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From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
	David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>, <stable@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: SEV: IBPB-on-Entry guest support
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2026 18:38:29 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e7acf7ed-103b-46aa-a1f6-35bb6292d30f@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260128192312.GQaXpiIL4YFmQB2LKL@fat_crate.local>

Hi Boris,

On 1/28/26 1:23 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 04:42:04PM -0600, Kim Phillips wrote:
>> The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side
>> implementation. The feature was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first
>> SNP Zen implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the
>> initial set of SNP features were added to the kernel.
>>
>> In its abundant precaution, commit 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP
>> guest feature negotiation support") included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry
>> bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking guests from using the feature.
>>
>> Unmask the bit, to allow guests to take advantage of the feature on
>> hypervisor kernel versions that support it: Amend the SEV_STATUS MSR
>> SNP_RESERVED_MASK to exclude bit 23 (IbpbOnEntry).
> Do not explain what the patch does.

For that last paragraph, how about:

"Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the
hypervisor, as the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to
expose."

?

>> Fixes: 8c29f0165405 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
>> Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> CC: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
>> CC: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>> Cc: stable@kernel.org
> I guess...

Hopefully a bitfield will be carved out for these
no-explicit-guest-implementation-required bits by hardware such that we
won't need to do this again.

>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> index 4d3566bb1a93..9016a6b00bc7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> @@ -735,7 +735,10 @@
>>   #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SMT_PROT_BIT)
>>   #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT	18
>>   #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC_BIT)
>> -#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT		19
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BITS19_22 GENMASK_ULL(22, 19)
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT	23
>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SNP_IBPB_ON_ENTRY_BIT)
> Why isn't this part of SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT?
>
> If this feature doesn't require guest-side support, then it is trivially
> present, no?

SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is for the non-trivial variety: Its bits get set as
part of the patchseries that add the explicit guest support *code*.

I believe 'features' like PREVENT_HOST_IBS are similar in this regard.

>> +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT		24
>>   #define MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK	GENMASK_ULL(63, MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESV_BIT)
>>   #define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_CONTROL		0xc0010138
>>   #define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_EN_BIT		0
>> -- 
> I guess this is a fix of sorts and I could take it in now once all review
> comments have been addressed...

Cool, thanks.

Kim

  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-29  0:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-26 22:42 [PATCH 0/2] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-01-26 22:42 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: SEV: IBPB-on-Entry guest support Kim Phillips
2026-01-27  6:19   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-01-28 19:02   ` Tom Lendacky
2026-01-28 19:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-29  0:38     ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-01-29 10:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-29 22:32         ` Kim Phillips
2026-01-30 12:32           ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 14:56             ` Tom Lendacky
2026-01-30 15:45               ` Borislav Petkov
2026-02-02 15:38                 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-02-02 15:49                   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-02-02 16:09                     ` Tom Lendacky
2026-02-02 17:12                       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-26 22:42 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-01-27  6:38   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-01-27 20:56     ` Kim Phillips
2026-01-28 19:08   ` Tom Lendacky

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