIT_EX with INIT_RMP=1, make sure that
>> +		 * all dirty cache lines containing the RMP are flushed.
>> +		 *
>> +		 * NOTE: that includes writes via RMPUPDATE instructions, which
>> +		 * are also cacheable writes.
>> +		 */
>> +		wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
>> +
>> +		rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX, &data, error);
>> +		if (rc)
>> +			return rc;
>> +	} else {
>> +		/*
>> +		 * SNP_INIT is equivalent to SNP_INIT_EX with INIT_RMP=1, so
>> +		 * just as with that case, make sure all dirty cache lines
>> +		 * containing the RMP are flushed.
>> +		 */
>> +		wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
>> +
>> +		rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT, NULL, error);
>> +		if (rc)
>> +			return rc;
>> +	}
> 
> So instead of duplicating the code here at the end of the if-else
> branching, you can do:
> 
> 	void *arg = &data;
> 
> 	if () {
> 		...
> 		cmd = SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX;
> 	} else {
> 		cmd = SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT;
> 		arg = NULL;
> 	}
> 
> 	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> 	rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, arg, error);
> 	if (rc)
> 		return rc;

Yes, makes sense, will fix it.

> 
>> +	/* Prepare for first SNP guest launch after INIT */
>> +	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> 
> Why is that WBINVD needed?

As the comment above mentions, WBINVD + DF_FLUSH is needed before the 
first guest launch.

> 
>> +	rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH, NULL, error);
>> +	if (rc)
>> +		return rc;
>> +
>> +	sev->snp_initialized = true;
>> +	dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware initialized\n");
>> +
>> +	return rc;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(int *error)
>> +{
>> +	struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
>> +	struct sev_data_snp_shutdown_ex data;
>> +	int ret;
>> +
>> +	if (!sev->snp_initialized)
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
>> +	data.length = sizeof(data);
>> +	data.iommu_snp_shutdown = 1;
>> +
>> +	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
>> +
>> +retry:
>> +	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX, &data, error);
>> +	/* SHUTDOWN may require DF_FLUSH */
>> +	if (*error == SEV_RET_DFFLUSH_REQUIRED) {
>> +		ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH, NULL, NULL);
>> +		if (ret) {
>> +			dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP DF_FLUSH failed\n");
>> +			return ret;
> 
> When you return here,  sev->snp_initialized is still true but, in
> reality, it probably is in some half-broken state after issuing those
> commands you it is not really initialized anymore.

Yes, this needs to be fixed.

> 
>> +		}
>> +		goto retry;
> 
> This needs an upper limit from which to break out and not potentially
> endless-loop.
>

Ok.

>> +	}
>> +	if (ret) {
>> +		dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware shutdown failed\n");
>> +		return ret;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	sev->snp_initialized = false;
>> +	dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware shutdown\n");
>> +
>> +	return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int sev_snp_shutdown(int *error)
>> +{
>> +	int rc;
>> +
>> +	mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
>> +	rc = __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(error);
> 
> Why is this "locked" version even there if it is called only here?
> 
> IOW, put all the logic in here - no need for
> __sev_snp_shutdown_locked().

In the latest code base, _sev_snp_shutdown_locked() is called from
__sev_firmware_shutdown().

Thanks,
Ashish

> 
>> +	mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
>> +
>> +	return rc;
>> +}
> 
> ...
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-30  2:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 158+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-16 13:27 [PATCH v10 00/50] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 01/50] KVM: SVM: INTERCEPT_RDTSCP is never intercepted anyway Michael Roth
2023-10-16 15:12   ` Greg KH
2023-10-16 15:14     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 15:21       ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 02/50] KVM: SVM: Fix TSC_AUX virtualization setup Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 03/50] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:50   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 17:30     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-12-13 17:40       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 04/50] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:51   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:31       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:40           ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 14:18               ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 15:41                 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 17:35                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:53                     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 05/50] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-10-25 17:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-27 21:50   ` Dave Hansen
2023-12-13 12:52   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-10-25 18:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 16:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 18:32     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  8:21       ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 15:19         ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 19:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 20:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 21:21           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 21:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:08               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:33                 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-08  6:14                   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  9:11                     ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 19:53                     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-08 17:09       ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-12-08 23:21         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-20  7:07     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 07/50] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-11-14 14:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  3:31     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-09 22:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 08/50] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-11-15 16:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  6:08     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 09/50] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-10-16 14:14   ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-16 14:55     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 10/50] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-11-21 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 11/50] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-11-21 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 16:20     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 12/50] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 13/50] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 14/50] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-11-27  9:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-30  2:13     ` Kalra, Ashish [this message]
2023-12-06 17:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-06 20:35         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-09 16:20           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-11 21:11             ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-12  6:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 15/50] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 16/50] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-08 20:54     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-07 16:20   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-08 22:10     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-11 13:08       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12 23:26         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 17/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-08 13:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 23:46     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 18/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-12-09 15:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:38     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 19/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-12-12 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 20/50] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-29 21:41     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:40     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 21/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-12-12 17:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 22/50] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-12-11 13:24   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12  0:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-13 13:31   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-18 14:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 24/50] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-12-18 17:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 25/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 26/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 27/50] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 28/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 29/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 30/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 31/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 32/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 33/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 34/50] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 35/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 36/50] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 37/50] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 38/50] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2023-10-19 12:20   ` Liam Merwick
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 39/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 40/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 41/50] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 42/50] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 43/50] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 44/50] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 45/50] iommu/amd: Report all cases inhibiting SNP enablement Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 46/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:11   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 47/50] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 48/50] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:18   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-17 16:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18  2:28       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-18 13:48         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 20:27           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 20:38             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 21:27               ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 21:43                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19  2:48           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-19 14:57             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19 23:55               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20  0:13                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20  0:43                   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20 15:13                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20 18:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-10 22:07           ` Michael Roth
2023-11-10 22:47             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-16  5:31               ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05  0:30                 ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05  0:48                   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 20:06                     ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05 22:04                       ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 23:11                         ` Dan Williams
2023-12-06  0:43                           ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 49/50] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 50/50] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth

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