From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, aik@amd.com,
yilun.xu@linux.intel.com, bhelgaas@google.com,
alistair23@gmail.com, lukas@wunner.de, jgg@nvidia.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/19] x86, swiotlb: Teach swiotlb to skip "accepted" devices
Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2026 14:37:56 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5ah5qx9t77.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260303000207.1836586-11-dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> writes:
> There are two mechanisms to force SWIOTLB operation, the kernel command
> line option and the internal SWIOTLB_FORCE flag. With the arrival of
> "accepted" devices, devices that have been enabled to DMA to private
> encrypted memory, the SWIOTLB_FORCE flag is an awkward fit. It may be the
> case that SWIOTLB operation wants to be forced regardless of the device
> acceptance state.
>
> Introduce a new SWIOTLB_UNACCPTED flag that allows for both augmenting the
> result of is_swiotlb_force_bounce() dynamically and allowing for an "always
> SWIOTLB" override.
>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
> include/linux/swiotlb.h | 15 ++++++++++++---
> arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c | 2 +-
> kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> index 3dae0f592063..0efb9b8e5dd0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> +++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ struct scatterlist;
> #define SWIOTLB_VERBOSE (1 << 0) /* verbose initialization */
> #define SWIOTLB_FORCE (1 << 1) /* force bounce buffering */
> #define SWIOTLB_ANY (1 << 2) /* allow any memory for the buffer */
> +#define SWIOTLB_UNACCEPTED (1 << 3) /* swiotlb for unaccepted devices */
>
> /*
> * Maximum allowable number of contiguous slabs to map,
> @@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ struct io_tlb_pool {
> * @nslabs: Total number of IO TLB slabs in all pools.
> * @debugfs: The dentry to debugfs.
> * @force_bounce: %true if swiotlb bouncing is forced
> + * @bounce_unaccepted: %true if unaccepted devices must bounce
> * @for_alloc: %true if the pool is used for memory allocation
> * @can_grow: %true if more pools can be allocated dynamically.
> * @phys_limit: Maximum allowed physical address.
> @@ -109,8 +111,9 @@ struct io_tlb_mem {
> struct io_tlb_pool defpool;
> unsigned long nslabs;
> struct dentry *debugfs;
> - bool force_bounce;
> - bool for_alloc;
> + u8 force_bounce:1;
> + u8 bounce_unaccepted:1;
> + u8 for_alloc:1;
> #ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB_DYNAMIC
> bool can_grow;
> u64 phys_limit;
> @@ -173,7 +176,13 @@ static inline bool is_swiotlb_force_bounce(struct device *dev)
> {
> struct io_tlb_mem *mem = dev->dma_io_tlb_mem;
>
> - return mem && mem->force_bounce;
> + if (!mem)
> + return false;
> + if (mem->force_bounce)
> + return true;
> + if (mem->bounce_unaccepted && !device_cc_accepted(dev))
> + return true;
> + return false;
> }
>
> void swiotlb_init(bool addressing_limited, unsigned int flags);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
> index 6267363e0189..8a737f501ae5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
> @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static void __init pci_swiotlb_detect(void)
> */
> if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> x86_swiotlb_enable = true;
> - x86_swiotlb_flags |= SWIOTLB_FORCE;
> + x86_swiotlb_flags |= SWIOTLB_UNACCEPTED;
> }
> }
> #else
> diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> index a547c7693135..57e9647939fe 100644
> --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> @@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ void __init swiotlb_init_remap(bool addressing_limit, unsigned int flags,
>
> io_tlb_default_mem.force_bounce =
> swiotlb_force_bounce || (flags & SWIOTLB_FORCE);
> + io_tlb_default_mem.bounce_unaccepted = flags & SWIOTLB_UNACCEPTED;
>
This should be.
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ void __init swiotlb_init_remap(bool addressing_limit, unsigned int flags,
io_tlb_default_mem.force_bounce =
swiotlb_force_bounce || (flags & SWIOTLB_FORCE);
- io_tlb_default_mem.bounce_unaccepted = flags & SWIOTLB_UNACCEPTED;
+ io_tlb_default_mem.bounce_unaccepted = !!(flags & SWIOTLB_UNACCEPTED);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB_DYNAMIC
> if (!remap)
> --
> 2.52.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-03 9:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-03 0:01 [PATCH v2 00/19] PCI/TSM: TEE I/O infrastructure Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] PCI/TSM: Report active IDE streams per host bridge Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:36 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] device core: Fix kernel-doc warnings in base.h Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:39 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-12 14:45 ` Greg KH
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] device core: Introduce confidential device acceptance Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:42 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-12 14:44 ` Greg KH
2026-03-13 4:11 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-13 12:18 ` Greg KH
2026-03-13 18:53 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-13 19:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-13 13:32 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-13 19:56 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-13 20:24 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-14 1:32 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-23 18:14 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-24 2:18 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-24 12:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-25 4:13 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-25 11:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-26 1:27 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-26 12:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-26 15:00 ` Greg KH
2026-03-26 18:31 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-26 19:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] modules: Document the global async_probe parameter Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] device core: Autoprobe considered harmful? Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:58 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] PCI/TSM: Add Device Security (TVM Guest) LOCK operation support Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] PCI/TSM: Add Device Security (TVM Guest) ACCEPT " Dan Williams
2026-03-03 7:15 ` Baolu Lu
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] PCI/TSM: Add "evidence" support Dan Williams
2026-03-03 3:14 ` kernel test robot
2026-03-03 10:16 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-03 16:38 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-13 10:07 ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-13 18:06 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-14 18:12 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-17 1:45 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-19 0:00 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-20 2:50 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-17 18:14 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-18 7:56 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-23 18:18 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-14 18:37 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-16 20:13 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-16 23:02 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-17 14:13 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-18 7:22 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-17 18:24 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-18 7:41 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] PCI/TSM: Support creating encrypted MMIO descriptors via TDISP Report Dan Williams
2026-03-04 17:14 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-13 9:57 ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-05 4:46 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-13 10:23 ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-13 13:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-17 5:13 ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-24 3:26 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-24 12:38 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-16 5:19 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-23 18:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-26 23:38 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-27 11:49 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] x86, swiotlb: Teach swiotlb to skip "accepted" devices Dan Williams
2026-03-03 9:07 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2026-03-13 10:26 ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-03 0:01 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] x86, dma: Allow accepted devices to map private memory Dan Williams
2026-03-03 7:36 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] x86, ioremap, resource: Support IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED for encrypted PCI MMIO Dan Williams
2026-03-19 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] samples/devsec: Introduce a PCI device-security bus + endpoint sample Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] samples/devsec: Add sample IDE establishment Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] samples/devsec: Add sample TSM bind and guest_request flows Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] samples/devsec: Introduce a "Device Security TSM" sample driver Dan Williams
2026-03-27 8:44 ` Lai, Yi
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] tools/testing/devsec: Add a script to exercise samples/devsec/ Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] samples/devsec: Add evidence support Dan Williams
2026-03-03 0:02 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] tools/testing/devsec: Add basic evidence retrieval validation Dan Williams
2026-03-03 9:23 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] PCI/TSM: TEE I/O infrastructure Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-03 22:01 ` dan.j.williams
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