* [PATCH v4] x86/sev: Fix making shared pages private during kdump
@ 2025-05-02 21:21 Ashish Kalra
2025-05-04 9:21 ` Ingo Molnar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Ashish Kalra @ 2025-05-02 21:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx, mingo, dave.hansen, x86, bp, thomas.lendacky, hpa
Cc: michael.roth, nikunj, seanjc, ardb, stable, linux-kernel, kexec,
linux-coco
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
When the shared pages are being made private during kdump preparation
there are additional checks to handle shared GHCB pages.
These additional checks include handling the case of GHCB page being
contained within a huge page.
The check for handling the case of GHCB contained within a huge
page incorrectly skips a page just below the GHCB page from being
transitioned back to private during kdump preparation.
This skipped page causes a 0x404 #VC exception when it is accessed
later while dumping guest memory during vmcore generation via kdump.
Correct the range to be checked for GHCB contained in a huge page.
Also ensure that the skipped huge page containing the GHCB page is
transitioned back to private by applying the correct address mask
later when changing GHCBs to private at end of kdump preparation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3074152e56c9 ("x86/sev: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec")
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index d35fec7b164a..97e5d475b9f5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1019,7 +1019,8 @@ static void unshare_all_memory(void)
data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
ghcb = (unsigned long)&data->ghcb_page;
- if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb <= addr + size) {
+ /* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
+ if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb < addr + size) {
skipped_addr = true;
break;
}
@@ -1131,9 +1132,8 @@ static void shutdown_all_aps(void)
void snp_kexec_finish(void)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ unsigned long size, mask, ghcb;
unsigned int level, cpu;
- unsigned long size;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
pte_t *pte;
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
@@ -1157,11 +1157,14 @@ void snp_kexec_finish(void)
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
- pte = lookup_address((unsigned long)ghcb, &level);
+ ghcb = (unsigned long)&data->ghcb_page;
+ pte = lookup_address(ghcb, &level);
size = page_level_size(level);
+ mask = page_level_mask(level);
+ /* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
+ ghcb &= mask;
set_pte_enc(pte, level, (void *)ghcb);
- snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)ghcb, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
+ snp_set_memory_private(ghcb, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
}
}
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] x86/sev: Fix making shared pages private during kdump
2025-05-02 21:21 [PATCH v4] x86/sev: Fix making shared pages private during kdump Ashish Kalra
@ 2025-05-04 9:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-05 21:49 ` Kalra, Ashish
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2025-05-04 9:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ashish Kalra
Cc: tglx, mingo, dave.hansen, x86, bp, thomas.lendacky, hpa,
michael.roth, nikunj, seanjc, ardb, stable, linux-kernel, kexec,
linux-coco
* Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
> - if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb <= addr + size) {
> + /* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
> + if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb < addr + size) {
> skipped_addr = true;
> break;
> }
> @@ -1131,9 +1132,8 @@ static void shutdown_all_aps(void)
> void snp_kexec_finish(void)
> {
> struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
> + unsigned long size, mask, ghcb;
> unsigned int level, cpu;
> - unsigned long size;
> - struct ghcb *ghcb;
So this patch just morphs the type of 'ghcb' from a typed pointer to
unsigned long, while most 'ghcb' uses in coco/ are typed pointers?
That's just sloppy and fragile. Please just keep 'ghcb' a typed
pointer, and introduce *another* variable for the virtual address to
the hugepage.
> pte_t *pte;
>
> if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
> @@ -1157,11 +1157,14 @@ void snp_kexec_finish(void)
>
> for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
> - ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
> - pte = lookup_address((unsigned long)ghcb, &level);
> + ghcb = (unsigned long)&data->ghcb_page;
If 'ghcb' has the proper type then this ugly forced type-cast goes
away.
> + pte = lookup_address(ghcb, &level);
> size = page_level_size(level);
> + mask = page_level_mask(level);
> + /* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
> + ghcb &= mask;
This too calls for using a separate variable for this, because after
this masking 'ghcb' is very much *not* the location of a GHCB page
anymore...
> set_pte_enc(pte, level, (void *)ghcb);
> - snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)ghcb, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
> + snp_set_memory_private(ghcb, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
Do we know whether this is safe? Could the huge page around the GHCB
page contain anything else? What is the structure of this memory area,
is it all dedicated to the GHCB, or could it contain random other data?
Thanks,
Ingo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] x86/sev: Fix making shared pages private during kdump
2025-05-04 9:21 ` Ingo Molnar
@ 2025-05-05 21:49 ` Kalra, Ashish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kalra, Ashish @ 2025-05-05 21:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ingo Molnar
Cc: tglx, mingo, dave.hansen, x86, bp, thomas.lendacky, hpa,
michael.roth, nikunj, seanjc, ardb, stable, linux-kernel, kexec,
linux-coco
On 5/4/2025 4:21 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> - if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb <= addr + size) {
>> + /* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
>> + if (addr <= ghcb && ghcb < addr + size) {
>> skipped_addr = true;
>> break;
>> }
>> @@ -1131,9 +1132,8 @@ static void shutdown_all_aps(void)
>> void snp_kexec_finish(void)
>> {
>> struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
>> + unsigned long size, mask, ghcb;
>> unsigned int level, cpu;
>> - unsigned long size;
>> - struct ghcb *ghcb;
>
> So this patch just morphs the type of 'ghcb' from a typed pointer to
> unsigned long, while most 'ghcb' uses in coco/ are typed pointers?
>
> That's just sloppy and fragile. Please just keep 'ghcb' a typed
> pointer, and introduce *another* variable for the virtual address to
> the hugepage.
>
>> pte_t *pte;
>>
>> if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
>> @@ -1157,11 +1157,14 @@ void snp_kexec_finish(void)
>>
>> for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
>> data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
>> - ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
>> - pte = lookup_address((unsigned long)ghcb, &level);
>> + ghcb = (unsigned long)&data->ghcb_page;
>
> If 'ghcb' has the proper type then this ugly forced type-cast goes
> away.
>
>> + pte = lookup_address(ghcb, &level);
>> size = page_level_size(level);
>> + mask = page_level_mask(level);
>> + /* Handle the case of a huge page containing the GHCB page */
>> + ghcb &= mask;
>
> This too calls for using a separate variable for this, because after
> this masking 'ghcb' is very much *not* the location of a GHCB page
> anymore...
>
Sure, i will use a separate variable for this and keep ghcb as a typed pointer.
>> set_pte_enc(pte, level, (void *)ghcb);
>> - snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)ghcb, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
>> + snp_set_memory_private(ghcb, (size / PAGE_SIZE));
>
> Do we know whether this is safe? Could the huge page around the GHCB
> page contain anything else? What is the structure of this memory area,
> is it all dedicated to the GHCB, or could it contain random other data?
>
There will be an issue if the huge page containing the GHCB
has both private and shared memory contents in it.
When we skip a huge page containing the ghcb in unshare_all_memory()
then that huge page should have been containing all shared memory,
because if it had other private memory contents then there would be a
mismatch between NPT entry and RMP entry (as RMP would have 4K sub-entries
for private and shared mappings and then there would have been size type
mismatch between NPT and RMP tables) causing an RMP fault and then correspondingly
NPT would have been smashed/split into 4K private and shared mappings.
So at end of snp_kexec_finish(), when will be revisiting this huge page
again which contains the ghcb, it should be containing other shared memory
along with the ghcb as this whole range was skipped earlier and now
we should be able to convert this huge page back to private.
Thanks,
Ashish
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2025-05-02 21:21 [PATCH v4] x86/sev: Fix making shared pages private during kdump Ashish Kalra
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