From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793419781; b=NKgd0bhk/QgiLS4GS/jB7zkkWR2tAks3Vc13r6bqvPHDmt2CjbiE2Cl9O/Zc+bvwwBpe bQq7Pc3bZePQmkpiugnPZUwk1JIKnY5kTZouC4A9g0CNgL2t2f8SUPvaogVzHl1mp2k6D 4Bi4fGlxvX+i7wX93p6/eFD4Tx371QE5pEVbcANFl6nSbIXUZ+PsYU1uTJugKb/tUBWhp s90iAn/FScypAkMBB8HklleumHLE3OgBRFl2XlFypfkBZF3IvcAzRHclik6xEuu5MUnW2 VGGJMcuC+Rz431aIjcUOX7u5mc/aAc1YZnsGb6LBQYdizU6YNx921Vykdl1ZJnM1Ccw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793419781; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:X-Mailer:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To: References:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; bh=aAFd1Osv5M7suApYUvHmPaqN8qPqZG2Y5RH+DfHeAcs=; b=cxjaTCwElP57Mt3ByREwyY7N4+cHEG4+wDMzX253GD2kIJHHfGScpAAjVV6euuxqLEg2 OzHEyrmVJIChPp5ODCfmKH/BbvUbA2pIQKm1kwEsc44PQ0ZxIeI4K7MLkhQbmPEy07BfP DRsFCJTBrP06ipckwdI1UBve4EZIFMCdPmkUrIHUPQTxqPm5eFoWS/01jtvGgEszWquQl KMhLSJ6/CfSDAD7LAbtbEze75B2LYVXoWD/kf4nqgW0rRd7VWUNcy2NSE9ygKtOLuP7c3 rzs3H2yT1UA0spcGREKu7KyGqiB1PDYlxD1hXx0WSVeY/K0Qd3tYv2p0+3FYKhh4eiw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=ljqG8MMC; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 05892606A31A; Sat, 31 Oct 2026 04:09:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key, unprotected) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=ljqG8MMC Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2E1FF1F0093A; Sat, 31 Oct 2026 04:09:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1793419780; bh=aAFd1Osv5M7suApYUvHmPaqN8qPqZG2Y5RH+DfHeAcs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=ljqG8MMC79nHvUXZ/IIOV+wC3qH5qMF0nxrAPXkp6HlIdVSzYCLO2+g5vdWKcmlSG GZV6m2TzgqaWQdNs3EMFAvqPJD+jf9kw04WGuUCebWy9hp+TLnCEb8dgwoS0PON/Xa SOeRCX3X1+Mj0L56vE1QpBna3sak7HstiZdURwbTwRhIhV1ORdiX8x3z9WnSmOpXRb dgh9Leag/hnWQrkBMKA8itSCZH09ldieZ9wuA3Cbip36ejE4hYx8e7s/Emuh9+7k56 pPlPi3pZvmXFVPYEh8Q/u2pGMHd+QtsYz/LzQVzspWWFN4BO5/OhrUg7UVas88liEH 3tQDLI2sPOGqw== X-Mailer: emacs 31.1 (via feedmail 11-beta-1 I) From: Aneesh Kumar K.V To: Jiri Pirko Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Kevin Tian , Alexey Kardashevskiy , Xu Yilun , Catalin Marinas , Suzuki K Poulose , Steven Price , Kiryl Shutsemau , Rick Edgecombe , Dave Hansen , Jonathan Cameron , Jason Gunthorpe , Bjorn Helgaas , Ashish Kalra , Tom Lendacky , John Allen , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , patches@lists.linux.dev Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted In-Reply-To: References: <20261028152618.1356860-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> <20261028152618.1356860-4-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2026 09:39:30 +0530 Message-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Jiri Pirko writes: > Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 04:26:10PM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote: >>Use EVIDENCE_ACCEPT to enter secure operation after userspace has >>checked the evidence. Check the referenced device and evidence >>generations before calling the driver, and record acceptance on success. >> >>Remove the separate DEVSEC_RUN command and callback. >> >>Keep DEVSEC_STATE_GET so userspace can read both evidence acceptance and >>device state. Clearing acceptance does not undo the device state change. >>For example, with the following PCI/TSM patches: > > Note that the published wip_attestation_all_1 baseline still > has DEVSEC_RUN. I am planning this merge into EVIDENCE_ACCEPT for > my next revision, which is not pushed yet. > I agree with your comments here and in the other emails regarding attestation. I will wait for the next revision of your attestation series. If you can accommodate these changes there, I can rework my patches accordingly. Could you also add the ctlv-attestation-spdm family so that I can base the PCI/TSM changes on top of it? -aneesh