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From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"kas@kernel.org" <kas@kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Verma, Vishal L" <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"tglx@kernel.org" <tglx@kernel.org>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 22:40:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d783c07ce3d6bf7477eaee3b892a3f007bd291e6.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260323-fuller_tdx_kexec_support-v2-3-87a36409e051@intel.com>

On Mon, 2026-03-23 at 14:59 -0600, Vishal Verma wrote:
> Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum where a partial write
> to TDX private memory can cause a machine check on a subsequent read.
> On these platforms, kexec and kdump have been disabled in these cases,
> because the old kernel cannot safely hand off TDX state to the new
> kernel. Later TDX modules support the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which
> provides a way to cleanly disable TDX and allow kexec to proceed.
> 
> The new SEAMCALL has an enumeration bit, but that is ignored. It is
> expected that users will be using the latest TDX module, and the failure
> mode for running the missing SEAMCALL on an older module is not fatal.
> 
> This can be a long running operation, and the time needed largely
> depends on the amount of memory that has been allocated to TDs. If all
> TDs have been destroyed prior to the sys_disable call, then it is fast,
> with only needing to override the TDX module memory.
> 
> After the SEAMCALL completes, the TDX module is disabled and all memory
> resources allocated to TDX are freed and reset. The next kernel can then
> re-initialize the TDX module from scratch via the normal TDX bring-up
> sequence.
> 
> The SEAMCALL can return two different error codes that expect a retry.
>  - TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE can be returned in the case of a host
>    interrupt. However, it will not return until it makes some forward
>    progress, so we can expect to complete even in the case of interrupt
>    storms.
>  - TDX_SYS_BUSY will be returned on contention with other TDH.SYS.*
>    SEAMCALLs, however a side effect of TDH.SYS.DISABLE is that it will
>    block other SEAMCALLs once it gets going. So this contention will be
>    short lived.
> 
> So loop infinitely on either of these error codes, until success or other
> error.
> 
> Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
> 

Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-23 22:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-23 20:59 [PATCH v2 0/5] Fuller TDX kexec support Vishal Verma
2026-03-23 20:59 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h> Vishal Verma
2026-03-24  9:49   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-23 20:59 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86 Vishal Verma
2026-03-24 10:03   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-23 20:59 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE Vishal Verma
2026-03-23 21:54   ` Verma, Vishal L
2026-03-23 22:40   ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2026-03-24 10:18   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-23 20:59 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump Vishal Verma
2026-03-23 22:41   ` Huang, Kai
2026-03-23 20:59 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/virt/tdx: Remove kexec docs Vishal Verma
2026-03-23 22:41   ` Huang, Kai

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