From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 18BBF276049; Thu, 18 Jun 2026 08:37:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781771853; cv=none; b=LIeyk/IBtu4oqA3VzJL74bUPduqWYLeJfwAjIRgZkFq5fdSH8n32Xwm8bDWd608BF9LZ77J1dpRxAODkiCYQ5I4F2CWELDEmjXCpNdGAbCQZQcjGSIp7IXhUQUkBtY8wv1H/KmwaPBOPnZA2mp+m8oa/EXuY8j6MWqIoDpmZmm4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781771853; c=relaxed/simple; bh=2p8Tyh/UWigSfVM1Alp/U1v3F1IYe71ZRicsBMgPa0w=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date:Message-ID: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=LpvhNLDfo3FDN0+JKJjC48n5JsK6BAIfOpLcdxFq0fTicyPamqrCAZxcrA4i62ihh/3GTcfjx3YBEq6BDzWcCpJUyzO6UnCVtD6MBF0xXZZcthlpvvmV0RLQzBDj+dq9K9ad4zp50/N7eglFl/B6IRz4mgHDsMjsRcc1ZpAX42Q= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=bJYmurEU; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="bJYmurEU" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 334ED1F000E9; Thu, 18 Jun 2026 08:37:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1781771851; bh=Tjfp3FF0f+SxzpFBuG9E9B1amsn/loCXBkKBhFITWIo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=bJYmurEUTf4p9ddXp1VSCskBHjygy+xD/oNjB9s2Ep/Uu73ZeAFn3grah/ZH/26bC Z2IKNbkJrX3SQyniq2V3c43nApViK8ptRc8Gz9vZ5aBx3WYWws6jmsSQ1n8wC/ZhsC aPXbP4vBO9+s7L7Gu2B1QTaU30Q3lwF3YsxuWM4vVa7T2kphUxDrfVTBh2RPbtKviM f3h5f4VrWfNGB2xgQRFYm9r1q8fBv53E49ns83ljI6VaL3Opsq3DE6buX9d8xYbXtu r9HlAXaeEfYUQ5HKSssJFRAz7y8WVKnEyAfSl5fBP2P87RedjDBY2R+S227cOm339+ HGR07rvOMXPTg== X-Mailer: emacs 30.2 (via feedmail 11-beta-1 I) From: Aneesh Kumar K.V To: Alexey Kardashevskiy , Jason Gunthorpe , Catalin Marinas Cc: iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Robin Murphy , Marek Szyprowski , Will Deacon , Marc Zyngier , Steven Price , Suzuki K Poulose , Jiri Pirko , Mostafa Saleh , Petr Tesarik , Dan Williams , Xu Yilun , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , "Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" , Alexander Gordeev , Gerald Schaefer , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/20] dma-mapping: Use DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED through direct, pool and swiotlb paths In-Reply-To: <2ecfa1a8-6202-4319-9692-a6ffeb5a3dbf@amd.com> References: <20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> <20260609144746.GL2764304@ziepe.ca> <2ecfa1a8-6202-4319-9692-a6ffeb5a3dbf@amd.com> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 09:37:22 +0100 Message-ID: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Alexey Kardashevskiy writes: > On 10/6/26 00:47, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: >> On Tue, Jun 09, 2026 at 02:43:08PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: >>> On Thu, Jun 04, 2026 at 02:09:39PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote: >>>> This series propagates DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED through the dma-direct, >>>> dma-pool, and swiotlb paths so that encrypted and decrypted DMA buffers >>>> are handled consistently. >>>> >>>> Today, the direct DMA path mostly relies on force_dma_unencrypted() for >>>> shared/decrypted buffer handling. This series consolidates the >>>> force_dma_unencrypted() checks in the top-level functions and ensures >>>> that the remaining DMA interfaces use DMA attributes to make the correct >>>> decisions. >>> >>> Please check Sashiko's reports, it has some good points: >>> >>> https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org >>> >>> I think the main one is the swiotlb_tbl_map_single() changes which break >>> AMD SME host support. There cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) is true >>> but force_dma_unencrypted() is false. Normally you'd not end up on this >>> path but you can have swiotlb=force. >> >> IMHO that's an AMD issue, not with the design of this series.. >> >> The series is right, a device that is !force_dma_decrypted() must be >> considerd to be a trusted device and we must never place any DMA >> mappings for a trusted device into shared memory. > > > swiotlb=force forces swiotlb, not decryption. > >> That AMD has done somethine insane: >> >> bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) >> { >> /* >> * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. >> */ >> if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) >> return true; >> >> /* >> * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the >> * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the >> * encryption mask. >> */ >> if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { >> u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); >> u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, >> dev->bus_dma_limit); >> >> if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) >> return true; >> } > > > So when I try "mem_encrypt=on iommu=pt swiotlb=force" with this patchset, it fails to boot. But it boots with a hack like this: > > === > @@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) > return true; > } > > - return false; > + return swiotlb_force_bounce; > } > === > > Or we say "mem_encrypt=on iommu=pt swiotlb=force" combo is just weird and we won't be supporting which bit in this? Thanks, > Something like? modified arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, dev->bus_dma_limit); + /* + * With memory encryption enabled, SWIOTLB is marked decrypted. + * If SWIOTLB bouncing is forced, treat the device as requiring + * decrypted DMA. + */ + if (is_swiotlb_force_bounce(dev)) + return true; if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) return true; -aneesh